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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines whether worker co-operatives are able to construct institutions of 
work which improve the control and security of individuals in an otherwise insecure 
liberal capitalist environment, drawing together literature on the viability of co-
operatives, work within co-operatives and the 'developmental freedom' approach. This 
would be manifest in an increase in members' control over working life, an increase in 
economic security for individuals, and more meaningful work. The thesis extends upon 
the established theoretical foundations of  the 'developmental freedom' understanding of 
work, which values control over work and control over time, by applying it to the 
worker co-operative. The thesis engages in a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on such organisations from economic and political perspectives, and original 
qualitative empirical evidence is provided by interviews at four case study co-operatives 
from the UK. The thesis concludes firstly that co-operatives offer an experience of work 
governed by social bonds of reciprocity and solidarity; secondly that they are beneficial 
for control over time for individuals in both the short and long term; and finally such 
firms are able to survive and develop in liberal capitalist economies, in part due to the 
embedded relationships of control within them, but under strain due to the constraints of 
such a system which in turn inhibit control. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
This research aims to establish whether worker co-operatives (sometimes known, 
especially in the US, as producer co-operatives
1
, labour managed firms/LMF or worker 
managed firms/WMF
2
) can form an effective vehicle for advancing an individuals 
meaningful control over working life in liberal market economies through an empirical 
study of co-operative firms in the UK, thus generating a better experience of work.  
 
The notion of a better experience of work, explored in more depth in the first chapter of 
this thesis, is a concept which establishes the primacy of control over one's working life 
with the ultimate objective of enriching the productive experience of individuals, 
allowing them to get more out of work and to reach long-term goals in their personal 
development. This is decided by a range of factors at the systemic level, in particular the 
mode of capitalism operating in the economy, which creates institutions governing 
economic behaviour. In my thesis I raise the possibility for co-operatives to act as an 
institution within the dominant liberal capitalist model which is able to create an 
environment of different institutions governing work within itself, whilst operating 
successfully in the wider system. In so doing, it is possible that such firms will be be 
able to create a better experience of work by augmenting the existing institutions of 
control within the economy, principally those at the level of the state, with a set of 
sources of control at the firm. 
 
Work under capitalism, it can be argued, is becoming increasingly casualised as more 
people enter into work which is neither secure, fulfilling or rewarding (Standing 
2002:47). The increasing prevalence of casual and zero-hour contracts, employee 
benefits at a statutory minimum and minimal state support for the unemployed mean 
that many people are less equipped to make long-term decisions about their careers and 
establish control over their working life. It is due to the market logic of liberal 
 
1 Although on occasion the term producer co-operatives refers to a collective which is 
designed to “enable self-employed people and family business [sic] to gain the strength in 
numbers they need to to survive in the market” (Wilson & Maclean 2012:532). These are 
not the same as worker co-operatives and are not the subject of this study. 
2 See note on Vanek's LMF/WMF distinction in Jossa (2014:xx) 
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capitalism that this occurs – constraints exist as firms and workers compete for profits 
and employment respectively, and the institutional constraints created in the liberal 
capitalist system reinforce and consolidate one another. Co-operatives may act as a 
sanctuary from market logic, offering stable, long-term and fulfilling employment 
because it is the workers in the co-operative who control their working life.  
 
However, it is very possible that the same liberal market logic may pervade co-
operatives which, in the pursuit of profit and constrained by their operation in a 
competitive market, may be forced to mimic the operations of the capitalist firm. It is 
possible that the nature of co-operatives is not conducive to developmental freedom at 
all, for example due to low capitalisation or because the collective democratic control 
over the firm does not free the individual worker from authority structures.  
 
The central research puzzle is twofold. Firstly there is the question of the theoretical 
paradox in which the 'free' market constrains behaviour by forcing people to operate in 
line with market norms, raising the issue of whether or not it is possible for co-
operatives to act against this market logic. This is the broader aspect of the research 
question, but the more focused application of this is as to whether individual control can 
be enhanced in liberal market economies by the organisation of work into worker co-
operatives, or will co-operatives fail to achieve this due to the constraints of the market? 
An alternative way to ask this question would be whether, in the current British 
economy, worker control can translate into control for the individual worker. 
 
1.1 Defining Worker Co-operatives 
 
Worker co-operatives share a number of features with small businesses (generally 
referred to as “conventional firms” throughout this thesis) as well as having some 
unique features which resemble social or community enterprises or even charities. The 
definition chosen here is similar to that of Thornley (1981:3) who employs a “loose 
definition of worker's co-operative” which includes “[A]ny venture which seriously 
tried to practise co-operative principles...”. These principles vary slightly but encompass 
a set of ideals that the co-operative firm attempts to pursue, as exemplified by the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA, n.d.): 
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“Voluntary and Open Membership”: The co-operatives in the study did not force 
workers to become members (although non-member workers were rare). After a time of 
probation workers could become members. Completely open membership is not viable 
(Fletcher, 1976:183) and there are debates to be had about what worker co-operatives 
can do in order to meet this principle. It is also difficult to extend the principle to casual 
workers (such as cleaners or drivers) who might also have employment elsewhere. 
 
“Democratic Member Control”: The co-operatives were all managed through “direct 
employee participation in decision-making at all levels in the enterprise” (Thornley 
1981:4). This may exclude firms such as the John Lewis Partnership where partners' 
participation is limited and day-to-day management is not carried out democratically. 
 
“Member Economic Participation”: Although direct capital ownership by employees 
was rare at the co-operatives, all of the co-operatives survive through members work 
which in turn creates surpluses over the fixed costs of production. These surpluses are 
then managed by the members and distributed as wages, saved for the future, or 
reinvested (in effect an investment in the firm). 
 
“Autonomy and Independence”: All the co-operatives studied were independent 
businesses with no higher authority than democratic members' decisions. 
 
The ICA also discusses other co-operative principles including “education, training and 
information”, “co-operation among co-operatives” and “concern for the community”. 
These principles are less useful as definitional aspects of co-operatives and more as 
guides to their behaviour based on values of “self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality, equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members 
believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for 
others.” (ICA, n.d.). However, Thornley (1981:4) suggests other definitional principles 
as including “the principle of 'one person one vote'' alongside limited returns to capital. 
 
Perhaps the simplest version of the definition is that the co-operative is a firm in which 
the capital-labour relation is reversed – labour controls the firm and hires capital, rather 
than vice-versa. This means that the capital stock of the co-operative is “collectively 
owned” (Thornley, 1981:62) as opposed to being owned by capital and administered by 
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a manager. However, because returns to capital are generally limited to dividend 
payments or interest on loans, the motivation behind the firm is different and the profit 
motivation, beyond survival and wage payments, becomes one of many business 
concerns alongside democratic management, ethical functioning or job security 
(Thornley, 1981:63). However, it should be noted that all of the co-operatives in this 
study are for-profit enterprises which seek to generate their surpluses through a 
particular predefined means. Most co-operatives are not inherently anti-profit nor anti-
growth. Fletcher (1976:178) marks a distinction drawn by the ICA in terms of the 
distribution of benefits – the co-operative is distinct from a private or conventional 
firms in that the benefits accrue to members/labour rather than to capital. 
 
Although the 'co-operative' exists as a legal form in the UK, many co-operatives which 
fit the definition above exist as other legal forms also, including operating as private 
limited companies or other conventional business structures, or as charities in some 
cases. This creates a need for a wider definition so as to not exclude co-operatives 
which were not formed as such, or for whom there are financial or administrative 
advantages to using other legal forms. In this study, three of the four cases are registered 
as co-operatives, whilst one (Wholefoods A) is a limited company undergoing transition 
to co-operative status through buying back shares from “members”. 
 
Co-operatives in the UK operate in a different way to conventional firms, and they can 
take a variety of legal forms depending on the nature of the company. They can be 
incorporated or unincorporated (Co-operatives UK 2011b). Incorporation, although 
protecting individuals from risk through limited liability, is an expensive procedure 
requiring expertise. Co-operatives can take the form of companies limited by shares or 
guarantee, as private rather than public companies. Forming as companies limited by 
guarantee has traditionally been the co-operative path but places limits of financing due 
to the lack of share capital. Alternatively, since 2001 a co-operative could be formed as 
a limited liability partnership (LLP) which would allow most of the advantages of 
forming a limited company. This has become increasingly popular for worker co-
operatives, although none of the case studies of this thesis are LLPs. Historically, ‘bona-
fide’ co-operatives could form as an industrial and provident society (IPS), which 
operate on a one-member-one-vote basis and can issue withdrawable shares although 
limited to £20,000 per investor (Co-operatives UK 2009). This has since been reviewed 
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with the share limit being raised to £50,000 and the term IPS being changed to 'Co-
operative Society'. The legal form taken by the co-operative will govern how it operates, 
who owns the assets and what happens to the assets if the co-operative is wound up, and 
how it is financed. Raising finance is an issue commonly visited in the literature 
critiquing the co-operative model. Some co-operatives also exist as charities. Each form 
offers a particular set of characteristics on reporting of finances, restrictions on 
shareholding and distribution of surplus, and different requirements for control. Various 
forms of finance for co-operatives exist in the UK and are examined in the second 
chapter. 
 
Because of the different legal forms that co-operatives can take, it is difficult to make an 
accurate measure of the number of co-operatives in the UK. Hobbs and Jefferis (1990) 
suggest that, historically at least, estimations from within the co-operative movement 
have been optimistic both in terms of the number of co-operatives and the rate of 
growth. Different measures of co-operatives include all forms of co-operative, including 
worker co-operatives but also consumer co-operatives and other membership 
organisations such a clubs. This also makes it difficult to construct statistics such as the 
average size of co-operatives or their collective or average turnover or surplus. 
Nonetheless, co-operatives by the definitions above do exist in the UK, with the largest 
employing several hundred members (e.g. Suma, n.d.) and the smallest below ten 
members (see Bakery Co-operative case study). Nolan et al. (2013:111) suggest that 
there are around “400 worker co-operatives in the UK (with 2000 members and 2000 
employees)” although this figure is approximate and unqualified. 
 
1.2 The Existing Literature 
 
There is a clear divide in the literature between economic and more political or 
sociological perspectives, with the former mostly taking the form of theoretical work 
and the latter taking the form of empirical study, although exceptions to this tendency 
exist (e.g. Bonin et al. 1993 as an empirical study based on economic principles; Dahl 
1985 as a largely theoretical approach from a political perspective). The economic 
literature tends towards competing theories either in favour of the co-operative firm 
(e.g. Bowles & Gintis 1993) on efficiency or fairness grounds, or against it, usually on 
grounds of the management of finance (e.g. Miller 1981). Much of these hypotheses are 
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based on assumptions about the behaviour of individuals in the firm and it should be 
noted that these models will be heavily context-dependent. This study engages with the 
economic literature but finds many of the predictions of the economic models are not 
borne out by empirical study and seem to miss the sociological and political aspects of 
co-operation.  
 
Most empirical study of co-operatives to date has been centred on their operations as 
businesses and the experiences of work within them (see for example Welford 1990, on 
company structures, motivation and democracy; Cornforth et al. 1988, on business 
development in co-operatives and successful co-operatives; Russell 1985, on different 
forms of worker ownership; Dow 2003, and Elster 1989, on the rarity of workers 
control; Miller 1981 on comparative investment levels in co-operatives and capitalist 
firms). Although there have been a number of studies of co-operatives, the focus has 
tended to be on the firm rather than on the impact on the workers' self-development. 
Theoretical work (for example Bowles & Gintis 1987; Dow 2003; Archer 1995; Dahl 
1985 among many others) has often sustained a heavy focus on democracy and justice 
as intrinsic goods without a focus on their instrumental value in providing for self-
development. Empirical research on the effects of co-operative work in terms of 
security and control for the individual is lacking. Although there are theoretical 
perspectives on co-operatives from a range of perspectives on work, consideration of 
individual control in terms of Haagh's (2011b, 2012) analysis of dynamic and static 
control is, due to the originality of these ideas, not present in the co-operative literature. 
 
This thesis applies Haagh's (2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) concepts of control and freedom 
to the firm level alongside the pre-established systemic level, and enhancing the 
literature on co-operatives with empirical research into their long-term effects on 
working life. This requires a blending of three sets of literature – the economic 
perspectives on firm behaviour and the viability and sustainability of co-operative firms, 
the political and sociological literature on work in co-operatives, including observations 
from previous empirical study, and literature on the nature of work and how control 
over working life is governed by institutions. 
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1.3 Synopsis of Chapters 
 
This introduction forms the first chapter. The second chapter introduces some of the 
normative concepts used in this thesis. It explains the ideas of the quality of work 
through analysis of Marxist conceptions of alienation, the labour process literature and 
Pagano's (1990) and Macpherson's (1973) analyses of work and institutions, finding that 
there is a sound normative argument for the institutions of capitalism creating a poor 
environment for work. An approach to transforming work is then suggested in terms of 
Haagh's (2011b, 2012) concepts of static, dynamic and constant control and these are 
considered in terms of the institutions which can act as sources of control.  
 
The third chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on co-operatives, 
making the normative case for their existence in terms of workers control, but also 
examining theoretical perspectives on their failings with particular reference to the 
degeneration of co-operatives into capitalist firms. It also explores an institutional 
analysis, which is largely advanced through Pagano's (1990) approach to property rights 
within the firm, with a focus on the systemic institutionalist approach (Haagh 2011b) 
which demonstrates the role of a wide set of institutions governing behaviour across an 
economy. The potential problems of institutional change are also considered, with the 
complementary nature of institutions raised in Hall and Soskice (2001) as well as 
Pagano (1990) bringing into question the possibility of operating a different set of 
institutions in a potentially hostile environment. This literature review helps to form the 
theoretical foundation and starting points of the qualitative inquiry described in Chapter 
5. 
 
The fourth chapter examines studies of co-operatives in the UK, Argentina, Spain and 
the US. It details sets of literature focusing on specific areas of co-operative research, 
examining co-operatives in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s; rescue co-operatives, both 
in the UK in the 1970s and more recently in Argentina in the form of occupied 
factories; co-operatives in the US, including plywood co-operatives; large wholefoods 
co-operatives including Suma, one of the largest worker co-operatives in the UK; and 
the Mondragón Federation in Spain. The chapter summarises their key findings in 
regard to both the viability of co-operatives as businesses, and the experience of work 
within the co-operative in order to illuminate the methodology of the next chapter.  
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The fifth chapter describes the research methodology used in this study The empirical 
research is focused on qualitative research in co-operatives across the UK in order to 
investigate how the co-operative mode of organisation has, or has not, created 
institutions which are sources of control, and the barriers faced by co-operatives in so 
doing. The multiple case study design is both described and justified with reference to 
the overall model of research, the sampling and interview techniques used, and ethical 
considerations. 
 
There then follow four chapters which presents the empirical findings of case study 
visits, discussing the outcomes of interviews in a narrative form which seeks to describe 
each case study in depth. They also summarise the data collected and seek to highlight 
points of particular interest at each co-operative in order to locate them in relation to 
one another for analysis. These results are then analysed in Chapter 9 in terms of the 
concepts of static and dynamic control in order to begin to answer the central research 
questions and puzzles given above.  
 
Four case studies are examined in this research, all of which are worker co-operatives in 
the UK. The first, Wholefoods A, is a successful wholefoods wholesaler and retailer, 
which at the time of the research was converting its legal form from a private limited 
company to a 'bona-fide' co-operative. It demonstrates some of the challenges of 
running a medium-sized co-operative but also exemplifies many of the values of 
solidarity and fellowship which seem to define co-operative working relationships. The 
second case study is the Printing Co-operative, which was set up in the 1970s to serve 
the co-operative and alternative community as a printer, as well as being a successful 
high-quality commercial printer in its own right. It has undergone a series of transitions 
over its long life and demonstrates some of the problems faced by co-operatives in a 
declining sector, highlighting some of the structural tendencies of co-operatives facing 
crisis and demonstrating the resilience of the co-operative form. The third co-operative, 
the Bakery Co-operative, is a very recently formed company which produces very high 
quality artisan bread. It is currently undergoing a process of accumulation where wages 
are kept low in order to keep the company afloat and generate surpluses to be invested 
for the future. It is expanding and has been able to take on additional members from 
outside its founding circles, and demonstrates the problems faced by start-up co-
operatives, especially in the aftermath of recession. The final case study, Wholefoods B, 
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is a very large wholefoods co-operative which, like Wholefoods A, has both retail and 
wholesale departments, as well as being an importer of wholefoods. At between 80 and 
120 members, it demonstrates some of the problems faced by radical co-operatives as 
they grow, including issues of management and working practices. It is, however, a 
successful enterprise which has been able to fund itself through accumulated surpluses. 
 
Finally, the thesis concludes by directly addressing the key research questions using the 
discussion of the preceding chapter. Conclusions are drawn of the possibility of the 
worker co-operative acting as a viable means of advancing individual control in work, 
the usefulness of such an idea and the scope for further research into the issues. The 
primary conclusion is that the worker co-operative can act as a source of security in the 
liberal system due to the institutions within, on three interrelated levels: firstly, through 
control over work in the short term allowing for members to pursue work in which they 
find value; secondly, through allowing flexibility over time allowing for more control 
over how members are able to manage their working life; and thirdly, because co-
operatives can offer stable employment, even in a system where they are an exception, 
rather than a norm. These conclusions are qualified by other findings: that the co-
operative, especially early in its life-cycle, may require significant sacrifices from its 
members in the short to medium term if its potential is to be realised; and that to some 
extent these advantages in the UK system come from the fact that co-operatives operate 
differently from the rest of the economy producing a culture of co-operation which 
allows for a solidaristic approach to work. The thesis draws to a close by evaluating the 
research and suggesting avenues of further research. 
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2 
Work and Control 
 
This chapter examines alternative perspectives on work, drawing on sources both from 
the labour process and institutional political economy literature. It argues for a shift 
away from the neoclassical conception of work as a materialist endeavour with a 
compensatory objective of working to finance individual consumption (Spencer 2009), 
and suggests work as an arena for personal development and the engagement of human 
capacities. The work of Haagh (2011a, 2011b, 2012) highlights control over time 
through the freedom to make long-term strategic decisions regarding personal 
development as an important element of welfare and freedom. This “occupational 
model” allows us to “observe how institutional sources of security furnish a sense of 
stability and personal control” (Haagh 2011a:450). On the other hand the labour process 
literature, with its genesis in Marxist accounts of work, highlights the potentially 
alienating and dissatisfying elements of work under capitalism (Braverman 1975, 
Burawoy 1985, Thomson 1989). Following Haagh's (2011b, 2012) analysis, the key 
aspect here is control over time, and it is this control in a range of time-frames which 
allows for fulfilling work and the potential for personal development through work.  
 
I suggest that the worker co-operative represents a set of institutions which are in 
principle ideally situated to deliver this better version of work. These institutions 
include the common ownership of property, consensus-based decision making, norms of 
non-hierarchy, and norms around the purpose of the firm, which in co-operatives is seen 
as of social value as well as being a source of profit. The institutional analyses of 
Pagano (1991) and Haagh (2012) demonstrate the importance of property rights of 
individuals: for Pagano (1991) through the institutional effects of division of labour, and 
for Haagh (2012) through the 'property rights in stability' offered by social democratic 
'horizontal capitalism' which allow for planning and control.  
 
It is important to build a framework of what we are trying achieve in seeing working 
life as an institution for personal development. Neoclassical perspectives on work have 
often emphasised a division between work and leisure and have underestimated the 
value of work as an institution for freedom and development (Haagh 2011a:450, 
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2011b:44). I aim to integrate various alternative perspectives on work in order to 
develop criteria for satisfying and emancipated work in which the opportunity for more 
self-development and free choice can be realised in the workplace. Work makes up the 
majority of most people’s lives, and to view it as a source of mere income for 
subsistence and pleasure outside of work is to miss an opportunity for self-development 
and meaningful engagement of human capacities. Work has both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations, and realising the former is crucial to promoting well-being in work. Work, 
argues Haagh (2007:132), is central to life due to its: 
 
intimate association with our creative capacities, and its core function in shaping 
both monetary and non-monetary economic rewards...renders its structure 
central to other domains of life, and hence to our ability to exercise autonomy in 
each and all of these 
 
This chapter beings by looking at critiques in work based on conventional capitalist 
property and employment relations, drawing significantly on Marxist critique and the 
labour process literature. The chapter argues that work under capitalism has elements 
which are inherently alienating and that there is a tendency towards deskilling and 
mechanisation of work which reduces the ability of the individual to value the working 
experience as more than just a means to leisure. The chapter then introduces a different 
way of examining work through the developmental freedom approach of Haagh (2007, 
2011a, 2011b, 2012) whereby work is seen as a multifaceted element of human life in 
both the formal and informal, paid and unpaid spheres, and that working life can be seen 
as an experience shaped by institutions of individual control over time. The individual 
can, with the aid of institutions providing security, be made freer to shape their own 
working life through control over the type of work they perform and how it is 
performed allowing them to see work as a good in itself rather than as a means to 
leisure, and that the more control they have over time the freer they are to balance 
formal, paid work with informal and unpaid work. However, individuals are rarely, if 
ever, in a position to realise this “developmental freedom” (Haagh 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 
2012) alone, and require various “sources of security” (Haagh 2011a:450) at the 
systemic level (Haagh 2011a, 2011b). It is these institutions, such as basic income and 
social democracy (Haagh 2011b, 2012) and employment security, education and income 
support (Haagh 2011a:450) which allow the individual to exercise control over working 
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life. This thesis argues that the co-operative may be in a position to act as source of 
security in itself by changing the rights individuals have over their jobs. In debating the 
merits of basic income, Haagh (2011b:50) argues that “in this [Walrasian] market, 
individuals may be free to leave, but not necessarily to stay in, jobs”. If employment 
and income stability is, among others, a source of security, then the co-operative, by 
changing property rights at the level of the firm, may provide institutional support for 
the individual to exercise control. 
 
2.1 Work in Capitalism 
 
There is some agreement in both the classical and Marxist perspectives on the impact of 
work upon the individual. Both Smith (1976:302-304) and Marx (1975:274) discussed 
the effects of rigid routine in the workplace and the effects it may have on the worker. 
The mindless repetition of simple tasks, for Smith, degraded the capacities of the 
individual; for Marx, the sale of labour to the capitalist leads to a dissociation of the 
producer from the product.  
 
Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1976:302-303) whilst writing on the role of the state in 
providing education notes that industrial work generally forces the individual towards 
performing a small number of tasks repeatedly. In so doing, there was no capacity for 
creation or innovation and the work becomes increasingly monotonous and mindless. 
Smith (1976:303-304) contrasts this with non-industrialised societies in which each 
individual performs a range of tasks and is constantly learning and experimenting with 
how to perform them more adeptly and efficiently, thus constantly engaging their 
creative and intellectual capacities. Smith does, however, identify that the division of 
labour also allows for innovation and creativity - famously, he advocates division of 
labour in part due to the learning-by-doing gains of performing a particular task 
repeatedly which lead to gains in efficiency through innovations in the method of 
working and invention of new tools. Sennett (1998) discusses Smith’s perspective and 
links it to control over work time, noting that “at a certain point, routine becomes self-
destructive, because human beings lose control over their own efforts; lack of control 
over work time means people go dead mentally” (1998:37). This identifies the tension 
between economic efficiency and the human dimensions of work.  
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In Estranged Labour (1975), Marx writes of the problems created by the separation of 
the worker from the product of labour – that the product becomes independent of the 
producer and, in so doing, labour becomes objectified and materialised in the product 
itself. Labour is therefore a commodity, an input no different from a machine or raw 
material. Work becomes a means to satisfy external needs through payment, not through 
voluntary choice. In Marx's (1975) terms, it becomes forced labour since the worker: 
 
  does not develop freely his physical and spiritual energy but mortifies his body 
and ruins his mind. The worker...only feels himself outside his work, and in his 
work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when 
he is working he does not feel at home. His labor [sic] is therefore not voluntary, 
but coerced; it is forced labor...the worker's activity...belongs to another; it is the 
loss of his self. (Marx 1975:274) 
 
What Marx writes demonstrates the extractive nature of the capitalist working 
relationship. As the worker does not own the product of their labour and works for the 
benefit of an employer, the control that they have over the means to live their own lives 
as they see fit is degraded. The human creative capacities of the individual are turned 
against them as they produce for the benefit of another. This demonstrates that the 
problem extends beyond the simple material extraction of labour power from the worker 
– if the wages were increased and the profit of labour went to the worker, this would 
simply amount to “better payment for the slave” (Marx, 1975:280) and would not 
emancipate the worker. The worker benefits from neither the process of work nor from 
the product as both are extracted from the worker by the capitalist (Novack, 1959: 
online). As a result, people develop an aversion to work rather than a willingness to 
participate in it. The division of work and leisure exists only because people are 
alienated from their work and wish to escape it – in Marx's (1975:274) words the idea of 
undertaking labour without coercion is “shunned like the plague”. It could be argued 
that all work is, to some degree, forced if it is necessary for income required to live, but 
this would detract from the idea that work is in itself a source of satisfaction and value 
for individuals through the exercising of creative capacities and the perceived value 
added to society.  
 
Marx also has much to contribute to the discussion of the value of work for the 
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expansion of human capacities. For Marx, work represents the very basis of human 
social existence and differs from mere labour present in animals due to the engagement 
of the creative and human faculties of the mind. People work to exercise and develop 
their capabilities as well as for material gain (Spencer 2009:60). This is quite clearly 
seen in the 'work' undertaken voluntarily such as hobbies and interests pursued not for 
their material gain but for the enjoyment they provide even though others may be paid 
to perform them as labour – gardening and computer programming being two examples. 
Work is central to the identity and individuality of each human. Alienation therefore 
comes from two sources – non-ownership of the means of production and the separation 
of the skill of the productive process from the worker (Thomson 1989:42-43, Marx 
1975) 
 
Macpherson (1973) constructs the idea of developmental liberty in his defence of 
positive freedom against the laissez-faire negative freedom approaches of Berlin. 
Macpherson argues that there is a relationship between freedom and power, specifically 
the power to decide how to deploy and develop one's own human capacities. In terms of 
labour, he conceptualises two forms of power. Firstly, he sees extractive power, the 
power to expropriate the labour power of another through the renting of their services as 
a worker. He also sees developmental power – the power of the individual to decide 
how to work and how to develop themselves. This analysis takes the idea of 
developmental power far beyond work, choosing to view it as the power to undertake 
those capacities which make the individual a human, ranging from abstract concepts 
such as the ability to think for oneself and enjoy nature and life, to the “capacity for 
materially productive labour” (Macpherson 1973:54).  
 
The transfer of productive power to an employer entails a transfer of extra-productive 
powers and therefore a transfer of the power of the individual to use their abilities for 
their own pleasure and enjoyment. We could conceptualise this in part as control over 
time. In Macpherson's own words: 
 
  A man whose productive labour is out of his own control, whose work is in 
that sense mindless, may be expected to be somewhat mindless in the rest of his 
activities. He cannot even be said to retain automatically the control of whatever 
energies he has left over from his working time, if his control centre, so to 
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speak, is impaired by the use that is made of him during his working time 
(Macpherson 1973: 67) 
 
In arguing this, Macpherson is suggesting that the individual's ability to enjoy work and 
perceive a sense of value from it is degraded by the fact that he is working for another, 
having his productive capacities extracted from him, and this has an impact on how the 
individual is able to enjoy the rest of their non-working life. Macpherson therefore 
proposes that the inability of the individual to exercise their productive power is directly 
related to an inability to exercise their extra-productive power. The energy and time 
spent working in a mindless fashion during working hours have a significant impact on 
the ability of the individual to make use of their abilities during what could be 
traditionally conceived of as their leisure time. This represents a false dichotomy of time 
in the neoclassical assumptions about work – the working time and the leisure time of 
the individual are inevitably interrelated and the idea that dull or unpleasant work can be 
recompensed by material means to enjoy leisure has the effect of denying the individual 
the free use of that leisure time since they are not in a position to enjoy it. 
 
To refer back to the idea of developmental liberty, Macpherson postulates that a 
materialist position which sees human beings as “no more than consumers of utilities” is 
incorrect, and instead should be replaced by an understanding of humans as “active 
exerters and developers and enjoyers of their human capacities” (1973:51). The 
extractive relationship of capital to labour represents a diminishing of the ability of 
exercise and develop human capacities. Although employers may retain the capacity to 
exercise their own human capacities, those employed are, through the exercise of 
“mindless” labour, less able to do so in either their working or non-working hours as a 
result of their lack of access to the means of labour. The inherent exploitation of the 
worker through the wage relationship limits the possibility of personal development and 
control over one's human capacities in work, and thus limits those capabilities outside of 
work. As a result, there is a need to look at how work is controlled, and who it is who is 
responsible for the extraction of the individual's productive power. By these approaches, 
it is necessary for the individual to exercise more control over their work, both in terms 
of the firms they choose to work for and how their work within the firm is organised, if 
they are to be able to maximise the personal development available through work. In 
arguing that a work/leisure trade-off is problematic, it is required that we conceptualise 
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work as within the control of the individual and offering meaningful value to their lives 
outside of the material. The co-operative firm potentially provides this for its members 
through giving them control of the organisation of work at all levels, which in turn 
requires and provides a deeper understanding of the processes of work, as well as 
allowing them to appropriate their share of the surplus. 
 
This approach to work assumes that all 'commodified' labour is inherently mindless, and 
both Macpherson and Marx generalise hugely in identifying all wage-labour in this way. 
Edwards and Wajcman (2005:23) suggest that “studies of work have traditionally been 
concerned to describe the conditions and experience of manual labour that was the 
result of industrialization”. Whilst wage-labour does involve working 'for another', this 
does not mean that the worker does not gain skills, life experience and pleasure from it. 
It is self-evident that many workers in capitalist firms have a degree of autonomy and 
are able to progress through their careers in a manner which they deem to be successful, 
indicating that they are able to exercise control in the job market. However, the Marxist 
approach does not need to be taken in a pure or literal sense to have relevance. Although 
many people are successful in their chosen career paths, this is not a universal 
experience and many jobs exist which do still match the ‘mindless’ description, offering 
minimal satisfaction and few opportunities for learning. These jobs can be argued to be 
a product of the classical capitalist arrangement of property rights, in which jobs are 
monotonous and labour highly divided. The approach of this thesis is that the 
prevalence of such jobs acts as a barrier to realising the developmental potential of 
work, as they offer minimal opportunities for development in the workplace and the 
casual nature of employment in many of these roles makes them insecure, damaging 
long term planning. In terms of the types of control discussed below, these jobs limit 
static control, as the spaces and dimensions for control are small, whilst also giving 
minimal dynamic control due to the lack of static control and the instability of work. 
 
The labour process literature is also concerned with the changing nature of work under 
capitalism, in particular with regards to the increasing use of technology in industrial 
production. Braverman, building on Marx's analysis (Edwards & Wajcman 2005), 
argues that “machinery also has in the capitalist system the function of divesting the 
mass of the workers of their control over their own labour” (1974:193) as machines take 
skilled work away from workers, leaving them as machine operators rather than 
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craftsmen. However, he also recognises the importance of developing individual skills 
and the satisfaction gained by workers when working together to maximise productivity 
– a gain not just realised through increased pay (Burawoy 1979; as cited in Edwards & 
Wajcman 2005:25). Burawoy (1985:53) also recognises the potential of the appropriate 
use of machinery in increasing efficiency and argues that it is the division of labour and 
the distribution of tasks in the firm due to capitalist relations which lead to this 
alienation rather than machines themselves. It is also argued by Hodson (2001; as cited 
in Edwards & Wajcman 2005:31) that divided production-line labour is undignified 
since it restricts “freedom of movement, skill, and autonomy as they perform a limited 
and repetitive range of activities”. This raises the question of how the division of labour 
within the firm can be managed in order to balance the efficiency of the firm against the 
degrading effects of routine, unskilled work.  
 
The labour process literature, with its roots in industrial capitalism in the mid to late 20
th
 
century, demonstrates issues around alienation and autonomy through division of labour 
and the use of machines. However, service work also accounts for a large section of 
low-skilled work in the UK economy (although fairly recently manual work still 
accounts for 40% of total employment, according to Nolan and Wood (2003:170; as 
cited in Edwards and Wajcman 2005:31). Service work, whilst sharing some features 
with manual work including limited autonomy and a high degree of division of labour, 
also involves more emotional, psychological and mental labour (Edwards & Wajcman 
2005:33-37). In such jobs there is more scope for individual workers to choose how to 
interact with customers, but there is also a conflict in the sense that they have to “act” in 
order to put across the correct image, in a way which may not correspond with their 
personal feelings. However, to suggest this is a totally alienating experience neglects the 
fact that there is some satisfaction and pleasure for the worker when they interact and 
help customers, particularly if they build up long relationships with them and feel that 
their work matters (Edwards & Wajcman 2005). Both within and without the 
workplace, an important source of enjoyment and satisfaction is the building of social 
relationships and “the workplace...remains a central location for the realization of 
employee's personal identity, their sense of autonomy and their will to connect with 
society” (Edwards & Wajcman 2005:42-43). It is therefore key to consider how the 
structure of the workplace changes the way that work is organised and controlled, in 
particular with regards to how tasks are broken up, how labour is allocated to these 
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tasks and how much freedom there is for the individual worker to control any of these 
dimensions of organisation. 
 
Standing (1999, 2002, 2009) also suggests that labour insecurity is increasing and that 
there is less control over time in modern capitalist economies. It is suggested that this is 
predominantly the result of globalisation, and Standing argues that institutions of 
employment security have steadily been eroded, citing a decline in collective bargaining 
and regulation and a shift away from “labour contracts” to “commercial contracts” 
(2002:45) in order to create a more “flexible” workforce which expects workers to adapt 
to the needs of firms, rather than firms adapting to the needs of workers (2002:46). It is 
suggested that employment security has been replaced by flexibility for firms (Standing 
1999:174) and has become less important for policy makers whilst workers no longer 
expect it (1999:183). In terms of control over time, it is suggested that protection of 
working time has become weaker as demands for increased flexibility grow, resulting in 
organisation of work-time based on the needs of the firm, weakening control over time 
for the worker (2002:50). This is particularly important for part-time workers who are 
expected to work flexibly on the employer's terms (Standing 2009:228). The “squeeze 
on time” which is part of the “intensified labour market, work and skill insecurities” 
brought about by economic liberalisation “can be a major source of social and economic 
insecurity” (Standing 2002:67).  
 
Standing (2002:47) suggests that lower-skilled workers are increasingly marginalised in 
flexible labour markets, and that “part timers are often 'dead-ended' in jobs with little 
access to training or promotion” (Standing 1999:186). Sennett (1998), who discusses at 
length the challenges that modern, flexible working presents for personal life, notes that 
skill sets have become more general as production is increasingly computerised, with 
the main requirement for working being basic computer skills rather than a knowledge 
of the product being produced, using a case study of a bakery (Sennett 1998:68-70). 
This leads to a weakening of occupational identity - the worker does not see themselves 
as a baker, and has no real association with the finished product nor an understanding of 
the manufacturing process. Sennett notes however that almost all of the workers do not 
feel a sense of alienation or anger at this detachment, but instead treat the job with 
indifference - most workers do not stay at the firm for more than a few years, are not 
unionised and do not seek to advance their skills in the industry (1998:70). The 
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technology in these firms obfuscates the manufacturing process, and in so doing does 
not challenge the worker or allow them to learn skills. However, it could be said that 
this still represents a form of alienation in that the work is not offering the full potential 
to the individual – they are alienated from the skills and control over work even if they 
do not identify this alienation themselves. Echoing Smith’s observations of the 
mindlessness of repetitive, simple work, Sennett also notes that when there are 
problems with the machines, there is a genuine drive to innovate to work around the 
problem (1998:70), indicating that the drive to become involved with work and to take 
some ownership of the productive process exists but is smothered by the automated 
nature of modern production. 
 
Pagano (1991) suggests that the division of labour within the firm is governed by the 
property rights within the firm and the technologies and corresponding institutions 
which develop around this. Pagano outlines three perspectives on the idea of division of 
labour. The first, the Gioia-Babbage (1991:317) principle, states that work should be 
divided according to the comparative advantage of each individual in order to maximise 
productivity and minimise learning time, since the worker has to learn how to perform 
fewer tasks. It entails a division of labour between production and management. The 
Smithian (Pagano 1991: 319) principle advocates division of labour for the reasons of 
efficiency from a different perspective, taking the view that task repetition aids 
efficiency through learning-by-doing. If the worker performs many tasks, they do not 
become expert at any, but through performing fewer they can become better at them. 
This represents efficiency as a consequence of division, rather than as a cause of it by 
focussing on gained, rather than inherent, skills – the inverse of the Gioia-Babbage 
principle. The principle is likely to advocate less division of labour than the Gioia-
Babbage, since there are some benefits to learning-by-doing in the long term of a wider 
set of jobs for the worker, and of understanding of the production process as a whole 
(1991:319). Finally, the labour can be divided on the workers preference principle 
which allocates work according to the wishes of the workers. The enjoyment of 
learning, and of performing tasks competently, suggests less division of labour in order 
to maximise the amount of learning-by-doing, whilst the desire for variety of work, 
rather than monotony, would lead to less division of labour also. The 'optimum' division 
of labour which Pagano advocates attempts to balance productivity against the 
'disutility' of division of labour, and it is noted that property rights within the firm 
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characterise the impact of each of these factors (1991:320).  
 
Pagano (1991) argues that it is the property rights inherent in capitalism which govern 
the nature of the division of labour in favour of the Goia-Babbage principle, in order to 
minimise training as much as possible, which creates “an undesirably hierarchical and 
detailed division of labour” (1991:321). Under the system Pagano identifies as 'classical 
capitalism', property rights to the human capital of an individual are owned by that 
individual and can be hired and fired by others (a simplistic model of a liberal firm) 
which creates an asset specificity problem. There is nothing to safeguard either the firm 
or the employee should they invest in firm-specific assets. The worker can be fired, and 
therefore left with assets with limited applicability in other firms, or can leave the firm 
voluntarily, which removes those assets from the firm. There is no incentive for the firm 
to encourage learning or divide labour by any other system than that which minimises 
learning because institutions do not exist to protect the investment on the part of the 
firm or the worker. We would therefore expect employment under these poorly defined 
property rights to minimise firm-specific learning through very high division of labour 
which focusses on general skills (such as computer skills). Learning by doing, for 
example, is likely to lead to the creation of firm-specific knowledge, as does workers 
involvement in the management and organisation of production (1991:322). 
Furthermore, workers' or management's incentives to spend time or money on 
improving their employment conditions are diminished as they cannot guarantee their 
continued employment or that the expenditure on these assets will offer the same 
benefits to future workers (1991:322-333). It is suggested that this will also lead to a 
stronger incentive to invest in firm-specific capital, particularly specialised machines 
requiring minimal user input, rather than skilled labour, as these capital assets can be 
owned by the firm (Pagano 1991, Pagano & Rowthorn 1996). The property rights of 
classical capitalism, in Pagano's words, may well generate: 
 
Hierarchical firms, characterised by an inefficient quantity and quality of 
machines, a detailed and authoritarian organisation of work and an unpleasant 
working environment” (Pagano 1991:325). 
 
Pagano’s primary focus in the first two sections of his paper is on the provision of 
training within the firm and the relationship between skills and division of labour, and 
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emphasises the institutional barriers to high degrees of skill specialisation in firms under 
particular property rights regimes. There are limits as to how far this analysis can be 
extrapolated to look at the division of labour more generally – for example, in firms 
where training costs are actually fairly low or where there most learning is not firm-
specific.  
 
Bringing together these strands of thinking on the degrading effects of routine wage-
work, we can identify key points. Firstly, the impact of routine can be destructive, as the 
worker is not able to contribute their own human capacities for creation and 
independence to change their patterns or modes of work in a rigid routine. Secondly, 
working in the capitalist firm is likely to accentuate this by creating an unsatisfying 
working experience in which the individual is detached from the productive process to 
the point at which their work becomes mindless. Division of labour therefore needs to 
balance economic viability with an approach to work which maximises learning and 
allows space for control, creativity and innovation. Finally, it is argued that it is the 
property rights of traditional capitalist firms that create a high division of labour which 
overuses machinery, leading to an alienating experience of work. 
 
2.2 Motivation, Security and Control Over Time 
 
It is suggested that “contemporary debates about work-life balance are, in large 
measure, about how to manage time – time for work, time for caring for family 
members, and sufficient leisure time” (Edwards & Wajcman, 2005:44). The general 
perspective on work is one which involves a trade-off between work and leisure, 
suggesting that ultimately work has a very limited non-material value to individuals and 
exists mostly as an instrumental means to subsistence and leisure. Obviously this creates 
something of a straw-man since most work will involve some degree of what could 
loosely be called job satisfaction, and people find intrinsic value in the work that they 
perform, thinking that what they do matters in some way, or find pleasure in aspects of 
work such as building social relationships. This section argues that motivation to work 
is important as work itself is made up of institutions which govern how people live their 
lives. People's “working life” involves both their paid employment, and control over 
working life allows them to perform other labour outside of employment including care, 
volunteer work and family life (Haagh 2011a), encompassing a wide scope of activities 
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in which the “uniquely human capabilities” described by Macpherson (1973:53) are 
employed. 
 
Haagh (2011a) examines how strategic behaviour on the part of individuals is affected 
by their sense of security and motivation through a study in Brazil. She emphasises the 
importance of security and control. Through a refutation of the neoclassical approach, 
the research demonstrates the weaknesses of the leisure/work trade off assumption 
which is key to this approach to work. The assumption based on this trade off is that 
when income is available without work, such as through income support, individuals 
will prefer leisure to work (2011a:451). This neoclassical approach highlights the 
disincentive effect towards work of alternative income streams. Instead, the role of 
income support in providing a base for choice and strategic behaviour, thus providing 
an incentive to work, is put forward. As Haagh (2011a:451) notes, both of these 
perspectives focus on one variable - income support and the security of a stable income 
and do not examine the intrinsic motivation behind work. Examining motivation to 
work requires us to look beyond income security and to examine the institutions within 
work itself. The neoclassical approach does not recognise this, and only recognises 
intrinsic motivation in relation to leisure time (2011a:453). Haagh (2011a:450) engages 
in a “multi-factorial” analysis including “schooling, employment stability...and income 
support” in order to model motivation in a way which goes beyond a single focus on the 
morality of individuals shaped by various incentives, and moves towards an approach 
based on how control is attained through institutions. Haagh suggests that “individuals 
are motivated by the prospect of attaining control, a motivation that grows in turn with 
the level of security or actual control acquired” (2011a:466), demonstrating that control 
over working life, which comes from “institutional sources of security” (2011a:450), is 
key to the realisation of well-being and the realisation of individual preferences.  
 
It can be argued that there is an intrinsic sense of well-being from performing 
meaningful work (Haagh 2011a, Rawls 1999, Sennett 1998). However, meaningful 
work need not require that the work fulfils a particularly noble social function, but 
instead highlights the relationship between motivation and control over “working life” 
(Haagh 2011a). Work performs a function of providing the basis for the planning of 
future life – Rawls's principle being that the best way to improve individual welfare is to 
realise the long-term rational plans of the individual concerned, coupled with the 
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principle that one enjoys more complex work which allows development and 
employment of creative and intellectual capacities (Rawls 1999, Haagh 2007). Haagh 
(2011a) summarises this approach and adds insight into the role of supporting 
institutions: 
 
First, intrinsic motivation, the enjoyment of work for its own sake, is a key 
source of well-being that tends to increase as uncertainty falls and the sense of 
stability grows. Second, individuals are likely, for this reason, to strategize [sic] 
to reduce uncertainty through attaining control over work - over time. However, 
and thirdly, individuals cannot attain an overall framework of stability on their 
own. They need institutions (Haagh 2011a:452) 
 
This approach suggests that enjoyment of work rises with stability, and also that it is 
this stability and control which allows individuals to further their personal development 
and therefore presents an intrinsic motivation for work (Haagh 2011a). Further then, to 
the enjoyment of work which is stable and challenging, there is also a case for work 
which provides the stability and means to construct and execute strategic decisions in 
both the short and long term in order to plan a career alongside the other various aspects 
of life such as care and self-development. 
 
Haagh's (2007) conception of developmental freedom conforms to ideas of positive 
freedom in giving the individual choices in their working life through the provision of 
an institutional basis of security, highlighting the importance of enabling institutions. 
This, as Archer (1995:18) notes, requires us to define freedom of choice as a 
prerequisite for freedom of action. Alongside this we require the individual to be free 
from positive constraints on action, but also to have the means to perform chosen 
actions. The means to act is essential for freedom to exist (Archer, 1995:18). The ability 
to act without constraint is meaningless if it is still not possible to act in accordance 
with one's choice. Furthermore, as Haagh (2007) notes, it is crucial that this positive 
freedom translates to self-direction and autonomy rather than simply a set of free 
choices. It must be “shaped by the freedom to connect choices and to build on previous 
experience” (2007:124). There must, therefore, be a set of institutions which can 
generate and sustain an environment of free choice if developmental freedom is to be 
realised, as put forward by Haagh (2011b, 2012).  
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We can now seek to identify from the existing literature some of the elements which 
comprise stability and control within the firm. Standing (1997:332) advocates seven 
forms of security, which are employment security, work security, job security, skill 
reproduction security, income security and work representation security which are 
needed to ensure human development. However, the key focus for a developmental 
perspective on work is a focus on “connect[ing] the realm of formal production with 
control of time for other (non-formal) activities” (Haagh 2011b:44) allowing for control 
over one's own productive existence, which takes the debate beyond simple 
employment and income security and towards the ability of the worker to enjoy control 
of their working life (Haagh 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). It is therefore necessary in 
order to develop the understanding of developmental freedom to see how these 
securities can be realised through the creation, consolidation and reinforcement of 
structural and systemic institutions of work.  
 
Haagh (2011b, 2012) divides the concept of control in three ways, identifying constant, 
static and dynamic control over time. Constant control can be seen as forming a 
foundation for developmental progress. It entails control over the basic requirements 
needed for an individual to be able to enjoy working life, such as income stability 
(Haagh 2012:548). Without constant control, it is impossible for the individual to plan 
strategically for the future, and therefore to be able to pursue any long-term 
developmental objectives. Haagh (2012:548-549) places constant control in terms of 
security of housing and health, but places stable employment under the category of 
dynamic control, highlighting constant control as a set of institutions separate from 
production. 
 
From a firm basis on constant control comes static control, the control over short time-
frames such as over working time, particularly in terms of allowing the individual to 
perform more than one role (Haagh 2011b:44, 2012:548). This allows the worker to 
make use of their human capacities to their own ends outside of the workplace and in so 
doing limits the inevitable consequences of working life having an impact on non-
working life (Haagh 2012:548). This allows the worker the maximum possible 
developmental freedom through the ability to fit work around the demands of personal 
life and, in particular, in skills development and the enjoyment of personal capacities 
outside of the workplace (Haagh 2011b:44). Control over time is especially important in 
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cases where the worker may have two jobs, for example an internship or volunteer 
position in a valued occupation combined with a job for economic necessity in another 
sector. Another form of static control, control over the variety and timing of tasks 
performed, removes some of the alienating effects of authority. Self-management is a 
particularly important issue here. Not only does this prevent work from becoming 
mindless, due to variation in work, but also allows the worker the freedom to perform 
their work in the ways which they feel most comfortable and hence to experience 
greater learning-by-doing through taking ownership of their personal productive 
process. 
 
Finally we see dynamic control, which can be defined as long-term control to achieve 
strategic objectives (Haagh 2011b:44, 2012:248). An example of this would be the 
ability to learn and develop skills in the workplace. Although static control could allow 
for changes in work practices to maximise learning by doing, dynamic control is needed 
in order for this to be most effective as it is the combined focus of many individual 
areas of static control in order to utilise learning and development in the long-term. 
Dynamic control can be seen as the result of many different static controls (Haagh 
2012:548). Employment stability is the foundation for all other elements of security and 
control as it ensures a predictable continuity of the status quo for the worker, removing 
uncertainty and allowing for investments of time and effort in training and in improving 
the existing workplace (Haagh 2012:548). However, it is also worthwhile to address the 
potential consequences of firm failure or redundancy for the worker, and therefore 
under this heading we need to address the role of the firm in managing the transition for 
the worker to a new firm or sector, for example through redundancy packages which 
allow the worker the real freedom to choose their next employment, and through the 
firm facilitating training in transferable as well as firm-specific skills.  
 
Standing (2002:37-69) argues that labour markets have become increasingly flexible, 
primarily due to liberalisation and globalisation, through a relative increase in part-time 
employment, a decline in union power and membership and less formal labour 
contracting. He suggests that the emphasis on “employability”, rather than building a 
sense of occupation, leads to: a reduced emphasis specialised skills, being replaced with 
more general skills; a sense that employers must work overtime and not take leave in 
order to demonstrate commitment; less emphasis on workplace safety, partly due to 
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lower union density and higher levels of stress. Again, we see here less static control in 
over work, more long-term insecurity and therefore a decrease in the opportunities to be 
created in the workplace for personal development. 
 
Co-operatives potentially provide a firm in which the property rights over work are re-
organised and the idea that an individual is free to leave a job but not free to keep it 
(Haagh 2011a:50) does not apply strongly, assuming co-operative members do not 
make themselves redundant short of exceptional circumstances. Haagh's (2012:543) 
approach of “property rights in stability” is based on the idea that the individual enjoys 
control over their life more when they have multiple sources of security in different 
time-scales and over various activities. Co-operatives may be able to provide direct 
control of working life through ownership of the workplace, and therefore rights to jobs, 
as well as the freedom from hierarchical management providing for the control of work 
within the firm. If motivation and control are linked (Haagh 2011a), then co-operative 
work should be an activity providing high levels of motivation and satisfaction. The 
additional control that they offer within working life may enhance developmental 
freedom through the control over time to pursue other valuable activities. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter raises the argument that there needs to be work which is meaningful both 
in terms of the enjoyment of the tasks performed and in the wider sense that the work 
has a role to play in the development of the individual. It has highlighted the features of 
the developmental freedom approach to work: the focus on formal, informal, paid and 
unpaid aspects of work, the principle of work itself providing value to individuals rather 
than simply being a means to leisure, and the role of institutions in providing security 
and control in working life. There are two dimensions to be considered here – the 
freedom of the individual to make choices about their working life, principally through 
control over time; and the means to do this which is granted by economic security 
through secure employment based both on control over when they leave the firm, and 
also on the firm's survival. These are inter-related – the individual can exercise their 
freedom to make choices in order to secure their employment, and it is the co-operative 
through its democratic functioning which allows a set of institutions to develop which 
allow the individual to consolidate a sense of security whilst also granting them the 
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freedom and autonomy to shape their own working life. Questions are therefore raised 
about how institutions in co-operatives are able to increase control over time in the 
static and dynamic senses, and how they can balance job security against economic 
survival as firms. 
 
In order to apply these ideas to co-operatives, the next chapter examines the theoretical 
potential of co-operatives to create institutions of control for individuals within formal 
work, and the extent to which the operation of these institutions might be limited by the 
systemic environment of capitalism in which co-operatives in the UK find themselves. 
This is then followed by a review of empirical studies of co-operatives in order to 
ascertain how previous theorists have understood the stability, security and control of 
co-operatives in different contexts. 
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3 
Theoretical Perspectives on Co-operatives in Capitalism 
 
The discussion from the previous chapter has suggested that there is a strong case, put 
forward in the labour process literature, that workers who lack control over how their 
tasks and work are designed face an alienating experience of work. It is also suggested 
that control over work has benefits in terms of improving the experience of work whilst 
offering the potential for static and dynamic control in order to plan working life in the 
longer term in accordance with Haagh's (2007) conceptions of developmental freedom. 
This chapter puts forward the argument that the worker co-operative can “return the 
locus of control to the individual” (Rothschild & Whitt 1986:145). The central puzzle of 
this research which is framed by this chapter is whether the worker co-operative is able 
to realise this theoretical potential in the liberal market such as that in the UK. It is 
suggested that an alternative institutional arrangement such as the worker co-operative 
will struggle to survive in a capitalist systemic environment (e.g. Miller 1981). Drawing 
on the varieties of capitalism approach of Hall and Soskice (2001) and the institutional 
analyses of Pagano (1991) it is suggested that the co-operative may not realise its 
potential in an environment of liberal capitalism. 
 
This chapter explores the theoretical position of the co-operative as a means to 
maximise developmental freedom in capitalist economies from a number of 
perspectives. The first part of the chapter examines questions of ownership and control 
in co-operatives, looking at types of ownership in firms and how these are associated, 
theoretically, with the rights to manage the firm and organise work, concluding that 
ownership and control are “mutually inclusive” (Gupta 2014:101). Some arguments 
from political and economic perspectives in favour of co-operative organisation are then 
examined. 
 
The analysis then examines the property rights of individuals and firms relating to work, 
and suggests that these property rights can be endogenously created within different 
capitalisms, creating a self-sustaining system. This suggests that the co-operative 
system of organising property rights in the firm is unlikely to emerge spontaneously in 
capitalism and is threatened by a lack of appropriate technologies of production. These 
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conclusions are applied to Hall and Soskice's (2002) 'Varieties of Capitalism' approach 
which suggests that the institutions governing work in liberal economic systems will 
create complementarities which inhibit the performance of rival institutions. In terms of 
co-operatives, this suggests that co-operative forms of organisation will not develop 
alongside supportive external institutions such as sympathetic financial systems in an 
otherwise liberal environment.  
 
The chapter then looks at issues and problems with co-operative firms, with a particular 
focus on how they raise capital and the problems that they face in doing so. One of the 
major aspects of the literature on co-operatives (e.g. Dickstein 1991:23-35, Miller 1981, 
Williamson 1985:266-267) in terms of barriers to co-operation is access to finance, so it 
is important to understand how their finance and organisation works in the UK 
economy. Later in this section there is an analysis of the potential for co-operatives to 
fail in markets through degeneration (becoming non-co-operative firms), which would 
be a significant barrier to the establishment of any kind of worker control. 
 
The chapter concludes with some questions to be examined in the next chapter, which 
reviews a set of empirical studies of co-operatives from the literature. 
 
3.1 Ownership and Control 
 
Ownership refers to a “bundle of rights that an economic agent is entitled to exercise 
over an asset” (Putterman 1993:245). In terms of owning a firm this refers to the right to 
hire, and fire, employees, to make and sign contracts, to claim all earnings and also to 
be liable (where legally applicable) for the costs of the firm, and the right to sell or 
otherwise transfer these rights (Putterman 1993). In terms of the co-operative being 
owned, we can consider the different legal forms of co-operatives as affording slightly 
different sets of rights (for example, the right to sell shares) and the ownership being 
individual or collective (Clarke 1984:105). 
 
Pencavel (2001:15-17) identifies a range of co-operative forms of enterprise based on 
two variables. The first is the management participation of the workers, and relates to 
the control that workers have over their working conditions. The second is the 
ownership of the firm, in terms of the rights to the surplus of the firm. A workers co-
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operative, in which decisions are made democratically, is the ideal type which 
maximises worker participation and all profit is allocated to the workers according to a 
democratically decided rule such as the numbers of hours worked, or the level of 
personal risk each job poses. Other forms of worker ownership could be employee stock 
ownership (such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans - ESOPs), in which workers 
receive a share of the profits but have limited, if any, decision making power (Pencavel, 
2001). Alternatively, worker control to some degree can be provided in a highly 
unionised firm in which workers participate in a traditional capitalist wage relationship 
but have some control of the management of the firm, particularly in a highly co-
ordinated, corporatist economy.  
 
Ellerman (1990:10) identifies two forms of 'ownership' within the firm. These are the 
capital-owner role of the firm, which signifies ownership of the capital assets of the 
firm, and the residual claimant role which describes ownership of the inputs of the 
production process and hence the ownership of the output. The legal owner of the firm 
plays both of these roles, but the residual claimant's role is not part of the ownership of 
the means of production since the capital assets can be rented out, with the leaser 
owning the product and funding the inputs whilst not owning the assets. The role of 
residual claimant is therefore generated by contracts – the residual claimant is the party 
which hires inputs, and is typically the owner of the assets due to the contractual power 
that this gives.  
 
The output of the firm is the legal right of the residual claimant, regardless of whether 
or not they own the capital assets. Ellerman (1990:29) argues normatively that through 
ownership of labour power, the worker should become the residual claimant to their 
output in accordance with the labour theory of property. This does not necessarily mean 
that labour needs to own the capital assets of the firm, simply that they are responsible 
for using the services of capital assets. However, if the workers do not control the 
capital assets of the firm, it cannot be a workers co-operative since the owner of the 
assets would want to employ them in such a way as to separate the returns to capital and 
labour. This does not mean the workers must own the capital assets provided they could 
exercise property rights over them through a contractual rental, in much the same way 
that a tenant controls a flat through renting it, but does not literally own the flat. One 
would not expect the property owner who actually owns an office block to appropriate 
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the profits of the company that works within it, but that the offices would be leased for 
rent which remains constant regardless of the profit made by the company. 
 
In terms of ownership, rather than purely control, Ellerman (1990:11) makes the case 
that the bargaining power of capital asset owners is such that they tend to remain the 
residual claimant, raising the question of whether or not it is also possible to have a firm 
in which there can be meaningful worker control, where workers have the right to the 
residual, without worker ownership. There is a lack of incentives on the part of the 
employer to implement such a design as it is hard to see the benefits for profit 
generation or distribution. A major exception to this exists in partly employee-owned 
firms such as the John Lewis partnership, in which assets are held in trust but 
democratic worker control is subject to a parallel hierarchical model, or to employee 
share ownership programmes where many workers enjoy the rights of both worker and 
shareholder and, collectively, might have a controlling share in the firm, although their 
individual shareholding is likely to be quite small. In an ESOP, the property rights 
system remains fundamentally capitalist (Pencavel, 2013) and without “significant 
changes in control” (Dahl 1985:93), since “such a scheme does not include provisions 
for workers to actively exercise influence and control” (Gupta 2014:100). In both cases 
the worker becomes a residual claimant due to either their right to a share of the profits 
in the case of the former, or to a shareholders' dividend in the case of a firm with 
employee share ownership. The motivation behind such conversions seems to be 
philanthropy when the original owners choose to retire and, rather than find a successor, 
they choose instead to gift the firm to its members.  
 
The property rights analysis of Pagano (1991), introduced in the previous chapter, 
indicates that firms will generally seek to divide labour as much as possible, whilst 
workplace democracy requires, and creates, wider knowledge of the firm's operation. 
Control without ownership does not transfer the property rights over employment to the 
worker since the form that the firm takes has to be decided by those with property rights 
over the assets of the firm at its start-up or restructuring. In some co-operatives, the 
assets are held in trust and owned by the co-operative collectively, so no individual 
worker has rights to them, but neither does anybody else – depending on the legal form 
chosen and the use of asset locks, in the event of the co-operative being wound up the 
assets might not be distributed amongst the members but would instead have to be 
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passed on to another asset-locked collectively-owned organisation (Co-operatives UK 
2011a). However, it is through the initial ownership of the assets by the worker and a 
commitment to setting up a worker co-operative that they can be voluntarily placed in 
this state. Therefore it is not worker ownership itself which is important for creating an 
environment of control, but the absence of any other sources of control through capital 
ownership as exemplified through the co-operative principle of autonomy (ICA, n.d.). 
Furthermore, Pencavel (2001:5-8) argues that voice mechanisms such as employee 
consultations and suggestions boxes within capitalist firms are inadequate. The chief 
purpose of the firm is to provide a profit for the owner, and therefore employers will 
always treat employee organisations with some degree of suspicion as they would 
expect them to attempt to redistribute rents towards the labour force rather than towards 
the owners. There is also a potential free-rider problem in capitalist firms, since better 
working conditions such as more flexible hours represent a public good within the 
workplace, and therefore workers would rely on one another to campaign for better 
conditions, especially when the potential costs of such a campaign are high – nobody 
wants to be a troublesome employee. Therefore opportunities for employees to control 
their workplace are likely to be only provided at the discretion of management and will 
not be seized upon by workers. As a result, it is only by owning the firm, whether 
directly or collectively, that members are able to exercise control – ownership and 
control are “mutually inclusive” (Gupta 2014:101), although Clarke (1984:106) is more 
tentative and suggests that “although the transfer of ownership to the collective of 
workers is a necessary conditions for the transfer of control, it is by no means a 
sufficient condition”. 
 
It should also be said that not all non-worker owned organisations will operate in the 
same way. Publicly-owned workplaces, for example, might tend towards a different 
organisation of work and generally could be said to offer greater stability for employees, 
partly due to the influence of public sector unions, in turn strengthened by 
comparatively long job tenure which might encourage high membership. However, such 
workplaces are not directly considered in this thesis since they are not usually set up 
with the objective of producing profits, thus do not compare to most worker co-
operatives which exist in the same markets as conventional firms. 
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3.2 Political and Economic Cases for Worker Control 
 
The extent of an individual's static or dynamic control within the firm will be dependent 
on the level of control of the firm that workers, both individually and collectively, can 
exercise. A share in the profits, although likely to boost worker income assuming the 
firm is running at a profit, is not necessarily sufficient to improve control, although the 
financial security it offers would be likely to increase control. There is a distinction 
between the democratic aspect of the co-operative firm and its ownership such that 
ownership does not mean that there is participatory democratic control and vice versa, 
although it would be expected that worker control necessitates worker ownership 
(Bowles & Gintis 1996: 65). 
 
The theoretical case put forward by Bowles and Gintis (1993, 1996) approaches the 
issue from the premise that the employment relationship is inherently authoritarian, they 
argue that remedying this with workplace democracy is necessary for four reasons – 
preventing the arbitrary exercise of power, producing better decisions, improving 
human capacities through participation and membership in a democratic community and 
in terms of protecting human dignity by dissolving the “master-servant relationships” 
(Bowles & Gintis 1993:89) of the capitalist firm. Democratic control then can be seen to 
have an intrinsic as well as instrumental value – it has value for employees in terms of 
what it can allow them to do, but also in terms of the way it affects the meaning of the 
relationship between workers and the firm. It is argued that there is a case for 
democracy in the firm since if the employer is to wield power over the employee, the 
employer needs to be accountable for this power (Bowles & Gintis 1993:85). For 
example, in the interests of profit maximisation, a firm might employ a particular policy 
of searching workers as they leave the premises, which workers may see as an affront to 
their dignity, despite the fact the objective is precisely in line with that of any other 
profit-maximising policy, as opposed to other examples of indignity cited by Bowles 
and Gintis (1993) such as sexual harassment.  
 
Dahl (1985) is one of the most famous proponents of economic democracy, proposing 
that if there is a case for democracy at the level of the state, then there is an equal case 
for democracy in the economy also; and conversely, if the arguments for democratic 
control of the economy were flawed, then so were those for democracy in government. 
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The decisions of a firm are as binding, perhaps more so, than decisions made by 
government because the firm controls the livelihood of the worker, and exit is a risky, 
expensive or otherwise impractical response to an unwanted decision by a manager in 
just the same way that it is an undesirable response to an unwanted government (Dahl 
1985:114). We could consider Marx's (1996a) double freedom here – the worker is free 
to leave the firm, but in so doing risks everything; especially as, in a competitive 
market, we might expect to see firms making very similar decisions, for example long 
working days or zero-hours contracts. Membership of the firm is not voluntary, but 
almost compulsory, since without an alternative source of livelihood, exit is not a useful 
option. Archer (1995:42-47) argues for worker control on the basis that those subject to 
the decision of the firm should have the right to exercise voice, regardless of exit costs. 
Hansmann (1990) suggests that in conventional firms workers are put in a position 
where they are 'locked in' to continued employment since they will have financial and 
social links with the area near the workplace (such as owning a house), and therefore the 
firm can take advantage of this safe in the knowledge that it is very unlikely that the 
worker will actually leave. Dahl also suggests that there is no case for a “guardianship” 
(1985:117), where managers control firms because they are the best placed people to do 
so, based on principles of equality. It is argued that workers in control of a firm will be 
competent enough to either make decisions themselves, or will be competent enough to 
know that it is best to democratically elect some kind of representative management. 
Workers are, Dahl argues, at least as well-informed as shareholders (1985:119).  
 
Dahl (1985:91) posited “a system of economic enterprises collectively owned and 
democratically governed by all the people who work in them” which would be a 
superior system on the grounds of justice and equality in a wider sense than just work 
within the firm. It is suggested that such a system could socialise individuals towards 
co-operative values, creating solidarity and a sense of public spirit (Dahl 1985:95, Jossa 
2014:140; see also Carter 2006, Rothschild 2009). It also has the potential to create and 
reinforce norms of moral responsibility, since “actions adverse to the performance of 
the firm would be harmful to all” (Dahl 1985:100) and would reduce the duality of 
workers and consumers, aligning their interests more closely since workers might have 
to bear the costs of management decisions in their role as citizens. There is also an 
appeal to fairness and equality as a democratically owned enterprise would distribute 
the returns to property ownership between more people, and the “adversarial and 
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conflictive relations inherent to the very structure of the private firm would be greatly 
attenuated in self-governing enterprises”. From a Marxist perspective, we can revisit the 
alienation critique of work in capitalism explored in the last chapter. Jossa (2014) 
argues that worker co-operatives are able to decrease alienation. From a fairly 
tautological perspective, if alienation is the product of wage-labour, then a system 
which reverses the capitalist employment relationship, as in a co-operative, will by 
definition reduce or eliminate alienation. Furthermore, the increased control over how 
work is to be performed, what products are to be produced, and the right to the worker 
to the surplus-value from their production all serve to reduce alienation. It is also argued 
that the social effects of co-operation will be such that members will begin to work 
together as their characters are changed through economic activity (Marshall 1925:228, 
Mill 1871; both as cited in Jossa 2014:109). Daudi and Sotto (1986:70) suggest that 
members of the co-operative movement argue a moral case for their actions in which 
“capital accumulation...is not the end…[of] cooperative economic activities. The 
goal...is, according to its discourses, the service of Man” suggesting that the goals of a 
co-operative differ from a conventional firm in the sense that the objective is social 
benefit. 
 
It has been suggested that there is no need for a worker co-operative to be non-
hierarchical (Bowles & Gintis 1993:177, Oliver & Thomas 1990:357), and several cases 
of hierarchy in such firms exists, most notably the plywood co-operatives in the US 
(Greenberg, 1986). However, such a model is potentially problematic, since the worker 
ownership without a non-hierarchical, democratic and participatory mode of governance 
loses some of its normative appeal and in an arena in which ownership is shared, it 
would be difficult to fairly allocate power. One solution might be for members of the 
firm to elect officers (Bowles & Gintis 1993), although this risks creating an elite who 
become de facto managers due to their knowledge or experience, or might lead to a 
situation of division and rivalry within the firm. Another means which avoids creating a 
hierarchy of members involves hiring external managers who are not owners and are 
there for supervision (Greenberg, 1986), especially since significant issues of discipline 
could arise in the absence of appropriate management, especially if the worker's role as 
an owner of the company is used in order to grant exemption from regulation (Elster 
1989:105). Managers could be hired for their expertise but the construction of power 
relationships in a horizontal environment is difficult, with some co-operatives such as 
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Mondragón placing great emphasis on the role of constitutions as a tool of self-binding, 
preventing interference from members (Thomas & Logan 1982, Elster 1989:106). 
 
In terms of economic benefits, a workers co-operative should be able to overcome the 
potential inefficiencies created by hierarchical authority due to the fact that workers 
form the management of the firm and receive the returns to both capital and labour. 
Bowles and Gintis (1993:92-94) locate three efficiency advantages in worker-owned 
and managed firms. Firstly, the fact that workers participate in the firm's decision 
making process provides a motivation to work harder. Workers will put in more effort 
when they have control over their modes of work and are working towards mutually 
agreed goals (Oliver & Thomas 1990). Secondly, there is a case for what Bowles and 
Gintis (1993:93) refer to as a “mutual monitoring effect” whereby management can be 
performed by all members of the co-operative monitoring each other's work, since all 
have the same motivation of increasing their own income by increasing the productivity 
and profitability of the firm. This makes supervision far cheaper and less conflictual 
than in a capitalist firm since the moral hazard of monitoring workers is internalised 
(Hansmann 1990:246). The effect of the size of the enterprise on this is disputed – if the 
firm gets larger, the incentive for free-riding increases as the individual worker will only 
appropriate a small part of the extra surplus they produce (Jossa 2014:111) but on the 
other hand, if all workers can engage in collective action together, the size of the firm 
becomes irrelevant. Thirdly, it is also argued that there is an efficiency gain to be made 
by creating incentives for better work with higher wages linked directly to profits (a 
problem of distribution within the firm), whilst also reducing monitoring and 
supervision costs which are typically high in capitalist firms as a tool for enforcing hard 
work, whilst wages are kept low. It can also be argued that the costs of negotiating 
employment conditions are far lower when there is no information asymmetry between 
management and workers (Hansmann 1990). Whyman (2012:846) notes that the 
survival of co-operatives, if not demonstrating more efficient operation than 
conventional firms, does demonstrate that they are not so inefficient as to be completely 
impractical, and that there is “no unambiguous evidence to indicate any inherent 
weakness in the co-operative model”. 
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3.3 Property Rights and Different Capitalisms 
 
The division of labour leading to lack of control over work in conventional capitalist 
firms can be said to be due to the poorly defined property rights over work, which limit 
the stability of the individual's employment and therefore their ability to gain skills in 
work, as well as creating an alienating working environment. There is a need to change 
these relations if the individual is to realise more control over working life. Haagh 
(2012) notes the ability of 'horizontal capitalism' as a means to achieve this by 
increasing security for all through a 'bundle of property rights in stability', with no 
single institution being able to achieve full security alone. Extending this argument, I 
suggest that the worker co-operative could also provide a means to improve 
developmental freedom by providing property rights in stability within the firm. In the 
co-operative, we could see control and stability as two sides of the same coin. The 
worker has some control in the co-operative due to the democratic nature of such an 
organisation, and this would lead to a fairly stable position in the firm for the individual. 
This stability could change the division of labour in the firm, as well as enhancing 
control through the democratic process within the firm. However, it should be stressed 
that such control is likely to be influenced by other systemic variables outside of the 
firm such as access to public services and state support such as pensions or 
unemployment insurance. 
 
Pagano (1991:330-337) suggests alternative methods of organising property rights. The 
first, 'company capitalism', gives workers property rights over jobs in the firm, although 
not necessarily a particular job, and are given priority for new jobs and promotions over 
workers from outside the firm. This removes the expropriation hazard of firm-specific 
skills as workers can depend upon staying within the firm and therefore their knowledge 
keeping its value. Alternatively, a 'unionised capitalism' could exist in which workers 
win property rights over a particular job, but not in a specific firm through unions of 
workers and employers. Setting uniform standards across sectors for particular jobs 
means that skills can be learned in one firm which are transferable to the same job in 
another firm. Both represent a more co-ordinated approach and allude to the 
employment regimes of Japan and Germany respectively. A model similar to social 
democracy, referred to as 'solidaristic corporatism', is also mentioned, which takes the 
'unionised capitalism' approach further and suggests that property rights to jobs could be 
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socialised, giving everyone a right to a job at a particular level, but not in a particular 
firm or sector, but Pagano (1991:335) notes the difficulty in creating and sustaining a 
set of institutions to enable this to happen whilst also noting its advantages in 
institutional stability and employment conditions. In the modern economy, we see a 
blend of these ideal types. For example, the creation of nationally-recognised vocational 
qualifications means that there is some transferability of skills between firms within the 
same sector, although in poorly unionised economies this will not protect workers 
against redundancy from the entire sector, whilst social insurance goes some way to 
mitigating the loss to the worker should they find their skills cannot be redeployed 
following redundancy. These alternative methods of allocating property rights 
demonstrate the systemic nature of the capitalist system. Prevailing systems of property 
rights will be generated through the prevailing variety of capitalism in the economy.  
 
Co-operatives display some similarities to the 'company workers capitalism' model, 
developed in Pagano (1991), by providing an environment in which workers can depend 
on the co-operative for the security of their employment and the co-operative can 
depend on the worker for their continued membership. This could be theorised as a very 
strong form of the company capitalism approach, although Pagano (1991) seems to 
assume in his analysis that the new property rights regime is prevalent across the 
economy rather than in a single firm. By allowing the development of firm-specific 
skills by removing expropriation hazards, we would see a change in the division of 
labour towards a more varied set of tasks and increased emphasis on improving 
employment conditions and encouraging learning-by-doing (1991:332). However, this 
structure may be institutionally unstable – if the firm is inefficient due to changes in 
demand or technology, it will struggle to adapt as taking on new members with new 
skills or making old members redundant will both be difficult, leading to a crisis within 
the firm and the potential move back towards classical capitalism (1991:333). This 
phenomenon has close similarities with theories of co-operative degeneration where 
both successful and failing co-operatives revert back to capitalist property rights, either 
due to the need for expansion in the first instance or efficiency in the latter instance. The 
complementaries between institutions make it extremely difficult for alternative forms 
of capitalist organisation to exist within a different systemic context. As a result, 
although the property rights of a co-operative form of economy, if applied across all 
firms, might yield preferable outcomes, those property rights may be unstable and prone 
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to failure if they exist only in a few firms. 
 
The prevailing capitalist institutional arrangement is likely to be stable. Property rights 
will influence the technologies used within firms, such as the division of labour and use 
of machinery (Pagano 1991:327). Although 'classical capitalism' can be said to be a sub-
optimal and inefficient method of allocating property rights, leading to poor 
employment conditions and a lack of firm-specific human capital, its prevalence will 
lead to the creation of a particular set of institutions which manage this division of 
labour. It can be argued that conventional management, and in particular the division of 
labour by task, is a form of control of the workforce rather than an argument for 
efficiency (Hill 1981:62), and actually costs money compared to a self-managed 
workplace due to the costs of supervision and direction (Hill 1981:64). Such a system, 
however, may not be seen to be sub-optimal, as generation of firm-specific human 
capital will be minimal and therefore not present a problem, and even if it is identified 
as such by managers, a transformation of property rights regimes will take time and may 
be difficult due to the mutual reinforcement of existing institutions. Pagano (1991:327-
328) discusses worker-owned firms specifically, identifying them as solving these asset-
specificity problems but states that they are unlikely to survive as the institutions needed 
to support a different mode of production (his emphasis being on a mode of production 
relying on human, rather than physical, capital) will be underdeveloped compared to 
those of the dominant 'classical capitalist' regime, even if at maturity, the co-operative 
mode of production would be more efficient. Pagano and Rowthorn (1996) argue that 
economic institutions are “self-sustaining” (Pagano & Rowthorn 1996:121) and that the 
two aspects of modes of production – property rights and productive forces such as 
technological change – are interdependent. In their own words “property rights 
'regenerate' themselves via technology and technology 'regenerates' itself via property 
rights”. (Pagano & Rowthorn 1996:122). 
 
This poses some questions for consideration. If the property rights within firms have an 
effect on the division of labour, a different configuration of property rights, principally 
with workers owning the firm, should alleviate the problems of asset specificity in 
principle (Pagano 1991:327). However, given the resistance of institutions to change 
due to the path-dependency of their development and the 'lock-in' of different 
complementary institutions, will an alternative property rights regime be able to change 
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dominant productive technologies, for example by changing the division of labour, or 
will the lack of supportive institutions mean that the co-operative enterprise fails due to 
inefficiency or degenerates back to classical capitalist property rights? This is 
something of an oversimplification as in different sectors of the economy, and in 
different markets, there will be slightly different constraints on the ability of firms to 
adopt different technologies and organisational structures, and it is possible for 
alternative technologies to exist in parallel with one another, and in competition, for 
various reasons – perhaps because each holds advantages which appeal to different 
consumers. Therefore the existence of some co-operatives does not demonstrate that the 
systemic environment has no impact at all, but that such firms are likely to be a minority 
and to struggle with the dominant sets of institutions in the economy. 
 
Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the defining difference between different forms of 
capitalism is the method of organisation in the economy and identify a range of 
typologies, mostly focused on OECD countries. The varieties of capitalism approach 
highlights the relationships which different actors in the economy, particularly firms, 
have with one another which controls their ability to make strategic decisions. Firms 
aim to produce at profit, and in order to do this need to solve a range of coordination 
problems – how to manage, for example, industrial relations, training, corporate 
governance, relationships with other firms and how to employ workers effectively.  
 
The difference between types of economy, Hall and Soskice argue, is the method of 
resolving these coordination problems. Liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the 
UK and US, organise these relationships by means of the market system and, where this 
will not suffice, through hierarchical arrangements of control. Coordinated market 
economies (CMEs), such as Germany, make more use of non-market modes of 
organisation to solve these problems, such as agreeing wages through collective 
bargaining in the sector rather than through market institutions. These are 'fuzzy' 
typologies, and CMEs do make use of the market for many decisions whilst LMEs do 
not mediate all interactions via the market. Institutions will develop which support the 
dominant method of organisation, and firms will reinforce these institutions by 
conforming to them for support (Hall & Soskice 2001:8-9). A particular set of 
institutional arrangements will lead to a cycle of development of firms and further 
institutions that complement the existing arrangements. Institutional complementaries 
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exist where the benefits of a particular arrangement increase the returns from another 
(Hall & Soskice 2001:17). This produces a clustering of economies around particular 
ideal types – an economy which has a liberal financial sector is likely to have a liberal 
labour market as well, whilst a more coordinated economy is likely to manage both 
using more non-market means (Hall & Soskice 2001:19).  
 
An example of this is given in the case of skilled labour in Germany, a typical CME. 
The economy relies upon a skilled labour force, but firms which train their workers in 
specific skills make themselves vulnerable, as this gives power to the labour force and 
means that other firms could 'poach' skilled workers. Therefore, institutions have arisen 
to solve this, notably industry-wide employment arrangements using employers' 
organisations and trade unions which equalise pay for equally skilled workers across the 
sector therefore making the poaching of workers more difficult (Hall and Soskice 
2001:24-25). In LMEs, on the other hand, it is difficult to coordinate wage levels as the 
institutions to organise them are much weaker, and therefore wages are typically 
controlled via market forces and are much more flexible. This means that production 
methods do not generally require a long-term specifically skilled workforce (Hall & 
Soskice 2001:29-30). Because institutions tend to develop which complement each 
other, we would expect to see a set of radically different institutions, such as those in 
the worker co-operative, fail to survive. Credit markets, employment law and training, 
for example, may not, in LMEs, be supportive of the co-operative structure. For 
example, co-operatives are unlikely to be able to receive equity financing due to the 
clash which this would represent with democratic principles, and therefore may be 
under-funded, or may not be able to pay skilled managers comparable wages compared 
with capitalist firms (Williamson 1985:267-268). 
 
The property rights within the firm are not the only set of institutions that can affect the 
stability and control that the individual has in their working life. The general systemic 
situation of the economy is likely to be as great an obstacle to or enabler of freedom. 
Because these types of relationships govern employment regimes, education and 
training and even the types of firms which develop in different types of economies, we 
would expect them to have a significant impact on developmental freedom. Control 
ultimately depends on institutions of support for the individual which enable them to 
make free long term strategic decisions about their careers. Haagh (2011b:45) describes 
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the 'systemic institutional' approach, working from the premise that the market is made 
up of property rights and institutions, and that it is the differences in the configurations 
of these which generate particular outcomes. Social democracies - highly coordinated 
economies – afford high levels of control over time at the society-wide level through 
subsidised childcare, social insurance, low components of means-tested benefits and 
generally high levels of welfare. This leads to a particularly solidaristic set of 
institutions, alongside high progressive taxation, allowing for increased control over 
time (Haagh 2011b, Haagh 2012). In the British case, however, we may see the 
potential benefits to the experience of work within the co-operative tempered by the 
external environment which may limit the capacity of the individual to make choices 
about their career regardless of the structure of the firm in which they work. 
 
3.4 The Case Against Co-operatives 
 
Although the case made for the impact of co-operative modes of work on the control 
enjoyed by the worker is strong, it operates in an ideal-case situation in which the co-
operative is able to work in accordance with all its principles. The practical viability of 
co-operative businesses as islands of democratic organisation in a sea of competitive 
markets is a different issue entirely and has been questioned by theorists since the 
inception of modern co-operatives. Clarke (1984:100) suggests there is a trade-off 
between commercial viability and democratic control, and that co-operatives must 
attempt to strike a balance between these two poles. This section examines some of 
these problems in terms of both the impracticality of co-operative production (their 
tendency to fail as businesses) and the 'degeneration thesis' (their tendency to fail as co-
operative ventures), which will now be examined together. These two factors are clearly 
interlinked since chasing economic success may lead to an abandonment of co-operative 
principles, and it is economic success which is necessary for their operation in a market. 
In his analysis, Horvat (1979:75-76) argues that “most producer co-operatives 
eventually fail”. We can assume he refers to eventually in the short to medium turn, as 
in the long term we might expect most firms to “eventually” fail. Three reasons are put 
forward – firstly, difficulties in accessing credit and negotiating with external capitalist 
organisations such as suppliers, secondly through difficulties in management, and 
thirdly through a tendency to degenerate when new members are treated as hired labour 
rather than full members. This chapter will draw on all three these of these critiques, 
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first examining issues around co-operative management, before moving on to look at 
issues around how co-operatives can access credit, and how they may theoretically 
manage their funds, before examining ideas around degeneration.  
 
3.4.1 Management of Co-operatives 
 
Management of co-operatives raises many potential problems. The first of these is the 
adverse selection of co-operative members, whereby co-operatives may be set up by 
people who explicitly reject many of the rules and norms of business (Elster, 1989:97), 
which could threaten the viability of co-operative enterprise in a competitive market. On 
a related note, it takes time to develop management skills, especially when attempting to 
reach decisions democratically, which could require exceptional organisational and 
social skills. Even experienced businesspeople could struggle to function effectively 
when attempting to manage a democratic workplace which does not reflect traditional 
approaches to business (Bowles & Gintis 1993:95). Dahl (1985:128) warns against 
ignoring the important role of managerial skills in running firms and assuming they will 
arise spontaneously, but later suggests these skills can be developed through hiring in 
external managers or through concentrating some resources into developing human 
capital. It could be argued also that managerial skills are less important in very small 
businesses, as co-operatives typically are, and that deliberative decision-making could 
lead to good decisions being made by drawing on the mixed expertise of several 
members.  
 
Furthermore, in a large firm the profits could be split between so many people that the 
incentive to work harder for an increased return becomes negligible and a free-rider 
problem emerges, and the distribution of bonuses for high productivity raises issues of 
fairness, efficiency and equity (Elster, 1989:104). However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that workers in such companies put in less effort (Bonin et al. 1993) and some 
to suggest that the opposite is in fact the case (Welford 1990). This raises the problem 
of self-exploitation
3
 since, given the difficult conditions co-operatives might face when 
operating under capitalism, the co-operative rhetoric will actually lead to a more 
 
3 There is some debate in the literature (see A. Carter 1989:196, O'Neill 1991) about whether 
the idea of 'self exploitation' is really appropriate in the Marxist sense of the term 
exploitation, with the possible term 'market exploitation' used instead to signify the systemic 
pressure in co-operatives.  
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exploitative system for workers, since workers in co-operatives tend to work longer 
hours in order to generate enough income (Baldacchino 1990:464), and that in order to 
invest and survive wages must be kept low (O'Neill 1991:234). This is a concern also 
for Carter (1986:186) who suggests that start-up co-operatives in particular are 
characterised by “low wages, long hours and poor working conditions”, and that real 
benefits from co-operation must manifest fairly swiftly after the formation of a co-
operative if members are to be retained and the co-operative model is to retain credence 
on the grounds of quality of life. 
 
The free-rider problem may also cause issues in relation to participation in management 
decisions (Putterman 1993:248) or, on the other hand, depending on firm size and the 
institutions present, the workers input to the management process could be so small as 
to feel like an authority relationship rather than a democratic process (Pencavel 2001:7). 
Finally, the case could be made that the real control, especially for smaller co-
operatives, lies externally in larger firms or in markets more generally, and this would 
limit the possibilities for internal control no matter how effective the democratic system 
(Bate & Carter, 1986, Carter 1986:186, Oliver & Thomas 1990:357). 
 
3.4.2 Finance in Co-operatives 
 
This section will first examine the possible methods of capitalisation for co-operatives, 
briefly describing 'sweat equity', loans and loan stocks (including loans specifically for 
co-operatives), share ownership and surplus reinvestment. The section then engages 
with the literature on the issues co-operatives may face in credit markets and the 
problems they have choosing how to distribute their surpluses and borrowing for 
investment.  
 
‘Sweat Equity’ is formed through the workers in the co-operative deferring wage 
payment during the start-up phase, thus lowering these costs and allowing the co-
operative to be financed by its own revenues from production. This can take the form of 
either deferred wages or, as the name suggests, through giving shares in place of wages 
(Co-operatives UK 2011a). This obviously has limited application as it relies on the 
workers in the co-operative being able to live with limited salaries for perhaps an 
unspecified amount of time. However, some co-operatives, such as Upstart Services 
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Limited have worked on this model (Co-operatives UK 2011a:25). 
 
Loans represent another form of finance. Although co-operatives can approach 
commercial lenders for loans, there are also various community development finance 
initiatives (CDFIs) which lend with particular community benefits in mind. One such 
example is Co-operative and Community Finance (CCF, formerly the Industrial 
Common Ownership Fund or ICOF) which lends amounts of up to £50,000 (Co-
operatives UK 2011a:34). Alternatively, members of the co-operative can be asked to 
lend money as a condition of membership, known as a qualification loan (2011a:37). In 
some cases, lenders can finance the co-operative through loan stocks or debentures, 
which allow for funding over a fixed period of time without giving out voting rights in 
the co-operative to lenders. This makes them especially useful for companies which 
cannot issue shares to lenders (2011a:38-39). However, such an approach could be risky 
- the interest on loans will need to be paid regardless of profit, and debenture holders 
have access to the assets before shareholders in the event that they force liquidation. 
 
A further method of financing the co-operative is through issuing shares. Co-operatives 
can issue withdrawable shares, which are worth no more than their original selling price 
when the company is wound up, and can be withdrawn at any point for the same price. 
However, if they are withdrawn, the company runs the risk of decapitalisation if there 
are not other investors to take the place of withdrawing ones or if the company is not 
building up reserves from surplus. Most co-operatives also make use of membership 
shares, which “are neither withdrawable nor transferable, but are forfeited when the 
member leaves the organisation” (Co-operatives UK 2011a:46). They are not usually a 
mechanism for raising capital as there is no reason to hold more than one of these 
shares. Other options exist, such as transferable or preference shares, but these are not 
often used by co-operatives - the former because of uncertainty and the possibility of 
individual windfalls (Co-operatives UK 2011a). The shareholding of the member does 
not generally create a conflict of interest over returns to capital since “the most 
important property right is that of a worker in his job; his share holding is seen as a 
means to job security rather than a financial investment” (Fletcher 1976:190-91). Vanek 
(1975:34) suggests that workers should own no capital stake in the firm, as to do so 
would be to link income to ownership of capital rather than work, and instead co-
operatives should depend on external financing, including state support. 
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Equity financing through selling shares is possible method of financing, as there are 
limits on how much can be done using debt alone. However, a worker co-operative is 
hard to fund through this mechanism since selling shares to a wider community than its 
own workers could undermine worker control. Various mechanisms exist to separate 
ownership and control, and a multi-stakeholder co-operative could be formed which 
limits the voting rights of some forms of share ownership. There are also limits on how 
much can be held by individual shareholders in legally-formed co-operatives. It is also 
hard to see the motivation for investors, in the absence of some kind of community co-
operative in which many stakeholders stand to benefit directly from the success of the 
firm (such as keeping a remote village shop open). There is little incentive, in a worker 
co-operative, for investment from outside since such investment may well not be linked 
to any control or supervision of the firm, as it would in a conventional capitalist firm. 
There is the possibility that there could be no particular reason for the workers to vote to 
leave any surplus for shareholders to take (Jensen & Meekling 1979:487; as cited in 
Jossa 2014:99).  
 
Financing thorough reinvestment of surplus also represents a problem for co-operatives 
in comparison to capitalist firms. Miller (1981) suggests that co-operatives in free 
markets would tend towards underinvestment compared to an otherwise identical 
capitalist firm, which can result in firm failure or degeneration, sine the individual 
incentives towards income maximisation may result in a collective outcome desired by 
no individuals (1981:312). Miller (1981:315-320) argues that co-operatives will only 
invest when the yield of investment is very high, since members may need to stay in the 
co-operative for a very long time to see the gains from their investment and therefore 
would be sacrificing income in the short term in order to invest. If assets in the co-
operative are owned collectively, then the investment is impossible to withdraw and 
redeem should the worker choose to leave. In this case there is no incentive to add to 
these assets and instead members will wish to take as much away from the firm as 
possible, and then borrow to finance investment (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1970; as cited in 
Ellerman, 1986), although it is noted that if workers stay with the firm for long enough, 
these problems start to disappear. If the firm is owned individually through shareholding 
then the incentive to invest is low since the worker will not be spreading their risk, since 
if the co-operative fails, they lose both income and the investment, and cannot be 
withdrawn easily once the investment is spent. Furthermore, if people do leave the co-
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operative when assets are owned individually, it will face decapitalisation unless it can 
find new members or investors (Miller 1981:316-317). Borrowing from a bank creates a 
similar problem, as the yield will have to outweigh the costs of borrowing and since the 
assets bought from the loan would be held collectively, the yield needs to be substantial 
in order to justify the investment in light of time horizons (Miller 1981:319). Co-
operatives therefore will always face chronic underinvestment due to their 
organisational structure, making them less competitive than capitalist firms. 
Underinvestment is also suggested as a problem by Elster (1989:94) as an issue of risk 
aversion as workers may be unwilling to invest in their own workplaces rather than 
diversifying their sources of income. Miller (1981:314) also suggests that because 
members will seek to maximise individual income (the total income for the co-operative 
divided by the number of workers), rather than the total income of the co-operative, it 
will be hard to expand as each new member will need to produce enough to allow for 
the fact that surplus will need to be divided by one more person. In the capitalist firm 
however, each new worker needs only to produce a penny more surplus than the cost of 
their wages and administration in order to be a productive individual. In the interests of 
keeping the dividends to members high, there is an incentive to keep the firm small, but 
this can lead to strange behaviour such as reducing production in response to rises in 
price (Vanek 1970; as cited in Bowles & Gintis 1993:75). However, there is little 
empirical evidence to suggest that this simple dividend-maximising model is true or that 
co-operatives are inherently inefficient or perverse in their operation (Bonin et al. 1993).  
 
The underinvestment thesis make some assumptions which can be called into question. 
The first, as noted by Miller (1981:313), is that co-operatives will seek to maximise 
income per member, although this is accepted as an over-simplification of individual's 
behaviour. The literature suggests that co-operatives form for reasons of control and 
social responsibility at least as much as maximising incomes (e.g. Fletcher 1976, 
Thornley 1981, co-operative principles in ICA n.d.), and the existence of institutions 
such as sweat equity implies that this is often not a key concern for co-operatives. 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986) draw similar conclusions about the purpose of the co-
operative firm in their studies of co-operatives, making the point that: 
 
Collectivist enterprises assess themselves in terms of how well they are practicing 
their democratic ideals, the quality of the products or services they are providing, 
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their ability to provide alternative places of employment, and – most ambiguous of 
all – their contribution to larger societal change (1986:145) 
 
It is also suggested by Whyman (2012:846) that many economic models of co-operative 
behaviour may operate on flawed assumptions since firms are not necessarily intending 
to act as income-maximisers, and neither are some conventional firms acting as profit-
maximisers. Therefore, they may not necessarily fail to invest, as there may be a 
recognition of the longer-term role of the co-operative as a social institution which some 
members would be willing to invest some income in without seeing a personal return, as 
an act of solidarity, and over a longer time-horizon less profitable investments become 
more attractive. It is suggested that many shares bought in co-operatives are bought for 
philanthropic or social, rather than financial, reasons (Co-operatives UK 2009:26). It is 
possible that co-operatives may avoid underinvestment by acting against their assumed 
preferences of individual income-generation, ensuring that they invest at a high level, 
even when this level is higher than their individual self-interest would dictate, in order 
to secure the longevity of the firm. Miller (1981:322-323) suggests that co-operative 
survival and the social purposes of the firm may be taken into account as factors 
alongside personal income when making investment decisions, although this would still 
lead to underinvestment compared to a capitalist firm. As a result “in the long term the 
capitalists will always tend to drive out the co-operators” (1981:323). Dahl (1985:123) 
suggests that the short-termism of management decisions is equally a problem in 
capitalist firms attempting to maximise shareholder returns. It could be argued that 
long-termism would be the norm in co-operatives in comparison to shareholder-owned 
firms since shareholders can sell their shares quickly whilst workers, if they leave the 
firm, need another job to go to. As a result, the failure of the firm due to a lack of 
investment or expansion is a real risk to members, and therefore an assumption that the 
interest of co-operative members is to increase the short term per-member income is 
myopic. Hansmann (1990) suggests the inverse as a potential cost for worker ownership 
– shareholders, due to having a large stake in the firm, homogeneous preferences and 
being easy to organise, are well placed to govern a firm, whereas workers might have 
divergent preferences depending on their priorities and position within the firm. 
 
Thornley (1981) also suggests issues around finance in co-operatives. She suggests that 
the capital available to co-operatives is generally very small, due to minimal investment 
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by members, and that banks are reluctant to extend credit to co-operatives due to issues 
in assessing the risk of lending to collectively owned capital (1981:65). However, only 
one of her 40 case study co-operatives was refused a loan, due to specific political 
reasons (1981:71). She separates internal capital (loans from members, shareholdings 
and surpluses) from external capital (loans from external organisations such as banks). 
It is not uncommon in worker co-operatives for shareholding to be limited to a purely 
nominal figure rather than a significant level of capital. As a result, loans from 
members, especially at start-up, or loans from wages are quite common. In terms of 
loans, the level of security on the loan is a key factor in how easily the co-operative can 
afford the interest payments without sacrificing profitability. (1981:70). Although 
impressive in its scope, it is important to consider the timing of Thornley's study – in the 
late 1970s during a period of recession and industrial dispute the overall economic 
context was very different, and in particular financial markets were less developed. 
Interest rates were also far higher than in recent years, making borrowing far more 
expensive. As a result the applicability of some of the findings to today's economic 
environment is limited. However, Bowles and Gintis (1993:167) suggest another 
problem for co-operatives seeking credit, based on the fact that workers are likely to be 
asset-poor, compared to asset-rich capitalist firm owners, so will be less able to secure 
cheap credit even if credit markets are functioning competitively; labour is not in a good 
position to bear risk (Putterman 1993) and is unlikely to have collateral (Vanek 
1970:318; as cited in Jossa 2014:55). This might result in risk-aversion on the part of 
the co-operative, which could lead to sub-optimal rates of innovation and expansion, 
although Jossa (2014:60) suggests that there is a possibility for co-operatives to make 
quite risky investments since the costs of failure are borne by lenders whilst the 
potential profits can be reaped by members. On the other hand, workers are dependent 
on the co-operative for their job security so it is also possible that they would be 
reluctant to make risky investments in spite of this logic (Jossa 2014:60). It is also noted 
that lenders are more likely to give loans where the risk-bearer also invests their own 
money in the firm (Putterman, 1993:246), but co-operative members may struggle to do 
this and thus pay higher costs for capital. Co-operatives are often argued to only really 
cluster in labour-intensive industries due to capital scarcity issues (Thornley, 1981), and 
that “shortage of capital for re-equipment may force workers into a high rate of 'self-
exploitation' in attempting to compete with better-equipped private firms”, requiring co-
operatives to reinvest considerable amounts of their surplus, requiring members to agree 
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to lower wages in the meantime (Fletcher 1976:117). It could be suggested that this is 
particularly the case where capital is firm-specific, explaining a lack of industrial co-
operatives (Hansmann 1990:166). Jossa (2014) engages with the evidence to reach the 
contrary conclusions that co-operatives have the possibility of both underinvesting and 
overinvesting, perhaps demonstrating the importance of context in determining co-
operative behaviour. It is argued that although incentives for underinvestment exist, 
principally for the time-horizon problem described above, overinvestment could occur 
as workers attempt to trade current incomes for future job security, on the assumption 
that more investment makes their jobs as secure as possible. Overinvestment could also 
occur due to the security of assets, since workers are unlikely to leave voluntarily when 
they have the option of voice through democratic control mechanisms, which in turn 
increases commitment to the firm.  
 
Overall there are many arguments to suggest that underinvestment and a lack of access 
to capital markets could present a problem for worker co-operatives, regardless of 
whether or not they are organised in terms of collective or individual ownership of 
assets, or whether or not they are self financed or externally financed (see Vanek 1970; 
as cited in Jossa 2014:xx for a distinction between worker-managed and labour-
managed firms on the basis of sources of finance and asset ownership, with the key 
difference being that the LMF pays returns to both capital and labour). However, there 
are also some convincing arguments that co-operatives will actually overinvest to 
provide more security. It is only empirical study which will be able to offer a definitive 
account, and even then only in a specific context since the attitude of members to risk, 
their tendency to invest for security a weighed against increased short term income, and 
the attitude of lenders are all likely to be rooted in the specific political and economic 
environment of the co-operative. 
 
3.4.3 Degeneration of Co-operatives 
 
It is also argued that co-operatives degenerate over time as the incentive to allow more 
members to join is minimal for existing members when they could simply hire extra 
labour to expand. This then reproduces the authority relation present in a capitalist firm 
(Pencavel 2001:17). The degeneration thesis suggests that market logic will continue to 
prevail in co-operatives which seek to maximise dividends for their members. If surplus 
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is to be distributed between members, then according to this same logic the members 
would try to keep membership in the co-operative as low as possible. On the other hand, 
this will limit the total surplus to be divided, assuming economies of scale and 
competition. Therefore, there are conflicting logics – to grow the company to generate 
increased surplus, and to keep the membership small enough to make the surplus 
attractive enough to continue co-operation. The solution to this problem is for the 
existing members of the co-operative to take on non-member workers who are waged 
rather than sharing in a surplus. In effect, co-operatives become “victims of economic 
success” (Baldacchino 1990:464). The extent to which is may represent a problem for 
co-operation is twofold. Firstly, if the non-member workers are still able to enjoy the 
democratic principles of the co-operative, the implications for their work experience 
may be fairly minimal, assuming wages are fair. The second implication depends on 
how surplus is distributed at the co-operative anyway – if surplus is not evenly 
distributed among members and wage compression is low, the addition of non-member 
waged workers would probably not create a two-tier system of workers. Finally, if the 
members form an authority in the firm over the non-member workers, we would not 
necessarily expect any departure from management styles in capitalist firms. Other 
forms of degeneration are possible – for example, a successful co-operative may be 
bought out by private capital offering an irresistible sum (Baldacchino 1990:465). 
 
Baldacchino (1990) suggests a different theoretical case for degeneration. Starting from 
the premise that co-operatives tend to fail, he suggests that this is due to under-
capitalisation, their typical operation in risky or competitive sectors, a lack of 
management expertise and diffuse authority structures. In particular, because co-
operatives often come from 'rescue' operations for failing firms, they are crippled from 
their inception, and this could lead to a high failure rate. He suggests a Gramscian 
approach to co-operatives, noting that: 
 
degenerative pressures are seen to emanate from power relations established at the 
point of production. This leads to a social structure with an unequal distribution of 
power which is then defended, reproduced and legitimized by social institutions 
(1990:466)  
 
In other words, the existing logic of the capitalist mode of production reproduces itself 
63 
and is hostile to opposing views, such as worker co-operation. Co-operatives are 
founded on a particular set of social relations, such as those of founding members, 
especially in the case of a rescue co-operative, and these in turn are legitimised by 
capitalist ideas. In particular, institutions of capitalism are seen as the norm, such as: 
 
the acceptance of inequality in the distribution of power and wealth on the basis of 
private property, the consideration of labour as a dehumanized commodity and the 
selective deposition of knowledge among 'experts' (Illich 1977, Marx 1959, Sik 
1984; as cited in Baldacchino 1990:468) 
 
Co-operatives cannot survive easily in hostile institutional environments. Where the 
worker co-operative cannot be seen as an entrepreneur, where workers cannot be seen as 
managers and where individuals lack a democratic consciousness within the co-
operative, such enterprises are likely to fail, lacking investment, market confidence and 
solidarity. Those that have succeeded have done so because they already existed in a 
supportive environment, for example taking advantage of lending from other co-
operatives, or were able to create such an environment through socialisation. Rothschild 
(2009:1031), writing on the scarcity of co-operatives in the US, also notes the prevailing 
culture of capitalism which legitimises bureaucracy and hierarchy. Furthermore, Elster 
(1989:100-110) also raises issues for co-operatives caused by the dominance of 
capitalist employment relations, suggesting that since preferences of workers are 
generated endogenously in capitalism, the relative rarity of co-operatives is likely to act 
as an impediment to further experimentation with the model, and a similar point is made 
by Rothschild (2009:1031) who asks “[h]ow can people gain experience in democratic 
communication and egalitarian relations when there are relatively few examples [in the 
US]”. Alongside this, substantial discrimination against co-operatives may exist. Elster 
(1989:97) suggests that this may be indirect – for example if suppliers expect co-
operatives to lack access to credit due to discrimination from banks, they may only want 
to accept cash payments, or vice versa. Bowles and Gintis (1993:95) also suggest a 
range of environmental constraints on democratic firms when attempting to operate in 
an economy populated almost entirely by capitalist firms. 
 
Egan (1990) describes this issue with reference to authority under market competition. 
Large-scale production requires supervision and organisation and, under capitalist 
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property rights, this role is performed by capital. However, in most large firms it is 
stockholders who actually own the company, and the role is performed by management 
on their behalf, with the owners of capital appropriating the surplus generated by the 
management (Marx 1998:434-435). Although the traditional capitalist organisation has 
become more complex, the relationship of labour to capital does not change. If the 
property rights are reversed, and a workers co-operative is produced, we see labour 
performing the supervisory role (perhaps by employing a manager) and appropriating 
the surplus (Marx 1998:385-286). However, the objective of supervision is to maximise 
surplus, and in a competitive market this will lead to a constraint on the ideal working 
conditions that a co-operative would, in other circumstances, pursue. Wealth becomes 
concentrated in successful co-operatives whilst labour exploits itself in attempting to 
maximise surplus. As a result, co-operatives either fail to compete in the market and 
dissolve, or end up degenerating into capitalist firms (Egan 1990).  
 
Marx (1996b) suggested three institutions which would help to prevent degeneration. 
Firstly, he suggested that all workers in a co-operative must be members and share in 
the firm's surplus. Secondly, he suggested a national organisation of co-operatives in 
order to prevent co-operatives from forcing one another to act as capitalists, and finally 
suggested a national fund for co-operatives to be made from shares of surplus in order 
to move towards more equal distribution of co-operative surplus. However, working in 
the limitations of the liberal market economy of modern-day Britain, these seem to be 
unlikely to solve the problem since co-operatives are still forced to compete with 
capitalist firms, and the relatively low density of co-operatives in virtually every sector 
means that there are very few institutions which can bind co-operatives together and 
prevent them from undermining each other through competition. It is worth noting that 
the Mondragón co-operatives do meet most of these requirements in a fashion (see 
Chapter 4), for example through having a co-operative bank which could be said to 
resemble Marx's national fund, and this may be a reason for their economic and co-
operative successes, alongside the strong working-class movements mentioned below. 
 
Ellerman (1990) notes the importance of separating ownership and control, stating that 
power within the co-operative needs to come from membership rather than ownership. 
This view is echoed in Horvat (1979:76) who argues that producer co-operative are not 
a “genuine labor [sic] managed firm” because “self-management is behaviourally 
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incompatible with private or collective ownership…social ownership means the right to 
participate in decision making is derived from employment not ownership”. If there are 
no capital owners in the co-operative, there is no incentive to degenerate. Elster 
(1989:100) suggests five methods of co-operative ownership, of which only collective 
ownership of all assets by the worker, leasing of capital by workers or external but non-
voting share ownership can offer absolute worker control and hence protect against 
degeneration. The other two types of ownership – share ownership in full or in part by 
workers based on either one-member-one-vote or one-share-one-vote systems – are 
problematic as not all members may be shareholders, power may be unequally 
distributed amongst members, or some shareholders may not also be workers. However 
if the co-operative is required to take out loans as a significant source of finance, the 
autonomy of worker control could be jeopardised if third-party lenders place restrictions 
on how the firm can operate in exchange for credit (Pencavel 2001:74). 
 
Egan argues that the success of the co-operative venture as both a business and a 
democratic entity relies on the ability of labour to mediate the pressures of the market. 
In order to survive, co-operatives need to be in economies with strong labour 
movements based in a solidaristic tradition, class consciousness and with a strong 
resource base. Successful co-operatives in Europe, for example, were built on strong 
working class solidarity, as in the Mondragón co-operatives in Spain, or had roots in 
political movements and parties, as in France and Italy. In the UK, this is not the case 
and although a co-operative movement exists, it has generally been created from above, 
mostly by Christian socialist movements, and has comparatively weak links to labour 
movements (Egan 1990:77-82). This argument appears to have some validity – 
economies with strong labour movements are likely to have better working conditions 
than economies without, and therefore capitalist firms will have less of an advantage 
over co-operatives in terms of how much they could exploit their workforce. Egan 
(1990:78-79) also suggests that co-operatives in economies with strong traditions of 
labour solidarity would be less likely to exploit non-member workers, noting that 
European co-operatives tend to treat non-members preferentially compared to their 
treatment in British and American co-operatives. Ultimately, he concludes that 
degeneration is not in itself an intrinsic challenge to co-operation but is one which is 
posed by the contradictions present for co-operatives in capitalist markets.  
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3.5 Questions and Hypotheses for Research 
 
This research is based on two main questions – firstly, whether or not co-operatives can 
produce institutions which improve the quality of working life through increased control 
over time in the static and dynamic time-frames; and secondly, whether co-operatives in 
liberal capitalism can provide a stable and secure basis for exercising this control. If 
they cannot do this, then they cannot be effective sources of control. From the theory in 
this chapter, it is possible to construct a series of questions and hypotheses which will 
form the basis of the analysis of the empirical evidence collected at the case study co-
operative.  
 
Control over work: The control of the firm by workers could lead to a decision making 
process which acknowledges the need for flexibility and enjoyable work, since workers 
are in control of how the workforce is organised and may divide labour differently. This 
would be likely to include the breaking up of hierarchical decision making processes 
and the implementation of more task rotation, and this should lead to more space to 
make choices and to bring concerns and needs of members to decision-making forums 
more easily, improving static control. Over time we might expect the democratic 
capacities of the members to expand as they become used to sharing power in this way. 
Workers managing each other may be able to share tasks rather than burden one another 
with them allowing all to enjoy the experience of work in the short term. The authority 
relationship is broken down, and therefore workers are able to enjoy autonomy in 
performing tasks. The control enjoyed by workers is likely to lead to high levels of 
motivation, and this will increase as more control and security is gained, in accordance 
with Haagh's (2011a) findings. The quality of working life might be expect to improve 
in terms of alienation and dignity, with workers taking pride in the idea of working for 
themselves and being free from hierarchical relationships with bosses. However, this 
could also be a problem as it could attract workers who are not able to run a business 
effectively – an adverse selection problem – which would jeopardise the firm's survival. 
Workers in a co-operative have a wide knowledge of the production process and are 
able to perform multiple tasks, allowing them to develop careers and skills for the 
future. Their democratic role in managing the business entails an inherent engagement 
and development of human capacities. The relative stability of work in the co-operative 
means that there will be more incentives for workers to invest in themselves, and 
67 
expropriation risks are minimised by the stake that each worker has in the firm, which 
could be a monetary investment, an investment of time and energy, or just that the costs 
of exit are potentially high. Having a wider knowledge of the production process and 
less division of labour will require more workers to become trained in more tasks, and 
allow them the space to understand and specialise should they wish. The division of 
labour is likely to allow for large amounts of on-the-job learning in many different areas 
of the co-operative. However, such a division of labour may be inefficient and could 
harm productivity, depending on the technologies available in the sector, so we might 
expect to see this working best in labour-intensive industries.  
 
Control over time: It should be easier for individuals to exercise control over time in 
both the static and dynamic time-frames – that is, throughout the working day and in the 
longer term to control shift patterns and ensure a flexible allocation of working hours. 
The knowledge gained from task rotation should enhance flexibility for both workers 
and the firm by allowing the individual to do lots of different types of work within the 
firm. In a longer term, dynamic sense, this would allow members to pursue other jobs 
and have more freedom in other spheres of life, such as care and family commitments. 
As a result they may be able to have a job that they can fit around their own lives rather 
than losing the freedom to engage in many different activities in order to earn a living. 
They might also be able to use their increased control to plan for the future more easily. 
However, the effects of self-exploitation might be such that individuals give too much 
to the collective, with peer-pressure degrading their control and therefore their 
capacities for freedom. 
 
Stability, security and survival: We would expect to see employment stability to be far 
higher in the worker co-operative since the property right to employment is owned by 
the worker. Workers will probably not be employed through short-term contracts. On 
the other hand there is little incentive to set up redundancy schemes or severance pay, 
whilst these may be needed in less stable employment as compensatory schemes by 
capitalist firms. Democratic decision making within the firm is unlikely to advocate 
laying off workers where possible, as seen in Pencavel (2001:70). Co-operative firms 
may be quite likely to survive, since workers will have an incentive to invest heavily in 
order to keep their jobs, and will have access to information about the financial situation 
of the firm. Democratic decision-making by individuals could be quite long-term 
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depending on job tenure, but the sense of control at co-operatives could be a reason 
which motivates staying at the firm. The attitude to members towards the firm will be 
key in understanding how they choose to make investment decisions. These firms are 
also likely to grow slowly due to a lack of access to credit or equity funding. However, 
they may also be fairly competitive for reasons of efficiency and work ethic, including 
establishing norms of responsibility, although this might not be valid for larger co-
operatives which could struggle with free-rider problems. Wages are likely to be low in 
the start-up phase, which means less control for workers since they will be forced to 
work more hours, perhaps at other jobs, in order to survive. The security of start-up co-
operatives might also be questionable, which creates insecurity and a lack of control, 
requiring sacrifices from members, such as the deferred payments of sweat equity, in 
order for the firm to survive. 
 
These improvements in control over time through control of the workplace exist in the 
context of a liberal economy, in which such control is limited by the prevailing market 
relations of job markets, which. Meaningful worker control can only be accomplished in 
such economies through worker ownership (Gupta 2014:101), since corporatist systems 
of governance are unusual and such control is unlikely to exist in conventional firms. 
Employment in liberal economies is characterised by flexibility and low skills, and 
therefore there is the possibility for a very different experience of employment in a co-
operative which would be an expansion of freedoms in work. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has put forward a set of questions about how co-operatives might, based on 
their definition explored in the introduction, be able to deliver an emancipatory 
experience of working life in which developmental freedom based on extensive static 
and dynamic control is high. It has looked at the potential of co-operatives critically 
from economic and political perspectives in terms of their advantages compared to 
conventional firms. It has argued that the property rights and management structures of 
co-operatives, although potentially useful, will not emerge or will be made less efficient 
in liberal capitalist economies. This is due to the property rights within the firm in 
conventional capitalism, which encourage heavily divided labour, minimise training and 
provide incentives for overuse of 'skilled' machinery. This raises the question of 
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whether it is actually possible, in a systemic environment of liberal capitalist 
institutions, to develop an alternative set of property rights in a very small subset of 
firms which will change the experience of work.  
 
It has then argued from a more structural perspective that co-operatives are themselves 
unstable due to their difficulties in managing finance for expansion, which dooms them 
to failure in a Darwinist, Schumpterian capitalism. It is also suggested that they are 
unable to expand whilst retaining their co-operative character for two reasons – firstly, 
due to the interests of established members, and secondly due to a wider reason based 
on norms of capitalism – in order to survive they will have to mimic the capitalist firm 
and in doing so will degenerate. The next chapter will examine a series of case studies 
from the literature categorised to engage with these issues and from this will set up the 
central questions of the empirical research carried out in this thesis. 
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4 
Review of Empirical Studies of Co-operatives 
 
The last chapter explained the the role of institutions in creating the conditions for co-
operatives to develop. It suggested that changing these institutions, in particular 
overturning the employment relationship and redefining the property rights within the 
firm, could generate sources of control, whilst acknowledging the difficulty of changing 
institutions in the modern economy. It also examined the issues around the operation of 
co-operatives from an economic theory perspective, suggesting that co-operatives 
struggle with poor management, compromised access to credit and a tendency to 
degenerate, and therefore are not well positioned to offer the stability and security 
needed for a high degree of dynamic control to develop. Although static control might 
be possible in the short term, there is no scope within this for the individual to plan in 
the long term due to the inherent tendency of co-operatives towards failure; and if this 
failure is avoided, the freedom of the individual within the co-operative is inhibited due 
to a potential trade-off between efficiency and democracy (Clarke 1984). 
 
This chapter looks at several case studies from the co-operative literature and concludes 
by summarising the main points that these studies raise. These studies demonstrate the 
potential problems faced by co-operatives as well as highlighting their successes in 
changing the experience of work, giving a perspective on the real-world operations of 
co-operatives. Firstly, the chapter examines British co-operatives in the 1970s and 
1980s, drawing on a range of qualitative and quantitative studies. At this time co-
operatives were attracting large amounts of academic attention, but many were 
conversions of failing firms known as rescue co-operatives. These are explored 
specifically, both in the UK and in a newer case of occupied factories in Argentina. The 
chapter then moves on to look at the experiences of both smaller co-operatives in the 
US, which resemble Wholefoods A and the Printing Co-op in terms of size; and the 
plywood co-operatives from the Northwest of the US which again have attracted 
substantial academic attention, partly due to their resiliency in an otherwise highly 
liberal market. The chapter moves on to two studies of large wholefoods co-operatives 
in the UK and the US – a category in which we could situate Wholefoods B. Finally the 
Mondragón federation in Spain, a set of co-operatives which have been the subject of a 
71 
number of studies, are examined in order to assess the reasons for their survival and 
success. Although the focus of this study is co-operatives in the UK, there are still 
important conclusions to be found from the operation of broadly similar models in 
different contexts. 
 
4.1 Co-operatives in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
A substantial proportion of the literature on co-operatives in the UK is based on the 
1970s and 80s – principally in response to two main events. The first was the 
intervention by the government to rescue three major firms through funding worker 
ownership – Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering (KME), Meriden Motorcycles and 
the Scottish Daily News – in the 1970s (see 4.2 Rescue Co-operatives). All three were 
eventual failures and collapsed. The second event is the conversion of Scott Bader to 
employee ownership, finalised in 1963. This organisation was credited with the 
formation of other co-operatives through providing support through the Industrial 
Common Ownership Movement (ICOM), which was formed in 1971 and provided rules 
and aid for co-operatives (Ridley-Duff 2009:52). The failure of conventional firms to 
provide good wages during economic crises of the 1970s, the failure of nationalised 
industries and a rise in alternative movements, such as the wholefoods movement, were 
also key factors for the rise in interest in co-operatives at the time (Young & Rigge 
1983). 
 
Cornforth et al. (1988) conducted a study of sixteen co-operatives in the UK between 
1984 and 1986, across a range of sectors and types of co-operative in order to 
investigate three features of the co-operative: business performance, the nature of the 
workplace and how they work as co-operatives as well as focussing on CSOs (co-
operative support organisations) aimed at helping co-operatives to develop. Interviews 
with members of co-operatives were conducted. The writers developed four orientations 
towards work – the instrumental, focusing on wages and job security; the social, which 
values loyalty and friendship in the workplace; the moral, which is based around ideas 
of purposive work both in terms of the work process or the product and finally control 
at the levels of task, department and organisation (1988:97). These categories fit well 
with ideas of control and security with the social and moral aspects being subsumed into 
ideas of quality of working life and motivation for co-operation, whilst control at 
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different levels and security allow for more control over working life more generally, 
which also increases motivation in work (Haagh 2011b). 
 
4.1.1 Co-operative Typologies from this Literature 
 
Cornforth et al. (1988) emphasise the importance of different types of co-operatives, 
highlighting the fact that just like conventional capitalist firms, co-operatives are not 
homogeneous. In particular they divide the organisations studied into a matrix of the 
origin of the co-operative and the motivation behind its formation (1988:9, see Table 1). 
Thornley (1981) studied a cross-section of British co-operatives in the 1970s, including 
rescue co-operatives and “collectives”. The term “collective” is not really defined by 
Thornley but seems to suggest co-operatives set up with the intention of operating as 
alternative business structures, often selling an “alternative” product such as 
wholefoods. The Printing Co-operative Wholefoods B and the Bakery Co-operative 
seem to fit into this model, with Wholefoods A also being similar although technically a 
conversion since it grew slowly into a co-operative.  
 
Origin of co-op Dominant Motivation Behind Formation 
 Philanthropic Radical/Idealistic Job Creation/Saving 
Failing Business   'Rescue' and 'phoenix' 
co-ops 
Conversion of Viable 
Business 
'Endowed' co-ops E.g. 'alternative' 
conversions 
Wholefoods A 
 
New Start 'Philanthropic new-
start' co-ops 
E.g. 'alternative' co-
ops 
Wholefoods B, 
Bakery Co-op 
Printing Co-op 
'Job-creation' co-ops 
 
 
Table 1: “A preliminary typology of worker co-operatives” from Cornforth et al. (1988:9, Table 
1.1), adapted to include case studies. 
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4.1.2 Findings from the 1970s and 1980s 
 
Cornforth et al. (1998) generally found that instrumental motivations for cooperation 
were more prevalent in rescue and job-creation co-operatives but their role was less 
important in alternative co-operatives. The co-operatives offered relatively better job 
security when compared with alternative modes of employment, in particular in job-
creation and rescue co-operatives. This particularly applied, at the time of the study, to 
women and older men who were concerned about redundancies. More flexibility of 
hours was also mentioned as an attractive feature of the co-operative (1988:98). The 
different nature of work in the co-operative also led to better wages in some sectors, as 
price differentials between jobs were decreased, in particular in shop work and 
warehouse packing
4
. Members of these co-operatives had a different type of job than 
they may have had in a capitalist competitor as they experienced more varied tasks and 
a degree of responsibility. In counterpart firms, they may have seen more division of 
labour as these mixed-responsibility jobs did not generally exist in capitalist firms. 
However, this was not always the case, especially for more skilled members who were 
overqualified for their jobs (1988:99).  
 
Direct benefits in static control were prevalent in both flexibility and task rotation. In 
several of the co-operatives studied, there was a strong sense of task-level control 
allowing for individual creativity and setting the pace of work without a strong authority 
at the task-level (1988:101). There was generally more variety of tasks, as mentioned 
above, due to task-rotation, and an emphasis on learning new skills. Individuals also 
valued organisational control over the use of surplus and the wage level, in particular in 
rescue co-operatives. Different advantages of worker control tended to be split between 
different types of co-operative. Job-creation or rescue co-operatives valued 
organisational control more highly, whilst in alternative co-operatives, the focus was 
more on task-level self-management. Some workers in alternative co-operatives did not 
enjoy their role as managers. This was reflected in the level of task rotation at the 
different types of co-operatives, with rescue and job-creation co-operatives more likely 
to divide the labour force for reasons of efficiency and surplus-maximisation than 
 
4 It should be noted that there is some evidence to suggest that co-operatives can offer higher 
average annual wages than equivalent conventional firms in France (SCOP 2008; as cited in 
Nolan et al. 2013:109). 
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alternative co-operatives which favoured task rotation.  
 
Costs of working in co-operatives were also identified. Costs “intrinsic to the tasks 
performed” (1988:104) were still present – manufacturing jobs remained monotonous or 
dangerous, for example. This cost was present in all types of co-operatives, perhaps 
hinting that task rotation was not a panacea for the costs of some types of work. Low 
wages, long hours and poor conditions were also often reported as a cost, affecting the 
quality of life outside of work and raising the idea of self-exploitation discussed in the 
last chapter, where the survival of the co-operative requires the exploitation of its 
individual members. However, many co-operatives have raised wages over time and 
people have tolerated lower wages, especially in alternative co-operatives where a 
political or moral imperative existed for the company. This raises the idea that co-
operatives have to trade lower wages for a better quality working environment but also 
suggests this is a temporary issue at start-up and that as the co-operative reaches 
maturity it is able to raises wages and reduce working hours, suggesting that control 
over time is sacrificed in the short term in order to secure future gains. This was also 
observed in Thornley (1981:76) who notes that at some cases wages are low but with 
the objective of paying the national average in the long-term.  
 
Co-operation in itself also presents some costs. Work was at times stressful as members 
were involved in managerial decisions for which they had little experience or training, 
especially in a collective and democratic mode of operations. There was increased 
uncertainty about the business as members were responsible for its survival and could 
not leave the decisions up to managers. It was also found to be difficult to reprimand 
those who are not working as hard and to balance tensions between self-management 
and poor work, especially in rescue co-operatives more used to clear authority in the 
workplace. A lack of good quality feedback on work exacerbated this problem. 
Members sometimes complained that they were expected to work harder than they were 
comfortable with or face being accused of a lack of commitment, again raising the issue 
of self-exploitation. It was also found that democratic decision making was far from an 
ideal model, with “informal hierarchies” and hidden agendas developing over time. 
Meetings were also tedious and took up working time (1988:106), and a strong sense of 
conservatism, especially in older or larger co-operatives, led to disillusionment when 
change was not forthcoming. On balance however, most members interviewed did not 
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want to return to conventional employment and showed a high level of commitment to 
the co-operative even where wider moral or social imperatives did not exist. The longer 
hours or poorer conditions were balanced by the increased satisfaction of working in a 
co-operative. On the other hand, in the case studies used, the high levels of commitment 
could be due to a lack of alternative employment and the age and dependencies of the 
members interviewed (1988:10).  
 
Thornley (1981:81) notes several of the issues in management of her case study co-
operatives, including issues of managerial skills shortages, issues of democracy when 
ideals of founding members clash with newer members' ideas, and divisions between 
short-term gain for individuals and the sacrifices needed for long-term viability. She 
notes that it is not uncommon in co-operatives for administrative jobs to be rotated to 
some degree, but that this can have an impact on profits. There is however an idea in co-
operatives that “traditionally highly rewarded jobs should be demystified and shared 
among the workforce” (1981:83) such as book-keeping and marketing. Task rotation 
can have benefits, such as sharing understanding of people's jobs, building all-round 
skills and constructing ideas of shared responsibility for management and 
administration.  
 
In terms of morale, in particular in internalising co-operative values, a class divide is 
also noted. Ideologically-driven co-operatives, which in Thornley's work are principally 
middle-class enterprises referred to as collectives (1981:87) are made up of workers 
who probably enjoy a higher degree of economic security. They have skills they can fall 
back on to for other employment, access to professional development, and sometimes 
other assets to support them in the event that their co-operative fails. This means that 
they are driven predominantly by their ideas and are able to create a 'pure' co-operative 
which privileges the democratic aspects of the firm. Their co-operatives “have a better 
chance of surviving but it matters less if they fail” (1981:87). This was also highlighted 
by Myers (2006:208) who suggests that it is mostly those from privileged backgrounds 
who will be able to enjoy a sense of ideological satisfaction from co-operative work due 
to the low profitability and instability of such enterprises. Working class co-operatives, 
such as rescue co-operatives, are in an opposite situation in which employment is the 
chief goal. Democracy here is important as it gives a sense of control for workers who 
would otherwise not have jobs. However, if this starts to be eroded by sacrifices made 
76 
for profitability and survival, the co-operative as a whole is likely to fail due to the drop 
in morale and commitment to making its values work in an economic environment. In 
Cornforth et al. (1988) the social and solidaristic element of co-operation was less 
present in rescue co-operatives but still had an important role to play, especially in 
learning skills as it created a workplace atmosphere that was more amenable to on-the-
job learning. It also created a commitment to the co-operative firm, although it was not 
the most important motivation for forming co-operatives. Moral benefits generally arose 
in the alternative co-operatives including those involved in wholefoods and printing for 
left-wing and community organisations. These represented an important factor for 
some, but not all members. Again, this analysis is set against the backdrop of the 
economic recessions of the 1970s in which the job creation/rescue element of co-
operatives was very important, and there is limited evidence to suggest that this idea 
still applies thirty years later.  
 
Welford (1990) notes the lack of empirical data about worker co-operatives due to the 
small population of such firms and reviews previous large-scale studies from the 1970s 
and 1980s, the largest of which (Wilson 1983; as cited in Welford 1990:305) involved 
113 worker co-operatives and noted the “multi-functional” aspects of co-operatives, 
such as ideological causes alongside flexible work. Welford himself examined, via a 
survey, 78 co-operatives and noted several aspects of their objectives, growth, 
organisation, and management. Crucially it is noted that profit-maximisation does not 
appear to be a priority for co-operative firms due to their ideological focus and their 
very small size which does not allow for optimal efficiency. Priorities identified at the 
co-operatives included “the atmosphere at work, wanting to work for oneself, the 
provision of a particular product, and a desire for equality with fellow workers” 
(1990:306). From this, a division was also identified between ideologically-focused co-
operatives and job security based co-operatives based on correlations between priorities. 
In terms of the motivations behind co-operatives, Welford makes the important insight 
that “[an approach which] assumes that each member behaves in the way which 
maximises his/her own utility and may be unaffected by the impact of the behaviour on 
others...in the case of the co-operative...may be particularly inappropriate” (1990:312).  
 
Financially, the majority (65%) reported surpluses, casting some doubt on ideas of co-
operatives as financially non-viable. No co-operatives surveyed reported decreased 
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turnover or membership, and most expected increases in turnover. Welford (1990:314) 
does note that there does not seem to be an obvious tendency to expect to expand 
membership alongside expanding surpluses, but suggests this may not be for reasons of 
having more members to share surplus with, but because increased membership would 
weaken the social incentives around co-operation such as the work environment. It was 
reported that in around a third of cases, pay was lower than in the non-co-operative 
sector, but this data is not broken down by sector. Around two-thirds had an equal pay 
structure, with most differentials in pay being based on skill differences, whilst others 
paid based on the number dependants, business brought into the firm or between 
full/part time workers. Non-member workers being paid less were very rare (Welford 
1990:314) 
 
In terms of the organisation of work, most respondents seemed to think that there were 
advantages to organising work on co-operative lines due to more motivation and 
flexibility, less demarcation of jobs and the benefits of self-monitoring. Respondents 
citing disadvantages such as slow decision making, a lack of money for expansion, or 
expectations by members of less work effort were very much in the minority. At most 
firms the work was divided by skill, with task rotation quite rare, but a third of 
respondents replied that there was not division of labour and that the labour force was 
flexible. The use of a manager to allocate work was unusual. Managerially, the co-
operatives tended strongly towards democratic management in the long-term, but the 
use of managers and management teams for day-to-day decisions, with managers almost 
always elected (Welford 1990:317-319). 
 
As with other writers such as Thornley (1981) and Cornforth et al. (1988), Welford 
(1990:319) draws a distinction between forms of co-operatives along the lines of 
radical/ideological co-operatives versus non-political, usually job-creation, co-
operatives, and suggests that the latter does not differ much in behaviour from a small 
capitalist firm, possibly based on the perception that there is a trade-off between co-
operative democratic processes and efficiency. The question arises as to whether this 
trade-off actually exists, given the possible benefit of such a system, or to whether even 
if it does exist, whether more radical co-operatives are prepared to sacrifice some 
efficiency and profitability for a better working environment since, as Welford notes 
that “the production 'norm' by which co-operatives would have been measuring 
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themselves is set by the prevailing form of capitalism” (1990:319). 
 
Oliver and Thomas (1990) examined several cases in the UK in the 1980s in order to 
answer some key questions about co-operative behaviour, especially with regard to the 
extent that they can avoid bureaucratisation and allow members to self-manage rather 
than have them adhere to rules enforced by supervision. They suggest that in the 
absence of hierarchy, behaviour in co-operatives is largely governed by cultural norms, 
which requires “a set of superordinate goals...minima internal divisions...intense 
socialization of new members...[and] structures and system which make individual 
behaviour public” (1990:343). Three case studies are examined in order to establish 
whether worker co-operatives are able to build the successful conditions for cultural 
control under different conditions. 
 
The first case, Recycles Ltd. is a small bicycle co-operative which began as an 
alternative co-operative in the late 1970s. The ultimate authority in the firm is the 
collective decision of all members at general meetings, but this control is rarely 
exercised over specific individuals since it seems there is a “shared sense of what is an 
acceptable decision to make individually and which decisions require collective 
endorsement” (Oliver & Thomas 1990:346). As a result the collective rarely overrides 
the individual. The members seemed motivated by a mixture of radicalism and a desire 
to run a successful business, and over time the former began to give way to the 
businesslike approach. Members seemed satisfied with their jobs which helps to keep 
them committed to the company. The success of cultural control is linked to the low 
membership of 7, common understanding of the work which allows for task rotation, 
which prevents divisions forming in the workforce, and a homogeneous membership 
built from people with a passion first for co-operatives, and then for cycling. This 
homogeneity is aided by the low wages, which mean that only those with a strong 
interest in the jobs will apply. Intriguingly, the “economic marginality” (1990:347) was 
also seen as a reason for this level of shared cultural control since it provides one goal 
for the co-operative – namely, its continued survival – and this limits the scope for 
conflict in the absence of choice and makes members more willing to make personal 
sacrifices for the firm. However, the scalability of this model is questionable since it is 
difficult to imagine collective working at a larger co-operative, and the appeal to co-
operative norms does not seem strong enough without another appeal from a sense of 
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identity or value in work, such as an interest in the products sold (1990:356-357). 
 
The study also examined two larger co-operatives: KME and Scott Bader. KME is 
explored in more depth as a rescue co-operative below. Scott Bader, on the other hand, 
is a philanthropic co-operative which was gifted to its workers in the 1950s and operates 
in a hierarchical manner with a similar management style to that at a conventional firm, 
except that there is a controlled wage differential. There is also an elected system which 
deals with issues of policy and has representation on the company board. There is still a 
strong idea of management along cultural lines despite there being a hierarchical 
system, with the idea that “the managerial role is seen as one of a 'catalyst of common 
effort'” (Oliver & Thomas 1990:349). Members of Scott Bader were typically satisfied 
with their jobs, citing the friendly atmosphere and the quality of the jobs in terms of 
control, variety and skills as reasons for this. They also enjoyed higher pay than they 
would in other firms (with the exception of senior management). Members tended to be 
in favour of the democratic opportunities offered and at the time of the study a third of 
participants had served as representatives at some point. This afforded Scott Bader the 
chance to develop a high degree of cultural control. This was further underlined in 1982 
when Scott Bader bought a failing firm, Synthetic Resins (SRL), but the heavily 
unionised SRL workers were deeply hostile to the idea of a non-unionised workplace at 
which there was no traditional industrial negotiation for wages. With this divided 
workforce, normative control of the firm was an impossibility. Scott Bader later closed 
down SRL in 1985 (Oliver & Thomas 1990). Scott Bader, as a case, demonstrates the 
importance of the need to continually rebuild and restore the norms of the co-operative 
through good channels of communication, enforcement of the ideals of membership, 
and building a strong shared community identity.  
 
These analyses of co-operatives in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s reveal many 
illuminating aspects of how they provide work for their members and how they are able 
to function in a capitalist environment, especially at a time of crisis. The first is that a 
large number of co-operatives seemed able to survive in this period and to grow, and 
that they were able to offer either opportunities for job creation and security, or, more 
radically, a different version of work in which co-operative norms were prioritised. It 
appears that where co-operatives are able to organise work win a non-divided way, such 
as with task rotation, the provision for this is valued by the workforce and has positive 
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effects for the quality of future co-operation. However, the willingness of members to 
accept lower wages is potentially problematic from the perspective of control and 
freedom. The analysis of this could take two arguments – the first is that there is a trade-
off between other advantages of the work such that members choose to take co-
operative jobs for lower wages because they are able to realise more value in the way 
work is organised at the co-operative. This accounts for members continuing their 
employment at the co-operative. The second argument to explain this could be that 
members, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, were not empowered to leave their jobs 
and pursue a better deal, especially more vulnerable members who might struggle to 
find employment elsewhere. Therefore, they were put in the position where they were 
forced to accept lower wages not out of a trade-off but simply as a means of securing 
their jobs – low pay is better than none. There is also a class distinction we could draw 
here – if wages are kept low in order to secure the future of the co-operative and invest, 
it suggests a long-termism we could attribute to ideological preference for the survival 
of the co-operative which can be tolerated by more radical, middle class members but 
comes as a burden to others who are dependent on the co-operative for work.  
 
4.2 Rescue Co-operatives 
 
Rescue co-operatives exist where failing conventional firms are sold or granted, 
sometimes through state intervention, to their workforces, in order to preserve jobs. This 
was particularly salient in the industrially-focused British economy of the 1970s where 
individual firms could be the only major employer in an area, responsible for the 
livelihoods of thousands of people, and represented by strong union. They are perhaps 
best treated as a specific historical case rather than as a current expression of the co-
operative movement, but they can still yield some interesting insights into the nature of 
co-operative working. 
 
Tynan and Thomas (1984) undertook research into the experience of democratic work at 
the Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering Company (KME) in 1974-79 based on a 
series of interviews with members. KME was a rescue co-operative organised by the 
Department of Industry under Tony Benn following a series of industrial action 
involving sit-ins and work-ins in the early 1970s (Oliver & Thomas 1990). It was never 
profitable as a co-operative and relied on grants and subsidies until its collapse in 1979 
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when state support was withdrawn completely following the election of Thatcher. The 
study aims to compare the experiences of work during the democratic experiment of co-
operation, focussing on the effect on individual within the firm. Partly due to the history 
of the firm, the study found significant tensions between different groups with conflicts 
of interest, and between the contradictory roles of the co-operative, such as the need for 
profitability and the need to maintain and sustain employment. They were not resolved 
by co-operation due to “first...the unrealisable expectation that they should be solved, 
and, second, because the co-operative promise is to all so that a solution has to be open 
and not be seen to disadvantage any particular group” (1984:86). There were clashes of 
ideas, particularly between union stewards who were threatened by the democratisation 
of the workplace (1984:87). There was a genuine attempt by activists to democratise the 
workplace and realise co-operative ideals, but these were made more difficult by the 
sheer size of the enterprise and the need to politically organise and educate the 
workforce, the hierarchical union structure which restricted democratisation, and a lack 
of management skills (Tynan & Thomas 1984). The democratic council was never able 
to achieve much legitimacy since it challenged established power relationships from 
both shop-floor unions and the management team (Oliver & Thomas 1990:353). In 
particular the rigid trade union structure combined with attempts by stewards to place 
themselves in a managerial role, led some to argue that the co-operative was not really a 
co-operative at all given that there appeared to still be hierarchical management by 
some workers (Tynan & Thomas 1984:89). However, KME would always struggle at 
first and demonstrates the need for co-operative processes to develop over time. The 
possibility of this happening at KME was limited by external market constraints and 
other specific external factors. Writing before the collapse of KME, Eccles (1976:167-
168) highlighted the issues of a lack of management skills, particularly given the 
unwillingness of some members to become involved in the management of the firm, and 
the problem of market constraints – principally a slump in demand for KME's products. 
In accounting for the failure of KME, poor management was “one of the principal 
causes” (Young & Rigge 1983:35) due to a lack of discipline in the workforce. 
 
Fundamentally the issues at KME were seen as a clash between the old conditions of 
work (based on workers being controlled by management and represented by a union) 
and the potential for the new ones which created expectations which generally were not 
met (Tynan & Thomas 1984). The lack of a strong co-operative consciousness means 
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that members of co-operatives, especially those for whom co-operation is pushed onto 
them rather than coming from the workers themselves, creates a set of contradictory 
expectations amongst different people, and there is a need to negotiate to make the 
objectives and potential of the co-operative clear to all (Tynan & Thomas 1984:91, 
Eccles 1976:168). Without such a model of co-operation, co-operatives are likely to 
degenerate when expectations are not met and contradictions become apparent, resulting 
in a recentralisation of power. (Tynan & Thomas 1984:92). It could be added that a 
commitment to co-operative values is fostered within the co-operative itself through the 
shared experience of forming and managing the firm. Carter (1990:337) suggests that 
the “issue of ownership and authorship is important; people will possess a feeling of 
ownership for what they create...” with reference to a co-operative conversion which 
was imposed on, rather than created by, its workers. In this case, there was limited 
scope for members to develop a commitment to the values of the co-operative and to 
share and develop their ideas about what the firm was about. Where members recognise 
the impact of their control and are able to exercise it at various levels of the 
organisation, they may be more likely to adopt a co-operative approach to their work 
and start to value co-operation. 
 
Bate and Carter (1986:61-66) studied a small shoe-making co-operative in the UK 
which was in essence a rescue co-operative formed after a factory closure due to a drop 
in demand for the product. The co-operative was capitalised at first by the original 
company offering a free lease on the machinery and premises of the factory, and 
through an initial bond paid by each member. However, the lease on the machinery was 
created with certain terms which meant that the small co-operative was producing a 
product which it was not suited for – a low end, cheap product which required mass 
production rather than an expensive one. The co-operative also had trouble getting loans 
from banks who did not accept the business model and stayed in business by not paying 
wages for the first year, and in trading with suppliers and retailers who did not trust the 
co-operative model either. The early struggle for survival meant that it was over a year 
before the co-operative could begin to develop its own identity and establish real worker 
control due to the constraints of the external market. For example, there began to be an 
emphasis on job rotation once the struggle for immediate survival was diminished. 
Workers experienced much higher levels of control and job satisfaction than they did in 
the old factory, especially when assets became co-operatively owned, and as the co-
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operative became more successful it was able to secure loans, albeit with strict terms, 
from commercial lenders. However, the dependence on producing shoes under contract 
for the original owners of the factory limited the flexibility of working patterns that the 
co-operative could offer its members. Part of this dependence on contract work was due 
to the inability of the small co-operative to markets its own goods, demonstrating one 
difficulty that co-operatives face compared to larger rivals. Bate and Carter also note the 
dependency of a rescue co-operative on larger firms – since the factory which closed 
down was not running at a loss, but merely at a low level of profit, the formation of the 
co-operative to save it has created a weak trading partner for the larger firm which is 
then free from the risks of failure in the co-operative whilst exploiting its need for work. 
Thornley (1982:98) also highlights the risks of dependency where co-operatives become 
cheap outsourcing options for larger conventional firms rather than creating and 
marketing their own products. 
 
Alongside this issue of dependency, the details of which are perhaps unique to this 
example where the co-operative rescued one factory rather than an entire failing firm 
and continued to have a relationship with the original firm, the study demonstrates three 
particularly salient points. The first is the issue of dealing with external actors in the 
liberal economy. The co-operative was unable for some time to convince banks and 
other firms that it was reliable and dependable. Secondly, the issue of competing with 
other firms is also raised. The co-operative was unable to market its products (the 
authors do not elaborate on why) outside of the co-operative community which bought 
the products out of support for the business. Therefore it was difficult for the co-
operative factory to get work which was not exploitative contract work. Finally, the 
study demonstrates the importance of time in the co-operative, through identifying the 
problems faced in terms of the first 18 months of start up, followed by a period of self-
discovery and some meeting of co-operative principles before struggling again to get 
work as the co-operative developed. 
 
4.2.1 Worker-Owned Factories in the Argentinian Crisis 
 
Some similar observations can be seen from a more recent case study which was carried 
out in the worker-occupied factories of Argentina at the start of the 21st century (Atzeni 
& Ghigliani 2007). In 2006 around 160 factories had been taken over by workers in 
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order to defend against potential closure and job losses (Atzeni & Ghigliani 2007) as a 
result of both neoliberal reforms and the later 2001-2002 crisis with the current number 
of occupied factories standing at around 205 (Rossi 2015:99). Although these could be 
seen as 'rescue' co-operatives, they are particularly radical as the workers concerned 
generally did not own the factories that they occupied, and forced evictions by police 
occurred in some cases. Occupation usually lasted around a year (Rossi 2015:101). 
Generally, Atzeni and Ghigliani's (2007) work puts forward the idea that the operation 
of liberal markets is a barrier to co-operative modes of production within them, as 
mentioned in the theoretical work above.  
 
The case study, which took place in 2006, employed participant observation techniques 
in four factories, ranging from 30 to 110 workers in size. Workers interviewed placed 
emphasis on their freedom from direct control, and valued egalitarian attitudes to 
income, work and democratic participation (Atenzi & Ghigliani 2007). It should be 
noted the majority of workers received the same salary regardless of their position 
(Rebón 2005:36 as cited in Rossi 2015:105). With regards to the latter, the factories 
tended to have a constitutional statue book which outlined their governance structures, 
consisting of an assembly of all workers and an elected management council. The chief 
decision-making body of the co-operatives is the assembly, which has its agenda set by 
the elected council. The evaluation of this structure was mixed. Meetings of the 
assembly were difficult to organise regularly due to work pressures in factories with 
continuous production, and although this could be to some extent resolved by good 
representation, there was a tension between decision making in the assembly and by 
elected representatives in the council. Workers tended to value the “democracy from 
below” within this system such as the ability to force a meeting of the assembly (Atenzi 
& Ghigliani 2007:661). 
 
The operation of the co-operative as a business interacting in a market economy also 
posed challenges for collective decision making. The need for urgency in business 
discussions, for example, “establishes an a priori agenda interfering with the democratic 
decision-making process” (Atenzi & Ghigliani 2007:662). Workers are forced to do 
more than just produce – in the absence of the former management of the factory, they 
must take over the commercial side of the business also. This reinforces the old 
distinction between those who are involved in production and those who are involved in 
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management, creating a two-tier system and reintroducing skill division, job delegation 
and market logic to the co-operative. Those who work in management generally are less 
sympathetic to the aims of the co-operative as it is they who experience the interactions 
between the co-operative and the market. However, capitalist production is not 
reproduced totally in these firms since although the elected management council and a 
small group of workers oversee the operation of the business through administration and 
management, they can still be held to account by the rest of the workforce (Atenzi & 
Ghigliani 2007). Rossi highlights the emergence of a “new logic of control based on the 
moral responsibility of each worker and the assembly's punishment of those who violate 
a consensus-based system of rules and regulations” (2015:106). 
 
The co-operatives being studied did not generally pursue technical job rotation. This is 
partly due to the problems of getting credit to buy new machinery in order to pursue 
more inventive ways of dividing labour, especially since many of these factories still 
had fairly outdated technology at the time of takeover. (Atenzi & Ghigliani 2007). Some 
credit was supplied by other occupied factories, or by contracting use of the factory to a 
sole provider of materials and buyer of the manufactured goods (Rossi 2015:102). 
Again, the market can be seen to constrain the freedom of the co-operative . However, 
most workers interviewed did want to learn new skills to be able to take on different 
roles in the factory, and there is some anecdotal evidence of this actually happening 
(Atenzi & Ghigliani 2007:664). The changes in the nature of authority at the factories 
could be responsible for changes in work modes, such as individuals working together 
to meet deadlines or taking over each others jobs for short periods to allow more 
flexible working times and breaks. Furthermore, tensions between skilled and unskilled 
workers hinder job rotation – co-operatives are forced to either pay more for these type 
of workers, who generally get a higher wage in capitalist factories than the co-
operatives, or offer them substantial benefits within the workplace in order to retain 
them. Here again we see the labour market conditions governing the freedom of the co-
operative. 
 
The empirical work by Atenzi and Ghigliani (2007) offers a comprehensive account of 
the conditions in these factories and the extent to which the spaces of control 
represented by the co-operative are limited by its interactions with the market. Later 
work by Rossi (2015) highlights the political role of the occupations. The occupied 
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factories became a major political issue and lobbied for changes in the bankruptcy law 
to favour worker ownership over asset-stripping to satisfy debts, with some occupations 
even receiving state support (2015:104). This was made possible to some extent by 
linking political parties, social movements and trade unions with the occupying workers 
in order to increase their political support.  
 
4.2.2 Conclusions on Rescue Co-operatives 
 
The application of the analysis of rescue co-operative in the UK today is quite limited. 
Such organisations were typically a product of the 1970s and were hailed as a method of 
re-energising Britain's struggling industrial sector whilst empowering the workforce. 
Generally it is fair to say that the project was not particularly successful. Rescue co-
operatives start from the worst possible position in a situation of economic crisis 
(Young & Rigge 1983:61) and have to set up co-operative institutions very quickly 
amongst a divided workforce, already hierarchically managed under both the 
management and the trade unionism of the time. None of the co-operatives in this study 
is a rescue co-operative
5
, and in the 21
st
 century such a form, in the UK at least, appears 
to be extremely rare. 
 
However, there are some important lessons we can take from these studies of rescue co-
operatives and worker occupations. Firstly, they demonstrate the difficulties in 
establishing co-operative norms and values amongst otherwise conventionally organised 
workforces. The need to establish a common project and agree on goals mutually seems 
to be a core requirement for the formation of a successful co-operative and demonstrates 
the need for a set of shared values and the adoption of these by new members. It also 
demonstrates the problem of conflicting hierarchies and the potential issues raised by 
parallel systems of control such as trade unions. 
 
All three case studies illustrate the difficult position of the co-operative as it relates to 
the market. Both British cases found themselves limited by access to credit – KME 
relied on the state in order to allow it to survive, whilst the shoe co-operative was not 
seen as a credible business by banks, which placed it at the mercy of its trading partners 
 
5 More detail about the cases is given in Chapter 4: Methods, but in Thornley's (1981) 
categorisation they could be referred to as “collectives”. 
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who had gifted the physical capital of the firm. 
 
Issues of organisation common to most co-operative are also raised, and there is little 
reason to think that rescue co-operatives would not suffer from the same internal and 
structural issues as other co-operatives, as already explained above. The case of KME in 
particular demonstrates the potential for poor management, but the constraints on action 
in KME, including under-capitalisation despite state intervention (Oliver & Thomas 
1990) and the backdrop of trade unionism make it a less than universal case.  
 
4.3 US Co-operatives 
 
Co-operatives in the US are fairly rare, as in the UK, but as another LME the US offers 
some interesting insights into co-operation. Worker co-operatives seem to be linked to 
either alternative communities (Gupta 2014), as in the two cases presented below; or to 
the plywood co-operatives of the Pacific Northwest.  
 
Gupta (2014) examines the Cheese Board Collective (CBC), a large US co-operative of 
55 members
6
, engaging in qualitative interviews with members to establish how it had 
remained successful. The co-operative was formed in 1971 as the philanthropic 
conversion of a firm established in 1967. Gupta engages with the main economic 
critiques of co-operatives – free riding, underinvestment, lack of access to capital, 
degeneration and poor management, and found little evidence to suggest that they were 
valid criticisms of the co-operative model. Strong bonds of responsibility to one 
another, and to future generations, were present at the co-operative, which allowed for 
sacrifices to be made for investment and a strong work ethic to emerge (2013:103). 
Motivation based on ownership was an important factor in creating this sense of 
responsibility (2013:104). The commitment to co-operative principles, even amongst 
new members, was also an effective barrier against degeneration, in particular with 
regards to equal pay (2013:104). Some criticisms of co-operatives were shown to have 
validity, with participants suggesting that some co-operatives had trouble accessing 
credit, but due to the success of CBC this has not been a problem, and it has also been 
able to reinvest surplus successfully and with regards to the future profitability of the 
 
6 Gupta (2014:105) refers to the CBC as a “small organization” in light of comparisons with 
Mondragón. 
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firm (2013:103-104). An inquiry into the ability of co-operatives to make democratic 
decisions effectively was inconclusive, with participants finding the experience both 
valuable and “frustrating” but that decisions made were generally good due to many 
voices being present, although most participants did not feel they personally had much 
control over the firm, since decisions were made collectively (2014:104-105). In this 
respect, the case study highlights the issues of size. It is suggested that the large number 
of members makes democratic decision-making more difficult - “the larger the 
cooperative, the harder it becomes to maintain democratic and egalitarian practices” 
(Gupta 2014:105). 
 
Recent studies of smaller co-operatives are rare in the literature. Cornwell (2012) 
conducted a series of interviews at Collective Copies, a 13-member co-operative in the 
US, which has grown since its formation in 1982 from 4 to 13 members. This means it 
is comparable in size and age to both the Printing Co-operative and Wholefoods A from 
this study. It developed from a strike against a conventional business, and operates on 
democratic model with wage compression based on seniority (2012:726). Participants at 
this case seemed to value “control over time” (2012:730) in both the immediate sense at 
work, but also in the longer term, allowing for the planning of shifts and sabbaticals. 
Such an arrangement was made possible at the co-operative through reciprocity and 
negotiation (2012:731). It was also coupled with a high degree of security since workers 
are unlikely to be fired (2012:734). Control was also improved since decisions about 
how much work needed to be done, and how surplus would be distributed, were made 
democratically and negotiated between members (2012:735). Members valued, but were 
also frustrated by, democratic decision-making, with the benefit raised that 13 minds 
were better able to reach solutions than a single boss (2012:733). Members were able to 
make financial decisions which were not based on immediate benefit, such as donations 
or disability insurance, with healthcare (particularly salient in the US) included as a cost 
of production (2012:735). This long-sightedness also contained a sense of leaving 
something for future generations in terms of the co-operative being able to provide good 
jobs well into the future (2012:736) and are driven by a motivation to spread co-
operative values through expanding their business (2012:737). The self-development of 
the process of democratic decision-making and responsibility was also a benefit of co-
operation raised by this study (2012:734).  
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4.3.1 Plywood Co-operatives 
 
Plywood co-operatives have historically been a major sector in the American co-
operative movement, stemming possibly from Scandinavian immigrant communities 
(Oakeshott 1978:228). Typically at such co-operatives, membership is defined by 
shareholding, rather than employment, which runs against the idea that all workers of a 
co-operative should be members. However, usually a majority of workers are 
shareholders who manage the company according to democratic ideas. They were 
highly productive in comparison with competing conventional firms. There are, 
however, concerns that by operating on this individualist, rather than collectivist, model 
of ownership and control, that they show signs of degeneration and act in many ways 
like capitalist firms with regard to non-member workers (Oakeshott 1978:230). 
Greenberg (1986) notes some key features of the plywood co-operatives, and highlights 
the similarities between different firms. They are democratic organisations with a 
mixture of direct democracy in general meetings of shareholders, and indirect 
democracy in delegation to elected managers and directors. They also operate on a 
principle of equal pay for shareholder/workers alongside dividends. Like Oakeshott 
(1978:229), Greenberg also highlights the division between shareholder and non- 
shareholder workers in the sense that the latter are, unsurprisingly, not given a share of 
the profits. However, he highlights that many of the non-member workers are actually 
paid more than shareholders because they occupy very skilled roles in the production 
process or are hired as managers or foremen, and suggests that there is not necessarily 
an exploitation of non-members at these co-operatives and that they do not compromise 
the democratic principles of the co-operatives (Greenberg 1986:62). In fact, due to the 
nature of the individual shareholdings in these co-operatives, in times of crisis it is 
shareholders who pay the costs, putting in more capital or taking pay cuts, because 
skilled non-shareholder workers cannot be laid off or have their pay cut in case they 
leave (1986:61).  
 
In terms of motivation to join the co-operatives, it was observed that members did not 
join for political or ideological reasons, but instead for financial opportunities and job 
stability. They did, however, come to appreciate the working environment and 
opportunities for participation, in particular with regard to being close to the decision-
making process compared to conventionally owned sawmills. (Greenberg 1986:36-37). 
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Working practices at the plywood co-operatives did not differ in terms of division of 
labour, since the machinery and production techniques are the same as those in 
conventional firms, but did demonstrate a difference in the role of shareholders in acting 
as ad-hoc co-ordinators by rotating jobs and raising awareness of problems – described 
by Greenberg as “spontaneous cooperation” (1986:42). 
 
The nature of the work requires specialised supervisors and foremen, even in worker-
owned plants. However, there were generally fewer of them in the worker-owned plants 
and their role was less supervising individual workers and more focused on co-
ordinating the production process as a whole. This yielded some complaints – the idea 
that the work was not being supervised well enough – and in some ways made the work 
of supervisors more difficult since they had minimal authority over 
shareholder/workers. On the other hand, the shareholders themselves were able to co-
ordinate and supervise each other through peer discipline in order to make the mills 
profitable without resorting to hierarchical management, and many workers valued not 
being treated as “little kids” (Greenberg 1986:45).  
 
In terms of managing the firm overall, Greenberg concludes that the 
worker/shareholders are, as a whole, in control of the firm and are able to manage the 
firm effectively through democratic means. This is helped by a good flow of 
information, although there are only a handful of shareholders who take advantage of it 
formally, and this is helped by the fact that managers retain their jobs on the shop floor 
so are available to discuss issues with other shareholders. This makes the overall 
process of decision-making far less distant and more accountable. There is a high 
turnover of elected board members, perhaps due to the increased workload and minimal 
rewards for holding such a position. Whilst this prevents a clique of influential members 
from forming, which is crucial for a healthy democracy, it could cause instability if 
there are frequent changes. Many co-operatives hire a general manager, who does not 
own shares, and this could present problems of distance and elitism. However, the hired 
status of such managers places them in the position of an employee of the shareholders 
whilst at the same time a source of management skills. Changes of hired manager are 
common (1986:56). One critique put forward by members of such co-operatives is that 
there are too many managers and not enough management expertise, which leads to 
arguments, disagreements and, ultimately, loss of profits due to the time and effort 
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wasted (1986:58).  
 
Pencavel (2001:69-71) notes that the plywood sector in the Pacific Northwest is a 
declining sector, but a relatively volatile one in terms of supply and demand shocks, 
therefore demonstrating the resiliency of the co-operative form in challenging sectors. 
The difference in responses to declining revenues between both capitalist and co-
operative firms is compared, noting that capitalist firms tend to respond to a drop in 
revenue by reducing the number of workers and keeping pay the same, whilst co-
operatives do the reverse, keeping workers and lowering pay, as pay is directly related 
to shares of revenue. For the co-operative, labour expenditure is to be maximised in the 
form of income, whilst for the capitalist firm, it is to be minimised. The focus of the 
study is on the economic success of the co-operatives rather than the situation of the 
workers within them, and it is noted that those that have experienced degeneration have 
done so because they have been extremely successful firms.  
 
4.4 Large Wholefood Co-operatives 
 
It is often assumed that co-operatives can only thrive in niche markets and with a small, 
homogeneous workforce (Meyers 2006). Meyers examines a 200-member grocery store 
in the US, carrying out a five-week long participant observation study alongside survey 
and archival research. She identified a system of democratic management which was 
“highly formal but non-hierarchical” (2006:215) based on a series of elected councils 
and committees at the departmental and interdepartmental levels as well as a long-term 
strategy group of elected members acting as directors. She remarks that this mode of 
management encourages worker participation, especially as such participation is paid 
and highly valued. 
 
This co-operative has been able to offer an excellent package of pay and healthcare 
benefits whilst growing in the face of competition from national food retailers (Meyers 
2006:216-217). The co-operative grew from a very small organisation in the 1970s 
before splitting, in the face of demand from members, into two co-operatives selling 
different forms of goods. These co-operatives then reunited into a large co-operative. 
Unlike many other co-operatives of the same period, it chose to grow rather than to stay 
small (2006:217-218). 
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The co-operative's success has been put down to multiple factors in Meyers' study. She 
found that members placed a large amount of trust in the democratic process and the 
institutions it creates. She also found this management style to be efficient due to the 
horizontal involvement of different departments in the decision-making process. This 
meant that information from one department could flow freely when making strategic 
decisions rather than being contained within hierarchical structures. This democratic 
process also helped to create shared values in the co-operative, with members not 
wanting to take advantage of others but instead working together through the 
democratic channels of communication to improve the co-operative. Turnover is also 
comparatively low as there is no promotion structure which might push some members 
away if they are unable to move up the hierarchy in a conventional firm. This keeps 
knowledge and skill within the co-operative, especially since there is a high turnover of 
members serving on the management committees who develop and retain institutional 
knowledge whilst often also moving between departments, and allows for good 
customer relations (2006:220). Meyers attributes economic growth to democratic 
density, arguing that the expansion of the co-operative allows for the responsibilities of 
management to be spread across a large number of people, so more effort can be put 
towards solving problems and improving the co-operative, attracting more members in 
future. This suggests that some scepticism of the ability of larger co-operatives to retain 
effective democratic principles of ownership and control (e.g. Gupta 2014:105) is not 
generalisable to all co-operatives with large membership. From this it is also suggested 
that there is less time wasted in “plotting and resistance between various levels of 
management and workers” (2006:229). It is argued that rather than being out of control, 
the system of non-hierarchical management is being implemented by all members 
through a “multi-sited panoptical system of control” (2006:229).  
 
Another large co-operative, Suma Wholefoods, has been the subject of a 1987 study 
(Macfarlane 1987). At the time of the report, Suma was a wholefoods wholesaler with 
35 members and is registered as a co-operative with £1 members share which aimed to 
generate surpluses to be reinvested in other co-operatives in the same sector. Suma has 
since expanded to around 150 members (Suma n.d.). Suma is often cited as a co-
operative success story, and even at the time of the 1987 study enjoyed £4 million in 
annual sales and a 20% annual growth rate, accounted for by the growth in the sector, 
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the high quality service offered by interested individuals which was in turn enhanced by 
task rotation and knowledge-sharing, flexibility offered by task rotation and a high level 
of commitment from the workforce. Wages themselves were seen as higher than in 
comparable jobs, but lower than the careers that highly educated members could have 
pursued (Macfarlane 1987:91-92). Management at this co-operative appears to be, for 
the most part, through peer-pressure and shared norms of co-operation rather than 
through explicit control, which, Macfarlane argues, makes the management efficient 
and decisions easily implemented (1987:92).  
 
The study of Suma provides some interesting perspectives on hierarchical management. 
It is argued that the management style has remained collective, and that although 
informal hierarchies of knowledge exist, these are not comparable to the formal power 
which is manifest in a management structure. These hierarchies of knowledge may also 
run in parallel with other informal hierarchies thus ensuring that power is actually 
diffused amongst all members in different ways. The co-operative has actively sought to 
avoid the emergency of hierarchy through restructuring to ensure that key roles are 
filled by diverse sets of members. This also involves implementation of majority 
rulings, rather than absolute consensus, in democratic decision-making. This prevents 
members with entrenched interests from exercising a veto (Macfarlane 1987:93-94). 
 
The work experience at Suma was also reviewed positively, with a focus on autonomy, 
self-esteem and respect, alongside rotation offering people the chance to develop a 
rounded skill set and variety in the jobs they perform. However, pressure on wages and 
working hours, particularly those worked without pay, and the burdens of the type of 
work, all inhibit the ability of members to work outside of Suma. Members particularly 
disliked general meetings and the burdens of democracy (Macfarlane 1987:108). It is 
suggested that there is a self-exploitation in the way in which peer-pressure defines the 
level of commitment required to work at the co-operative and encourages, even forces, 
members to work longer than they would like (Macfarlane 1987:97-98). This suggests 
that self-exploitation is not an issue only in start-ups but can also be a problem when co-
operatives are mature and growing. It was argued that information flow and poor 
planning capacities exacerbate some of these problems, combined with a loss of 
knowledge as old members leave and new members join (1987:99).  
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There are also some wider points made about the nature of co-operative management in 
terms of the entrepreneurship of co-operatives. It is argued that despite formal 
mechanisms for planning and strategic decision-making being weak, autonomous 
individuals were able to push forward with new ideas in their own field, in particular 
with regard to buying (Macfarlane 1987:103). However, this raises concerns that if 
individuals are the source of progress in co-operatives, then the collective management 
is failing to take responsibility for these decisions (1987:107). It is also suggested that 
the risk-aversion of the co-operative allowed for steady growth through the build-up of 
capital, which allows for stable financing throughout its growth, which in itself is only 
one priority amongst many (1987:104).  
 
4.5 The Mondragón Federation 
 
The Mondragón co-operatives offer perhaps the most famous example of a successful 
community of co-operative enterprises. Miller (1981:324-325) describes them as having 
four key features - they occupy a close geographical space with a large number of co-
operatives acting as markets for one another. They are financed by a ‘peoples bank’ 
which offers both capital and advice specifically aimed at supporting the co-operative 
form. The Mondragón co-operatives were formed in 1956, spread over a relatively small 
geographical area in the Basque region of Spain. As well as owning worker co-
operatives, other enterprises are owned under different co-operative models such as a 
housing co-operative, agricultural co-operative and a college. The scheme was 
originally set up in response to the poor education system in post-civil war Spain with a 
community-supported school set up in 1943, and the first co-operatives followed with 
the aim of involving the labour force in the distribution of profits (Campbell et al. 
1977:23-24). The bank, the 'Caja Laboral Popular', was founded in 1959 also operates 
as a workers co-operative and only lends to other co-operatives within the Mondragón 
group. Because the bank is internal to the group, and the profits of the federation are 
shared with the bank’s owners, it is able to take an active shared interest in the finances 
of member co-operatives resulting in stable financing of co-operatives even if they face 
financial difficulties (Clayre 1980, Thomas & Logan 1982:76, Williams 2007). The fact 
that Mondragón operates as a federation means that a range of jobs are available and 
workers can move between different co-operatives as the labour market shifts towards 
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different sectors (Clayre 1980:171).  
 
In 2005, the Mondragón structure consisted of over 200 companies with over 70,000 
members across several countries within a co-operative assembly named the Mondragón 
Corporación Cooperativa (MCC) which incorporates the various elements of the co-
operative under a general assembly. The federation has experiences some restructuring 
as it has grown significantly since its inception (Williams 2007:116 - see also for a 
detailed description of the Mondragón organisation circa 2005). Workers generally 
report good conditions within the federation, and state that they would work for the co-
operatives even if pay was significantly lower than in capitalist firms. At present 
however, most rates of pay rival those of the mainstream labour market with the 
exception of high-level managers, who experience wage compression resulting in their 
pay being at most 9 times the pay of the lowest paid workers (Williams 2007:118-9).  
 
Mondragón is not without its issues and drawbacks. It has been suggested that worker 
control is actually fairly limited in that very few members actively participate in 
democratic decision-making (Clarke 1984:108, Thomas & Logan 1982:189). It has also 
been suggested that it will not innovate in its products in the “Schumpterian” sense due 
to the conservatism of its members, and has the role of reproducing goods invented by 
other firms such that it can only “free ride off capitalism” (Hindmoor 1999:220-221).  
 
Mondragón’s success as a co-operative federation has been attributed to a number of 
factors. Williams (2007:120-122) discusses cultural, organisational, communication, 
financial and dedication factors. It is argued that particular Basque features of self-
reliance, the influence of the Catholic church on social justice and principles of 
solidarity all contribute to the continued dedication of the federation to the co-operative 
model. This is also key in Cheney (2006:190-191) in which the evolution of common 
values around which consensus can be reached is suggested as a reason for relative 
degeneration as newer members enter Mondragón who see many of its principles as 
outdated, suggesting an important role for these shared values. In terms of organisation, 
the role of the federation’s technical school is such that there is little need for 
hierarchical organisations within firms, whilst the presence of the Caja Laboral Popular 
means that capital and expertise are on hand in a way which supports rather than 
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undermines co-operative development. Cheney (2006:191) suggests that the bank has 
been a useful buffer between the co-operative and the market, allowing a 
“simultaneously open and closed system” in which the enterprise is protected from 
market pressures. This is also applied to the internal training of members which may 
foster co-operative values. As a result, failure of co-operatives is very rare. Furthermore, 
worker involvement is very high with excellent attendance levels at meetings and a 
prioritisation of the values of openness and fairness. Oakeshott (1978:199-200) also 
places the bank as a central aspect of the success of Mondragón. Although writing 
before significant restructuring of the federation, he raises the role of the bank in long-
term planning for the group as a whole and coordinating the different co-operatives. 
Oakeshott goes further in listing a range of institutional factors which have enabled the 
survival and success of the federation including: firm democratic control and worker 
ownership, the collective ownership of capital, the focus on solidarity in terms of both 
incentives to co-operate and in terms of wage differentials, institutionalised 
management, access to advice and capital, community backing, a skilled workforce and 
crucially the integration of each venture in a larger federation (1978:212-214). The 
existence of supporting institutions in the federation is very different from the systemic 
environment of other cases mentioned in this chapter, including those in the UK, and 
the role of systemic institutions is evaluated below. 
 
4.6 Conclusions, Hypotheses and Questions for Research 
 
The literature on co-operatives yields several conclusions. The first is that in all 
examples examined here, workers generally enjoyed the co-operative method of work, 
finding work to be more fulfilling. The benefits of task rotation are particularly 
prevalent in most co-operatives, as were the gains in morale from seeing work as a joint 
community venture rather than employment. However, there were limits as to how 
much benefit could be enjoyed due to the difficulties in redesigning the process of 
production completely, for example due to a lack of credit for new machinery. There 
were also problems with the co-operative mode of work, such as long hours and poor 
pay in some instances (but increased pay in others) and an informal re-establishment of 
hierarchy. The way in which the co-operative is run seems to affect this. The most 
successful co-operatives, such as Mondragón, have a particularly well established 
system of participation and institutions which support this method of participation. 
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Rescue co-operatives, on the other hand, lack an institutionalised system of co-operation 
and therefore attempts at co-operative management seem to clash with existing systems 
of hierarchy and representation, with these clashes manifesting themselves as conflicts 
between different crafts within the firm, or between production and administration. 
 
A second conclusion to draw from the empirical studies is that not all co-operatives are 
the same, and experience the pressures of the systemic environment in different ways 
depending on the economic contexts of time and place. The term “co-operatives” 
represents a heterogeneous set of firms of different ages and levels of development, 
different modes of internal organisation, different cultures and different motivations. As 
a result, the failings of, for example, rescue co-operatives may not be replicated in 
radical start-ups, and it may be that in more radical firms, the ethos of alternative 
lifestyles might be able to hold the co-operative together due to its effect on the 
preferences of individuals even if such a firm is not particularly profitable.  
 
Despite this, there are common themes to be drawn from many of them. In terms of 
commonalities we can begin to see a narrative of co-operatives in the UK emerging in 
which they principally operate in a way that is fundamentally different from most firms 
in the economy – they appear willing to pay the potential costs of co-operation (such as 
lower productivity, frustrating decision-making, lack of access to credit, lower pay etc.) 
in order to pursue a different set of ideas about what work is and how firms should 
operate, based on principles of providing decent jobs and on social responsibility. This 
raises some interesting questions about why workers might decide to work at a co-
operative in terms of whether they intentionally aim to make this trade-off with a pre-
existing positive attitude to co-operation, or whether or not they join co-operatives 
without this attitude, and whether or not this attitude develops over time, since a 
positive change over time might suggest that the benefits of co-operation outweigh the 
costs. The time an individual joins a co-operative in terms of the firm's life-cycle could 
also play a role. 
 
The third conclusion clear in these cases is the role of the systemic environment. In 
terms of systemic constraints, Mondragón’s experience looks to be very different from 
that experienced by co-operatives in the UK. Crucially, access to capital is much easier 
within the Mondragón co-operatives due to the influence of the bank which is able to 
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give loans on terms suited to co-operatives and has a stake in the success of the 
enterprises it finances rather than a commercial bank which would try to retrieve loans, 
or not offer them at all, if default was a risk (Williams 2007). This is very different from 
the financial arrangements for co-operatives in the UK for whom start-up or expansion 
capital is hard to acquire. Furthermore the degree of expertise available in Mondragón 
differs greatly from that available in the UK, where: 
 
“One of the reasons it is difficult to set up an employee-owned business is that there 
aren’t many lawyers or accountants who you can talk to who know much about this 
area. If you talk to most in those professions about this subject they look at you as if 
you are odd or from a different planet” (Mayfield 2012:220) 
 
In the other cases seen above, the co-operatives did not operate as part of a wider 
system of co-operation and this made a significant difference to their ability to operate 
successfully. Discrimination against the co-operative form from lenders and potential 
trading partners made co-operatives dependent on external actors which were able to 
impose some authority, either overtly or through the demands of the market, over the 
decision making process. This diminished the ability of the co-operative to offer the 
benefits of a new mode of work as well as threatening survival. Therefore, the gains to 
static control present in the ideal model of the co-operative appear to be diminished 
when the co-operative has to work in an externally dictated way, and this harms the 
potential of dynamic control, with the latter also diminished by the possible instability 
of the co-operative if it struggles to survive. It appears that Marx was correct in taking 
the view that co-operative ventures will struggle without supporting institutions, in 
particular in providing credit and trading partners. Roelants (2000:80) argues that “the 
socio-economic development of worker co-operatives relies to a large extent on the 
meso-level institutions which these enterprises establish among themselves” since small 
worker co-operatives will struggle to survive on their own, noting the role of such 
institutions in the development of over 1400 networked French co-operatives as well as 
the Mondragón group (2000:71-72). There are some examples of such institutions in the 
UK, such as ICOM, a product of the co-operative movement, and state-supported Co-
operative Development Agencies (CDAs) which provide assistance and advice to co-
operatives (Carter 1986). Such meso-level institutions can offer management 
consultancy, training and credit and can also aid in the networking of similar 
99 
enterprises, provide services to members and lobby for policy-making in favour of co-
operatives (Roelants 2000). However, struggling does not necessarily lead to collapse, 
and some cases presented above suggest that co-operative firms can operate as viable 
alternatives to the conventional firm. 
 
4.6.1 Hypotheses and Questions 
 
The findings of empirical studies can now be applied to the questions and hypotheses 
put forward at the end of Chapter 3. 
 
Control over work: Task rotation, whilst used at some co-operatives, especially more 
alternative ones, is not always viable due to divisions in skill. New start-ups might be 
better able to design work processes around task rotation than established firms 
undergoing conversion. Members generally seem able to exercise effective control over 
the allocation of work at the task level and the organisational level. Learning on-the-job 
and developing new skills appears to be quite strong in co-operatives generally since 
there are management roles to be learned as well as different roles in production. 
Although members find management responsibilities burdensome, they also seem to 
value their role very highly. There is strong evidence that there are benefits to members 
in terms of the moral and ethical aspects of co-operative work, especially in radical co-
operatives. Managers are rarely hired in the cases presented above (with major 
exceptions being the plywood co-operatives and Mondragón) and therefore the potential 
for a loss of control due to stratification within the co-operative is limited.  
 
Control over time: Self-exploitation, especially early in the co-operative's life-cycle, is a 
threat, and this has been observed in several studies. The effect on wages remains highly 
ambiguous. It is suggested that early in life-cycle, co-operatives may offer very low 
wages to members as investment of surplus takes priority. Upon maturity, however, 
there is evidence to suggest that wages can be higher than for comparable jobs within 
the sector, partly due to the effects of wage compression or equal pay. The potential for 
low wages calls into question the ability of the worker to exercise control over time 
since it may force them to leave the co-operative, to take other jobs or to forgo other 
aspects of life (such as delaying the decision to have children, for example). 
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Stability, security and survival: Jobs at co-operatives appear to be very stable, although 
the financial benefits are harder to evaluate (see above). Because job creation and 
retention seems to be an important aspect of co-operation, co-operatives tend to cut 
wages (or delay wage increases) rather than let people go. It is clear from the evidence 
that many of the standard economic assumptions about the behaviour of co-operatives 
and their members do not apply to organisations with a range of preferences beyond 
profit-maximisation or income-maximisation. Co-operatives themselves appear to be 
able to survive profitably in some cases, although rescue co-operatives are obviously 
limited in their potential to do this. However, even KME was able to ensure some jobs 
were kept for a number of years which would otherwise have been lost. Key factors for 
survival appear to include the prevalence of supporting “meso-level” institutions, 
especially bodies able to support co-operatives financially and free them from 
dependence on market relationships, although some co-operatives such as Recycles and 
Suma have been able to borrow from normal commercial banks (Thornley 1981:75-76). 
Also important is the ability to build a binding co-operative ethos in which members are 
prepared to work together, take on management roles and embed behaviour in the 
workplace in social relationships of responsibility reciprocity and solidarity. To some 
extent this calls the idea of trade-off between efficiency and democracy into question, 
since a compromised democratic structure might not be able to consolidate these 
relationships and could lead to dysfunction. Co-operatives appear to be quite 
conservative in their decision-making, which might limit their potential in competitive 
industries where innovation is key (Hindmoor 1999), but this also allows them to 
survive fairly well in less innovation-based industries such as retail, printing, food 
production and wholesale – the sectors of the four case study co-operatives. 
 
The next chapter explains the research methods used to approach these questions, in 
terms of the research design, how co-operatives were selected for case study and how 
the data was collected and analysed. Four case studies are then presented, which are 
analysed together in Chapter 9 in terms of control over work, control over time and the 
security, stability and survival of the co-operative firm. 
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5 
Methods 
 
This chapter will introduce the approach to the data collection and analysis to take place 
in the following chapters. The chapter will first describe and justify the research design 
in terms of rigour and triangulation, the case study approach, and the generalisability of 
the findings. The chapter then explains sampling methods and introduces the co-
operatives chosen, locating them in relation to each other in terms of their age, sector 
and type. The data collection methods, including the interview questions and topics, are 
then described and justified, followed by some discussion of the mode of analysis. 
Finally, the ethical considerations of the research are also considered. The study used a 
qualitative approach with interviews at a set of four case study co-operatives in order 
build understanding of working life in these environments. The primary unit of analysis 
here is the relationship between the co-operative and its members in terms of how the 
co-operative organisation functions, and how this affects the subjective experiences of 
members' working lives. 
 
The study aims to look at what it is like to work in a co-operative through interviewing 
a sample of members of the four case study co-operatives. Because of the difficulties of 
accessing a large workforce, members gave an account not only of their own working 
lives but also of their perceptions of how the co-operative worked more generally, and 
long-standing and founding members were particularly valuable in being able to provide 
this information. The interviews therefore provided both information about the co-
operative but also different ideas about how well it worked and what the appeal and 
issues were for individuals. The contributions of participants were then put together to 
provide a picture of working life at the co-operative, which follows in the next four 
chapters.  
 
Interviews with co-operative members are a common form of research in the field, 
usually with one or very few cases looked at in considerable depth, often in response to 
a particularly exceptional event such as occupation (e.g. Atzeni & Ghigliani 2007), or 
conversion (e.g. Carter 1990) and crisis (e.g. Bate & Carter 1986, Tynan & Thomas 
1984), although some simply examine a particular case in order to build an 
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understanding of operation in the longer term (e.g. Cornwell 2012, Gupta 2014, 
Macfarlane 1987). Another approach (e.g. Ridley-Duff 2009) used telephone interviews 
with co-operatives to investigate their financial decision-making, alongside other 
documentary sources, which were also an important source for Thornley (1981). 
Qualitative data collection at multiple co-operatives is less common, since many studies 
look at only one case (e.g. Cornwell 2012, Gupta 2014) but has been used for co-
operative research (e.g. Rothschild & Whitt 1986:25 who used 5 case studies). 
Approaches such as a postal survey with a large sample of co-operatives (e.g. Welford 
1990) have also been used. This study uses elements of both interview approaches, as 
mentioned above, through interviewing members of the co-operative not only about 
their working lives but also about how the co-operative works. Therefore, these 
interviews have both a factual and evaluative element. 
 
5.1 Research Design 
 
The research is a qualitative phenomenological multiple case study design using in-
depth interviews at the primary method of data collection. The phenomenological 
approach is designed to “understand the lived experience of individuals...in relation to a 
concept of interest” (Liamputtong 2009:5) and “study every day events from within the 
life-world of the person experiencing them” (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005:19). Every 
member will have a different relationship with the co-operative and therefore it will 
shape their working lives in different ways, due to factors such as differing 
expectations, past experiences and current situation. Their motivations, commitments 
and preferences will all be different, even if they are convergent at times, and therefore 
the objective of this research is to be able to understand how the relationship between 
co-operative and individual is understood in those individual contexts. This can then 
allow the building of a sophisticated composite narrative of experiences of work at the 
co-operative. 
 
In this study the concept of interest is working life in co-operative firms. The research 
design allows for systematic reasoning across individuals and across cases. However, 
there is no attempt made to quantify or otherwise measure experiences (Denzin & Ryan 
2007:582). Such an approach would be methodologically undesirable – it is not possible 
to draw these types of comparisons between participant's lived experiences since 
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“socially constructed reality cannot be measured, though it can be interpreted” 
(Liamputtong 2009:21). This does not mean that the case studies cannot be viewed 
through a comparative lens where appropriate. 
 
The research method was intended to produce an account of co-operative work which is 
credible, authentic, applicable, dependable and confirmable. The research must 
accurately portray the perspectives of the participants, and that the research findings 
ultimately reflect the data. By undertaking a series of interviews with different 
participants it is possible to gain an understanding of working life through triangulation 
of data. Where participants are in agreement, there can be a fair assumption that the 
information is valid, and outliers where participants disagree are in themselves 
interesting findings since they reflect how different people experience the same 
phenomena in different ways. In case study research: 
 
...the accounts of those involved vary and compete with one another...it is useful to 
expose the polyphonic, polysemic nature of organisation; many voices, many meanings. 
Many voices are silenced by prevailing power structures and relationships… (Buchanan 
2012:364). 
 
The objective of interviewing multiple participants at each case study is to reveal 
perspectives which might be unknown to other participants. There may be some 
participants whose experience has been different than the majority, but who have not 
shared their experience, although there is no systematic way to locate such voices. 
Whilst divergent findings cannot be validated in comparison to one another, they may 
also facilitate a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon (Liamputtong 
2009:28) whilst triangulation in general “gives access to different versions of the 
phenomenon that is studied” (Flick 1992:194 as cited in Sands & Roer-Strier 2006:240). 
This model of triangulation could be described as data triangulation as, for the most 
part, it comes from different participants being interviewed rather than from different 
methods of data collection (Denzin 1970:301). Erzberger and Prein (1997), in a 
discussion of using different methods of research to triangulate findings, suggest that 
findings can be convergent, complementary or dissonant. Although the form of 
triangulation is different, the same logic can be applied – if findings are convergent 
across participants or cases then a high degree of trust can be placed on those findings. 
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The majority of the interview data is expected to be convergent, increasing the validity 
of these findings. There is also scope for complementary findings where different 
participants give different but non-contradictory accounts of particular aspects, in 
particular where the more information-based parts of interviews (history of co-
operatives, for example) can shed light on the more subjective aspects, allowing 
“different findings [to be] integrated under a common theoretical assumption” 
(Erzberger & Prein 1997:144). Such findings can be combined together, and may exist 
same participant reveals more information about a past question whilst answering a 
different question. Dissonant results are also possible where, for example, the 
participants react differently to the line of inquiry, or their response is misinterpreted 
(Erzberger & Prein 1997:146). Where such findings can be trusted, they may cast doubt 
on the theoretical assumptions used, which may allow for new hypotheses to form 
(1997:147). Erzberger & Prein (1997) use these terms to discuss mixed-methods 
approaches but these are developed for qualitative research by Sands and Roer-Strier 
(2006:242-243) who suggest 5 possible outcomes from comparing interviews: “(1) 
same story, same meaning…(2) same story, different interpretations…(3) missing 
pieces…(4) unique information...(5) illuminating” when conducting comparisons 
between interviews, and suggest that this can be expanded by also comparing responses 
both within and between groups (2006:252), and allow the identification of common or 
conflicting values and expectations (2006:256). 
 
It is important to note that confidentiality concerns limit the ability of the research to 
engage in a detailed analysis of dissonant or divergent pieces of data – for example, by 
suggesting that a different experience of work is based on gender or age of a participant, 
which also has an effect on the transparency of the findings (Horsburgh 2003:309). 
However, given the sampling procedure (see below) such accounts might also lack 
validity. This option is also preferable to a prolonged engagement strategy (Padgett, 
2008:186), since in this instance access to participants is difficult. Participants would be 
unwilling to give multiple interviews, and participant observation and other forms of 
engagement such as focus groups would be too time consuming. This also precludes 
member checking (Lincoln & Guba 1985; as cited in Padgett 2008:190) or participant 
validation (Horsburgh 2003:310), in which the participants review their transcripts, 
making the triangulation of findings particularly important. However in this instance 
where theory is constructed from multiple participants, this may be of limited use 
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anyway as individuals could not validate these findings alone (Morse 1998; as cited in 
Horsburgh 2003:310). For some case studies (Wholefoods A and Wholefoods B) there 
is also documentary evidence which can be used to confirm some elements of the data.  
 
There is an emphasis in qualitative research for the reader to make their own decisions 
on transferability and the authenticity of the researcher's interpretation. This is made 
possible by use of direct quotations and accurate summaries of the interview data. The 
former in particular acts as evidence to support interpretation. Sometimes direct 
quotations are not possible due to the problems of anonymity, but the use of particular 
words and phrases gives an indication of the strength and nature of feeling of 
participants towards particular concerns. The thickness of description this approach 
offers also allows for the reader to make their own judgements about the transferability 
of the study (Liamputtong 2009:25). This chapter is intended to make the reader aware 
of the sampling and research approaches, including a candid understanding of the 
limitations of this form of study. However, this form of research is a highly appropriate 
one for research in these organisations since it allows an insight into working life on a 
subjective level whilst also allowing for a developed understanding of the co-operative's 
history, financial status and function as a business. Other forms of research, such as 
quantitative postal surveys which are common in co-operative research (e.g. Welford 
1990) require multiple case studies and large number of participants, and do not allow 
for elements of reflexivity whereby the lines of inquiry are developed by the responses 
of participants and researcher. 
 
5.1.1 Case Study Approach 
 
The multiple case study approach (Yin 2009:53) here has been used for this research, 
with four cases chosen. Fundamentally aim of this design is the “precise description or 
reconstruction of a case” (Flick 2006:141) in which the co-operative organisation itself 
is the case study (Buchanan 2012). The selection of multiple cases is based on Stake's 
(2008) categorisation of case studies into intrinsic, instrumental and multiple case 
studies. The phenomenon to be investigated is experience of working life at worker co-
operatives in England. These represent an instrumental case study (co-operatives in the 
UK) in themselves, since the systemic context of these co-operatives is in itself distinct 
from, for example, co-operatives in different varieties of capitalism. These four case 
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studies have been chosen based on criteria explained in the section on sampling below. 
In brief, a “set of cases chosen as different kinds of example” (Platt 2007:114) have 
been chosen. The multiple case study design has been chosen because by sampling a 
diverse set of co-operatives the research will be able to investigate the interactions of a 
wide set of variables (such as size, age and sector) and locate intersections of the 
findings from each individual case. It is also able to offer the stronger findings if the 
same conclusions are drawn from comparable studies (Yin 2009:61). 
 
The case study approach used to answer “how” or “why” questions about specific social 
phenomena which cannot be controlled by the researcher (Yin 2009:4, Liamputtong 
2009:196). It “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics 
of real-life events – such as...organizational and managerial processes” (Yin 2009:4). In 
this study, the questions are about how and why co-operative management affects 
experience of working lift, and how and why co-operatives work and survive, in 
particular in a post-crisis environment. The co-operatives are “bounded systems” 
(Liamputtong 2009:199) and therefore are well suited to a case study research, but it 
will also be possible to engage in some comparison of the cases, since both within-case 
and qualified comparisons between cases are likely to allow for the inference of strong 
conclusions (George & Bennett 2005:18).  
 
George and Bennett (2005:19-22) outline four key strengths of the case study approach, 
although in many ways these outline the strengths of a qualitative over quantitative 
approach in appropriate studies. Firstly, it enables “consideration of contextual factors” 
which are not possible in quantitative approaches. In this case, one example would be 
the stronger understanding of ideas of ideas of flexibility and security. It might be 
possible, say, for jobs at large conventional firms to be more secure but for workers in 
co-operatives to feel more secure due to the information flow within those firms even if 
statistically the risk of collapse is higher. Secondly, the approach allows for the 
recognition of new factors and variables which were not initially considered by the 
researcher. Thirdly, the approach allows an in-depth examination of causal mechanisms, 
and finally to appreciate the complex interdependence of outcomes. In terms of research 
into worker participation, Strauss (2006:796) suggests the case study approach allows 
the researcher to look at “the intervening variables between participation and its 
outcomes”. 
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The case study approach has its drawbacks. Firstly, case studies would usually be more 
intensively researched with a range of data collection methods such as interviews, focus 
groups and document analysis (Creswell 2007:73; as cited in Liamputtong 2009:191), 
allowing for a more detailed system of triangulation (Denzin 1970:307, Erzberger & 
Prein 1997) This is made difficult in these cases (as explained the data collection 
section below) primarily due to the time burdens it places upon participants. However, 
the range of interview data from different participants at each case study offers a 
substantial set of contributions on which to draw, and it is possible to work with only a 
single data collection method (Buchanan 2012:355). It is also a method which invites 
criticism for selection bias. In selecting only actively trading co-operatives, for example, 
this study only looks at successful co-operatives, and not as those which have failed. 
The ability to answer questions about why co-operatives fail is therefore compromised. 
However, case studies can be chosen based on a dependent variable as this “can help 
identify which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected 
outcome” (George & Bennett 2005:23). 
 
5.1.2 Generalisability 
 
As a qualitative study, it is not possible to argue for statistical generalisability to the 
population (Buchanan 2012:364-5), and this is not the purpose of this study. It is key 
that the scope of the findings be limited and qualified, and the inherent selection biases 
introduced by a purposive sample are recognised, since “case researchers...usually do 
not and should not make claims that their findings are applicable to...populations except 
in contingent ways” (George & Bennett 2005:31). However, Buchanan (2012:365-6) 
does describe ways in which the findings still have relevance to other cases and could 
be generalised where appropriate. The first of these are “moderatum” generalisations 
where characteristics and mechanisms uncovered in cases can reasonably be expected to 
resemble those in other similar cases, especially at a low level. The findings could not 
accurately reflect realities in other co-operatives for a host of contextual reasons which 
would impact the complex relationships between different factors. The key principle 
here is moderation and caution when attempting to qualify generalisations. It is also 
possible that the findings form part of a process of analytical refinement in the sense 
that “the findings from case research do not generalize from sample to population, but 
from experience and observation to theory”, meaning that it is possible for the findings 
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to “[broaden] our understanding with the accumulation of fresh observations” 
(Buchanan 2012:365). It will therefore be possible to observe similarities between 
different case study co-operatives and suggest that these similarities may, under 
qualified conditions, be applicable to other similar cases, and to create generalizable 
theories from cases (Yin 2009:15). 
 
5.2 Sampling 
 
As mentioned in preceding chapters, worker co-operatives have been defined by this 
study as for-profit commercial organisations which are owned and managed 
democratically by the entirety of their workforce in accordance with the ICA principles 
put forward in the introduction (ICA, n.d.). Whilst this is a useful theoretical construct, 
it is difficult to find co-operatives which operate precisely in this way. Many co-
operatives have some non-member workers, such as casual or temporary staff. They 
may also own their assets in different ways depending on their legal form, and some 
have a shareholding which extends to past members or other stakeholder groups in the 
surrounding community. The requirement for cases to be for-profit aims to exclude 
cases with volunteers, cases with external funding (such as charities) and other social 
enterprises at which member participation does not make up a major part of working 
life. 
 
Legal form was not chosen as a selective criteria in this study for two reasons. Firstly, 
co-operatively run firms in the UK adopt a range of legal forms such as operating as 
charities, limited liability companies or co-operatives. One reason for this is that legal 
forms can also change over time as the law changes, and this allows companies to 
change their structure in order to benefit most from different legal requirements. 
Switching between forms is a costly procedure and requirements, such as reporting 
requirements or shareholding laws, very for different legal forms, making some 
structures more suitable than others in different contexts. Secondly, the population of 
co-operatives is small and accessing information about legal forms for each potential 
case is an arduous process which could exclude potentially illuminating case studies. 
Firms describing themselves as co-operatives may well not be incorporated as such, and 
these differ again from employee owned firms which do not usually operate along co-
operative principles; for example by having unequal shareholdings, or a voting system 
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linked to the number of shares owned instead of one-member-one-vote. Information 
about how firms choose to operate, on the other hand, is often available through 
websites or informal communication with representatives of prospective cases. 
 
5.2.1 Sampling Co-operatives 
 
Worker co-operatives are fairly uncommon in the UK, and identifying them is not easy 
as there is no definitive description of a worker co-operative. Co-operatives UK 
publishes a database of co-operatives which is a useful resource for identifying potential 
cases, although it is not without its drawbacks. The definition it draws of a co-operative 
is broad, meaning that a large number of cases unsuitable for this study (such as 
Working Mens' Clubs) had to be removed from the list before approaches could be 
made to the co-operatives. 
 
Potential cases from this population were approached by email (although in one case the 
study was done by invitation). Response rates were around 25%, with around 20 
possible cases contacted. Upon response, some did not meet the criteria above, and 
others were unable or unwilling to accommodate a visit for interviews. At one case 
interviews began but the co-operative was unable to accommodate a further visit, 
leaving a dataset of one interview, too small to be of use as a study. 
 
In this type of study, it is apparent that more cases would offer a more generalisable set 
of findings. However, it quickly became apparent that each co-operative's situation was 
distinct from the others – for example, their size, the state of the sector in which they 
operated, and their age. A homogeneous group sampling, or typical case sampling 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005) would therefore be inappropriate – there is little prima 
facie evidence for homogeneity between co-operatives and therefore no typical case. A 
typical case could not be identified without significant research in itself and would 
exclude, for example, Wholefoods B, where the large membership makes it atypical, or 
Wholefoods A, which has a different legal form to the other cases. However, each case 
is still typical of a particular aspect of co-operatives – whether large co-operatives 
(Wholefoods B), small co-operatives (Bakery Co-operative), start-ups (Bakery Co-
operative), conversions (Wholefoods A), job-creation and radical co-operatives 
(Printing Co-operative) and long-running co-operatives (Wholefoods A, Wholefoods B, 
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Printing Co-operative). 
 
The form of sampling used is a hybrid of stratified purposive sampling and maximum 
variation sampling, with an opportunistic and convenience element (Liamputtong & 
Ezzy 2005). The studies allow for variation along a range of potential dimensions – 
size, legal form, age and sector. The cases are outlined in this way in Table 2 below. 
This allows for the study to examine a range of different variables by looking at the 
cases comparatively. It also ensures that a fair spectrum of co-operatives is included in 
the study from one of the smallest to one of the largest in the country, and from some of 
the oldest to newest worker co-operatives. It is likely that the means of locating co-
operatives means that there was a sampling bias towards co-operative legal forms, as 
these firms are more likely to advertise themselves as co-operatives and be involved in 
co-operative networks and umbrella organisations such as Co-operatives UK. For this 
reason, the study has not attempted a comparative assessment of the impact of legal 
form but has instead looked at the impact of the transition in legal form at Wholefoods 
A. There is a theoretical element to this sample (Gibson & Brown 2009:37) in the sense 
that engagement with literature informs the possible variables, such as size, which guide 
case study selection. However, this is not an example of theoretical sampling (usually 
associated with grounded theory) since there is not a re-iterative component where 
findings from one round of interviews inform further sampling. 
 
 Size 
(membership) 
Age
7
 
(years) 
Sector Health 
Wholefoods A 15-20 ~25 years Strong, growing 
Printing Co-op 10-15 30+ Declining 
Bakery Co-op 5 2-3 Small specialised sector 
Wholefoods B 80+ 20+ years Strong, growing 
 
Table 2 – Location of cases with respect to 3 variables 
 
7 As mentioned in the following chapters, age of the co-operative is difficult to ascertain due 
to differences in the dates of founding and dates of incorporation as a co-operative. Some 
co-operatives were formed from the fusion of smaller firms making it difficult to pinpoint 
exact dates of creation. Giving exact years may also compromise anonymity for cases. 
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Convenience and opportunism also played a part – networking with members of co-
operatives affected response rates (most obviously through invitation to the Printing Co-
op), and information at the premises of the cases revealed links with other potential 
cases which were then contacted. Due to time and funding constraints it would not have 
been possible to work with a much larger set of case studies using the same research 
techniques. However, “a crucial point in qualitative research is to select the research 
participants meaningfully and strategically, instead of attempting to make statistical 
comparisons or to 'create a representative sample'” (Liamputtong 2009:16, George & 
Bennett 2005). However, throughout the sampling process the objective of accessing 
different sectors and sizes was important. 
 
5.2.2 Sampling Participants 
 
Participants were selected entirely by opportunity sampling, and lists of participants 
were prepared by the co-operative. All participants were volunteers. Co-operatives were 
told that interviews with founding members or members of management committees 
would be especially valuable, since although the focus was working life, these members 
would also be able to give thorough accounts of the formation and history of the co-
operative. Such meetings were not always possible on the day of the visit. There could 
be potential for a sample bias here – people with negative feelings about co-operatives 
would perhaps be less likely to volunteer for interviews, and those with a strong 
normative disposition towards it might be more willing to discuss it at length. This issue 
is noted in a study of co-operatives based on telephone surveys by Ridley-Duff (2005; 
as cited in Ridley-Duff 2009:62) who notes that “aspirations and values [of founding-
member participants] – typically to run a business democratically – may have projected 
a more idealised picture of their workplaces than would have been the case if, for 
example, new staff had been interviewed”. Strauss (2006:796) also suggests issues of 
bias when interviewing actors in organisations. However, such bias appears unavoidable 
and could have been worse if the demands on the participants were more burdensome, 
for example in requiring member review or follow-up interviews. 
 
5.3 Data Collection 
 
The in-depth interview technique was used, which is common in phenomenological 
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research (Liamputtong 2009:5) and in research in co-operatives as shown in the 
previous chapter. Interviews were recorded (audio only) and notes taken by the 
interviewer to stimulate further questioning. The aim of this method is to “explore the 
'insider perspective'….[t]o capture, in the participants' own words, their thoughts, 
perceptions, feelings and experiences” (Taylor 2005:39). Interviews were face-to-face 
and one-on-one, and took place in private environments (although they were at times 
interrupted). Participants were left free to give their own opinions and views without 
much prompting, and were able to discuss tangential answers to the questions at some 
length. It was not uncommon for participants to ask to be reminded of the question. 
Interview length varied – some participants were happy to talk for over an hour about 
their experiences, and seemed to value the experience, whilst others were shorter due to 
constraints on time. This problem arose due to the need to carry out interviews in the 
workplace during working hours, but access to participants would be almost impossible 
otherwise.  
 
Interview questions came in three types. The first discussed in the individual – the role 
they performed at the co-operative, why they joined and what they had done before, 
attempting to uncover a general attitude towards co-operatives. Secondly, the questions 
asked for factual information about the history of the co-operative, telling the story of 
its formation, how it is financed and how the organisational structure is designed. The 
third, and most prevalent, form of question asked was evaluative, asking members their 
opinions on elements of co-operation including how they view decision-making, 
whether they feel they can exert control at the task and organisational level, their 
perspectives on working conditions and pay, and what they feel accounts for the growth 
of the co-operatives. Participants interpreted these questions in different ways, offering 
some scope for differentiated follow-up questions. 
 
The list of potential interview questions was not followed exactly with each participant, 
since different participants were able to provide different sets of knowledge, and 
expertise in various areas of the co-operative's operations. This fits with the attempt at a 
purposive sample of participants within the co-operative by trying to recruit longer-
standing members and members with particular responsibilities, and was also governed 
by the time limitations of the interviews – there is little point in asking a relatively new 
member about the history of the co-operative, and time may be better spent elsewhere. 
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On the other hand, an interview with a member who has been involved with human 
resources may put forward valuable contributions about discipline and management in 
the firm, even if this means there is not time to ask them about other issues. Questions 
were kept short and were open-ended, with follow-up questions asked as much as 
possible in order to encourage more detailed responses. One reason for this approach is 
that it invites participants to give detailed answers which may access knowledge which 
would otherwise not be disclosed. For example, it might be expected that interviews at 
these firms would reflect the public-facing line of the firm, with the participants 
extolling the virtues of co-operative work in ways which echo the constitutions, 
websites and publicity materials of the firms. By engaging in a longer interview, asking 
for examples of more general concepts and inviting critique, members were able to 
articulate doubt and scepticism without putting forward opinions which were dissonant 
with their general worldview (which we can assume to be generally pro co-operative). 
This approach is similar to that used for accessing “subjugated knowledge” (Hesse-
Biber & Leavy 2011:98). Such knowledge at co-operatives could involve opinions 
which might not be expressed in front of the rest of the membership such as frustrations 
with the co-operative, disillusionment with co-operative principles or the feeling at the 
co-operative does not operate in accordance with those principles. The interviews were 
based on a “romanticist” (Alvesson & Ashcraft 2012:242) approach to the interview 
process in which story-telling and co-construction of knowledge were prioritised, with 
mixed levels of success – in some interviews the participants were less 'open' than 
others and gave fairly guarded responses, but in other interviews participants talked 
without interruption and with enthusiasm in their response.  
 
There were some disadvantages to this approach (Taylor 2005:45-46,52-55). Firstly, the 
approach is noted as being difficult for a relatively inexperienced researcher, in 
particular in probing for information, and there may well be information which could 
have been elicited by a more experienced interviewer. It may be that the interviewer 
does not ask appropriate questions, or does not understand the answers, especially if 
they are unfamiliar with the exact case (Marshall & Rossman 1989:83). The approach 
was also subject to logistical constraints such as time and cost in order to access 
participants conveniently. Secondly, although interviews can yield a large amount of 
information efficiently, participants may be unwilling to answer questions, or could do 
so dishonestly in some cases (Marshall & Rossman 1989:83). 
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The interviews were designed to work on two levels – both as biographical interviews 
with co-operative members, and as a form of expert interview (Flick 2006:165) where 
the participant was assumed to be an expert on their co-operative. Therefore the objects 
of interest are both the participant's experiences themselves, but also their perceptions of 
how the organisation works as a whole. The participants also acted as informants 
(Alvesson & Ashcraft 2012:247) and suggested who to talk to about particular aspects 
of the co-operative (usually history or finance). 
 
5.4 Analysis 
 
The technique used for analysing the data is a “thematic analysis” (Liamputtong & Ezzy 
2005:265) whereby themes and analytical categories are identified during the data 
collection and analysis process. This is similar to approaches in grounded theory, with 
the difference being that theoretical sampling was not viable for this study 
(Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005:265). This approach was chosen because in this study the 
interactions between co-operative structures and working life are likely to be too 
multifaceted and complex to be formed into hypotheses for a purely deductive 
approach. Analytical categories and concepts often only become clear during the 
interview process itself. As shown in the literature review chapters, the findings of 
previous empirical research, and the approaches of different theorists, vary widely. The 
interviews are not designed to test and verify a pre-existing theory but instead to 
generate data in order to allow the formation of theories, with the existing literature 
acting as a starting point for inquiry. 
 
Thematic analysis involves breaking data into categories through coding interview data. 
Interviews were first broken down into topical categories related to the questions asked 
(such as “discipline”, “democracy”). These could then be subdivided into small 
categories, giving an idea of what each participant said (such as “view of other members 
discipline”, “effectiveness of meetings”) and their responses coded. The overall object 
of the analysis – experiences of co-operative life – is very broad and so breaking down 
into a series of categories and subcategories was important to make sense of an 
otherwise very disorganised dataset. Each participant's responses were recorded in the 
tables in rows for each subcategory. This allows for easy comparison between the 
responses of different participants.  
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This form of analysis was chosen for two reasons, which also explain why alternative 
analytical approaches were not used. Firstly, it allows for the inherent problems of the 
sampling method used for recruiting participants since it can accommodate diverse 
perspectives but does not require the active location of new participants or the 
performance of repeat interviews as theoretical sampling might. It also suits the range of 
participants since content analysis and closed-coding methods which attempt to quantify 
qualitative data by recording the frequency of different codes (Kellehear 1993a; as cited 
in Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005:260) would be unsuitable for this method of data 
collection because not all participants discussed every issue. It would also be difficult to 
identify categories before coding which is generally required for this approach as the 
open-ended responses of participants cannot be predicted and, whilst posing interesting 
questions for subsequent participants, cannot be applied retrospectively. Secondly, 
although discourse analysis around co-operatives has the potential to offer a particular 
set of findings, the dataset is not rich or varied enough to make this mode of analysis 
viable, and the objective of the study is not to examine how members of co-operatives 
construct their experience of the phenomena through language (Liamputtong & Ezzy 
2005:262).  
 
5.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
Although there are no vulnerable participants in this study, the research raises some 
ethical issues since the participants could be placed in situations where they are 
vulnerable, for example if interviews were not well anonymised. The most pressing 
concerns the security of participants, who were given the opportunity in these 
interviews to pass comment on their colleagues and workplaces. Should their comments 
be made public, their personal and workplace relationships could be jeopardised, and 
they could risk losing their jobs at the co-operatives. It is likely that other members 
would know who has been interviewed. This issue was avoided by removing names 
from the interview data, ensuring that specific comments could not be linked to one 
another in order to build a profile of different contributors. This is part of a technique, 
designed to aid anonymity, of “combining various parts of different participant's 
responses to make a composite picture” (Lincoln & Guba 1985; as cited in Liamputtong 
& Ezzy 2005:42). For example, a sentence such as “one participant, who worked in the 
transport department, said that….” would be inappropriate as the identity of this 
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participant would be made clear. This approach includes using gender-neutral pronouns. 
The names of the co-operatives were also changed. This is not a perfect solution as the 
identities of the co-operatives, and possibly of individuals, may become apparent from 
the things that were said, such as the histories of the co-operatives, or an individual 
expressing a belief which they are well-known for holding (Flick 2006:50). The former 
is particularly likely due to the relatively small co-operative sector, and the high degree 
of networking between co-operatives. This risk was emphasised on participant 
information forms (see Appendix 1: Interview Forms for Participants). As an extra 
safeguard, recordings of the interviews and transcripts were destroyed once they had 
been analysed.  
 
Informed consent is important for ethical research (Flick 2006:49) which involved a 
“Participant Information Sheet” and a “Consent for Use of Interview Data” form (see 
Appendix 1: Interview Forms for Participants). In the context of interviews taking place 
in workplaces with English speakers, signed consent forms are an appropriate approach, 
and there was no need to obtain an additional verbal consent. All participants were in a 
position to consent voluntarily (Flick 2006:49). Consent forms were not signed, and 
recording did not begin, until the researcher was satisfied that participants had read and 
understood the participant information sheet, and had an opportunity to ask questions 
about the research. The signed forms were kept separate from the interviews by using a 
parallel set of randomly generated numbers alongside the sequential participant numbers 
used to identify the interviews which were assigned to consent forms. The list of these 
numbers was kept privately by the researcher and the consent forms were pre-labelled. 
This ensures that the consent forms, which name participants, cannot be linked to any 
particular interview by anyone except the researcher. 
 
All participants were required to sign a consent form before and after the interview had 
taken place, and had the option to withdraw their interview from the dataset to a 
deadline several months after the interviews took place (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 
2011:101). This was designed to give participant the option to redact statements made 
in haste upon reflection. No participants chose to withdraw from the study. Participants 
also had to consent separately for direct quotations to be used in the research, but no 
participants chose to refuse this consent. 
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The second ethical consideration is that of reciprocity (Marshall & Rossman 1989:69), 
with the objective being that the research performs some kind of social good (Murphy 
& Dingwall 2001:339; as cited in Flick 2006:46). At each co-operative, a participant 
requested a copy of the finished study to be sent to the company, and some requested 
personal copies to be sent after completion. It is possible that the participants may find 
the findings to be useful, for example in seeing how other co-operatives operate and 
what problems are faced, or to see how others perceive their own firm. Participants were 
not paid or otherwise remunerated for their interviews, which took place during the 
working day. The interviews had to take place at that time and place for the convenience 
and privacy of participants. 
 
The study received approval from the University of York ELMPS Ethics Committee in 
September 2013.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used for the empirical research presented 
across the rest of thesis as a qualitative study based on interviews with co-operative 
members presented within case study co-operatives. This method of research has been 
justified as an appropriate approach to the research questions since it allows an 
appreciation of the subjectivity of working life as well as individual members' 
perceptions of the co-operatives where they work, and allows a large amount of data to 
be drawn from a fairly small sample, providing a firm basis for analysis and application 
to the questions from previous chapters. 
 
The chapters which follow collate the interview data from each case study to present an 
account of work at each study focussing on the history and formation of the co-
operative, the organisation of work and the level of flexibility and autonomy, the 
effectiveness and value of democratic management, and the financial situation of the co-
operatives.  
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6 
Wholefoods A - A successful firm run as a co-operative  
(Case Study 1) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the first case study, a successful medium-sized co-operative of 
around 16 members operating in the wholefoods retail and wholesale sectors – which 
have a comparatively high density of co-operative firms. This co-operative 
demonstrates the operations of a medium-size co-operative, alongside the Printing Co-
operative, and one in which the work could be seen as low-skilled, alongside 
Wholefoods B. It is also unique amongst the studies here in that it is a private limited 
company undergoing conversion to co-operative status through buying back shares from 
members previously issued as sweat equity. 
 
The chapter first describes the dataset. Various findings from the interviews are then 
presented, first focusing on its history and structure.. The chapter then examines the 
organisation of work, in terms of flexibility and control, and looks at the way that 
decisions are made, including the effect of democratic management. The chapter also 
examines effect of the ongoing transition from private shareholder ownership to a co-
operative legal form and the reasons for the success of the firm. It concludes with a brief 
summary of the findings, which, as in all four of the case study chapters, are based on 
the collations of interview responses.  
 
6.1.1 About the Dataset 
 
Data was collected through a day of interviews in July 2014. There were five 
participants from this co-operative, with around 16 members, comprising around 3½ 
hours. Participation was organised by the co-operative by volunteering from the 
workforce. One participant was interviewed spontaneously (with consent) rather than in 
a formal recorded interview. 
 
 
119 
6.2 History of the Co-operative 
 
Wholefoods A is a retail and wholesale co-operative which sells wholefoods. It has 
around 16 members, doing 12 full-time jobs since many members work part-time. It 
specialises in home deliveries as well as on-site retail and has a substantial warehouse. 
The co-operative enjoys considerable success, running at a healthy profit and has been 
able to build and buy its own premises. 
 
The firm was first formed around 25 years ago as a conventional business. It was then 
bought out fairly soon afterwards by another individual, using some compensation 
money from a previous incident, and continued to run along conventional lines. The 
individual who bought the business was unable to manage it himself – possibly due to 
health issues – and the other employees of the firm began to take an active role in 
management duties, such as buying in stock. There were around eight other employees 
at the time. In order to keep the business afloat, considerable overtime was worked by 
these employees and, given the firm's relatively low revenues, they were paid in shares 
for this overtime. This began a tradition of worker share ownership. One interviewee 
described the transition from a conventional to co-operative firm as “organic”, saying 
that it was unplanned and that at the time, nobody was really trying to form a co-
operative. The firm was not a legally-formed co-operative at the time of the interviews, 
but was undergoing a process of transition to buy shares back from shareholders in 
order to attain this status. It was however run in the style of a co-operative with no 
distinction in management decisions between shareholders and non-shareholders 
(except in rare cases as required by law), and emphasising a co-operative ethos and 
approach. 
 
Share ownership in the firm, which was still a limited company, continued until around 
2002, at which point members were no longer issued with shares. This has raised some 
issues in the co-operative, as some shareholders no longer work there, and not all 
workers have shares. However, management remains co-operative in character. Since 
around this time the firm has been trying to become a co-operative, which involved 
buying back the shares from the current shareholders by issuing a dividend each year. 
This has caused tensions within the co-operative as it means that some members receive 
both their pay and a dividend on shareholding, whilst other members never had the 
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chance to obtain shares. Given the success of the company, the shareholding is worth a 
considerable amount of money.  
 
Even as a conventional firm with worker share ownership, there was evidence of co-
operative values. The nature of the products sold – viewed as ethical, which the 
members take pride in selling - perhaps fosters this. Members were more interested in 
running a business which they felt was ethical and social than forming hierarchies of 
control within the firm. As an example, the firm has always implemented one-member-
one-vote systems of governance (where legally allowed to) rather than controlling 
affairs through the number of shares owned. Participants suggested that in essence, this 
mirrored the management style of a legally formed co-operative with shareholding, or 
lack of shareholding, having no real impact on the ability of members to influence the 
decision-making process. 
 
6.3 Organisation of Work: Flexibility and Control 
 
Work is organised into departments based on a particular job. There are no heads of 
department or other formal hierarchies. Members are encouraged to learn new skills in 
order to add some redundancy to the workforce, and where possible the co-operative 
seemed eager to accommodate people's preferences for work and to offer them the 
chance to learn new skills. Some interviewees worked in just one department, others did 
almost every job in the co-operative.  
 
However, there were some questions about the relationship between co-operation and 
task rotation. One member suggested that it was a characteristic of most small 
businesses, whilst another suggested that moving through the company by doing 
different jobs was akin to promotion in other firms, encouraging people to work hard 
and take on responsibility. Seniority had no impact on pay, which is a flat structure. It 
was suggested that the role of peer pressure was important in ensuring that people take 
on responsibility for difficult or less pleasant tasks, and that people would not be viewed 
favourably by other members if they only wanted to work in the easiest roles. One issue 
particularly key to this is that because everyone has opportunity to work in a particular 
role, there is a sound understanding of the nature of that type of work – people know, to 
take one example from the interviews, that driving is a far more taxing job than might 
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first appear. This has an important role in building empathy, fellowship and solidarity 
within the company, and allows for compromises to be made in allocating work, such as 
alternating the long and short driving routes to ensure that everyone shares pleasant and 
unpleasant work equally. There was a general sense that the more people know about 
how the co-operative operates, the better off the company will be. It was also stressed 
that members are free to work in one department only, and many do, either because they 
learn skills which take time to acquire, so become a considerable asset in their 
department which cannot be replaced, or because they choose not to try other jobs.  
 
The overwhelming theme of the interviews was that the co-operative was a good place 
to work, and that there was a sense of solidarity that existed within the workplace. It 
was described as a “social” organisation. Several members discussed the flexibility of 
their work – being able to move hours around easily to accommodate childcare, for 
example. As opposed to task rotation, there was a strong sense that there was a linkage 
between co-operative management and flexibility for individuals – one individual who 
worked particularly strange hours did not think they would be able to work in a 
conventional firm because no boss would allow them these hours. Members stressed 
that they valued this flexibility very highly.  
 
The theme of reciprocity was a common one – interviewees typically said that the 
collective members would try hard to accommodate each other provided the favour was 
returned. This made it possible to accommodate both long-term commitment and short-
term emergencies. Goodwill, it was suggested, is engendered by co-operation. This 
appears to account for the discipline in the firm as well – people seemed to appreciate 
the idea that they had a responsibility to work hard and give all they could to the firm in 
order to enjoy the benefits of this mode of work. Members would be happy to 
accommodate hard workers. Nobody, however, thought that people were pushed to 
work too hard or give to many hours of their time for the most part. 
 
There are also links between the flexibility of the workforce and the success of the 
business. The level of shared skills offered by task rotation means that people can cover 
for one another easily, so someone taking time away from work does not generally 
cause part of the business to stall. The success of the business was also often put down 
to its flexibility when dealing with customers – the fact that there are no “rules” about 
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how things should always be done means that staff can use their discretion to keep 
customers satisfied. Staff's dedication to their role was important and this could not be 
achieved without co-operation – people work harder because it is a co-operative, 
according to one member, and another argued that people like to go a step further for 
the customer because they feel their contribution to the company matters, and have 
pride in the co-operative. “Social” membership was reported to have a good effect on 
productivity. 
 
Staff turnover was remarkably low – the interviewees had worked at the co-operative 
for 8 years at the minimum to around 20 at the maximum. This relatively long job 
tenure appeared to be the norm for the co-operative. Some members had left the firm 
fairly recently, and this was to start their own businesses or self-employment. One 
member left his role for university and was able to return to the co-operative afterwards, 
suggesting a high degree of job security. This was generally put down to good 
relationships within the workforce, which allows people to feel supported and allows 
them to feel secure enough to work flexibly for both themselves and the business. One 
example of this was the ability to take time off without using up leave by switching 
shifts and ensure that other members covered work. Again, this could not be done 
without a high degree of shared knowledge within the co-operative allowing members 
to cover for one another easily.  
 
However, there was a more negative side to the issue of job tenure. It was suggested 
that many people left fairly soon after joining because they could not work with a “free 
style of management”. There was a very strong emphasis by several participants that co-
operatives can only work with the “right kind of people” and that many people cannot 
work in those conditions, especially those who have only previously had what one 
member called “proper jobs”, meaning traditional hierarchical workplace relations and 
needed to be given instructions by managers. This suggests a fairly polarised picture of 
job tenure - either long term (at least five years, often far more) or short term (1 year or 
less) with little middle ground 
 
The fact that people saw their membership as a long-term commitment gave them 
strong bonds and shared objectives with other members. Those with a more short-
termist approach generally do not fit in at the co-operative as they do not share the idea 
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of it being, in the words of an interviewee, “our business”. This allows for generally 
like-minded individuals who share a common purpose to work productively together 
and solve problems by deliberation and discussion in the absence of hierarchical 
authority. The long job tenure means people form deep relationships with one another. 
One factor particularly important here is the equal pay. There is a completely flat pay 
scale (except for shareholders' dividends) based purely on hours worked, and this means 
that there is a sense of equality and an acceptance of the idea that everyone puts in all 
they can, and is deserving of pay, even though some people might be better at their jobs 
or be able to put in more effort than others. Under-productivity and poor discipline at 
work is therefore not a systemic problem as people realise that they have to take 
responsibility for the business if they are to have a job to come back to the next day. It 
was suggested that co-operatives attract those who do want to take on responsibility for 
their own future and are good at sharing this responsibility by working in teams.  
 
Poor discipline has been a problem historically, with members taking advantage of a 
very generous sick pay arrangement which gave a strong incentive towards free riding 
as members received very high pay whilst being off work for far longer than is legally 
required. The members collectively made a decision to cut back on the sick pay benefits 
– which are still far more generous than the required minimum – but were able to 
compensate this with other bonuses such as bank holiday pay. There have been a few 
dismissals but these and formal verbal warnings are very rare. Such warnings are given 
by personnel officers, who can only react to complaints made by other members and 
therefore are not an authority in themselves able to root out poor behaviour. Discipline 
is therefore maintained fairly informally through “having a word” where necessary and 
through strong institutions of solidarity and mutual respect, with the idea being put 
forwards that people are looked after well by the co-operative, so take the time to look 
after it. This sense of solidarity was epitomised by one participant's perspective which 
was that working hard to maintain the co-operative was important not just for the 
individual or their current colleagues, but also to ensure that the co-operative survived 
to offer benefits for future generations of co-operators. The sense of pride, ownership 
and responsibility of and for the co-operative was extremely strong. 
 
The size of the co-operative is also important in terms of discipline. With regards to 
expansion most members suggested that the current size was something of a “sweet 
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spot” - any smaller and the co-operative would be overworked, sacrificing quality of life 
in order to make enough money to survive. If it was any larger, however, there would be 
more free-riding as the moral incentives towards good discipline and hard work would 
start to become more dilute and diffuse.  
 
6.4 Membership and Democracy 
 
The decision-making process at the co-operative is based on general meetings of all 
members, held every few months, and meetings every morning at which, where 
possible, every department is represented. There is also a considerable amount of 
decentralised decision making for day-to-day business, in which members ask their 
peers for ideas. For this reason, nobody suggested there were any issues in dealing with 
external suppliers or clients – the lengthy decision making process seemed to apply only 
to internal decisions. Decentralised decision making also empowered individual 
members to an extent, as without any hierarchical authority people are forced to take 
responsibility for their own actions. One participant said that provided the decision 
could be justified, it would not matter if it turned out to be a mistake, and another 
emphasised the importance of decisions made being “our decisions”, regardless of 
outcome.  
 
There are, however, some problems with this mode of organisation. In particular, it was 
suggested that agreements made in meetings, such as working allocations for the day, 
are often not adhered to, resulting in an occasionally chaotic working environment. It 
was suggested that in the absence of anyone to enforce decisions, people can “forget” 
decisions (although it was not clear from the interview whether this forgetfulness was 
genuine or wilful). It was reported that at times, people can overstep their remit, but that 
this is not a common problem. Previously there were problems due to there being no 
established system for working practices, and therefore breakdowns in teamwork and 
communication. This became clear when the business was computerised, but since then 
the system of work has been “tightened up” in order to streamline work and improve 
discipline. However, some resistance to this process was reported, as it would begin to 
undermine the (politically) anarchic nature of the co-operative. Hierarchical 
management was tried, briefly, but was found to be inflexible and inefficient. 
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Participants all reported that the decision making process takes time for “big” decisions 
– usually large business decisions or ethical decisions, which are common given the 
nature of the products sold. However, participants agreed that the slow decision making, 
although “frustrating”, did not present a problem. It was argued that the time taken up 
by meetings and debate was worth the flexibility and control it offered. Specific 
meetings are called to discuss particularly big issues, and members are encouraged to 
prepare written statements in order to encourage participation and discussion. There is a 
need to for people to “buy in” to decisions through deliberation, which allows for 
consensus to be reached. The co-operative switched from full consensus decision 
making to two-thirds majorities as it grew in order to streamline the process, but 
participants did not report any other consequences of this switch.  
 
The participants were asked whether or not they thought that everyone had an equal say 
in the co-operative, and agreed that whilst everyone has the opportunity to contribute, 
some people have far more to say about issues than others. This was generally attributed 
to differences in personality rather than any other factor – some people are more 
confident than others in meetings. Nobody reported that any particular department or 
group appeared to dominate the co-operative (with the only major division being that of 
shareholders against non-shareholders), but leaders emerge based on personality and 
willingness to participate and take on responsibility. As a result, people have equal say 
in big issues which are voted and debated on but in day-to-day affairs some people 
might be happier not burdening themselves with responsibility. 
 
Clashes in meetings are reported to be generally personality rather than work based, but 
the process appears to be able to contain disagreements. Extensive debate and 
discussion was generally cited as key to this – one member said that polls were taken 
before and after discussions, and it was very common to see people changing their 
minds about issues when they have been discussed. This suggests that people have a 
strong dedication to the co-operative consensus-based ethos and are prepared to 
question their ideas when they hear the perspectives of others. As noted above, task 
rotation could be particularly useful at building empathy and understanding between 
workers. One participant said that the process of meetings shifts the focus of decision 
making from the individual to the business as a whole. 
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The importance of access to information was also mentioned – members appeared to 
trust the assessments of other department (for example, financial projections), and 
access to information was valued as it allowed people to take full advantage of the 
democratic process. There was little evidence of apathy, although some people did not 
like to shoulder the responsibility of decision making.  
 
6.5 Finance 
 
As mentioned above, the co-operative has been in the process of buying back shares 
from shareholders in order to become a co-operative and be owned entirely by members 
with a nominal £1 shareholding. Responses to this issue from the interviewees were 
mixed. Some were enthusiastic about the transition – one shareholder was optimistic 
that the firm would have requisitioned all the shares in the next two years, and saw the 
shareholding as a fair reward for work done early in the co-operative's formation which 
was not remunerated at the time. Others were less optimistic, and far more cautious 
about the rate at which shares could be bought back. Typically, as might be expected, 
shareholders reported less disagreement on the issue than non-shareholders, and were 
far more optimistic about the transition. It was felt by members who saw the buy-back 
as an issue that the problem had been fairly well contained within the co-operative – 
nobody had left over the issue, nor were there deep-seated divisions. The main problem 
appeared to stem from the fact that the issue had dragged on for a long time – a number 
of years - rather than being resolved quickly via a bank loan to buy the shares and give a 
definitive answer to the problem. One interviewee suggested that it would have been 
better to borrow money to buy all the shares quickly, and take full control and 
ownership of the co-operative at once.  
 
The buyback process caused tensions in the co-operative on two other fronts. Firstly, as 
previously mentioned, there is some dissatisfaction over the idea that some individuals 
get a bigger reward than others. The shareholders have attempted to mitigate this by 
donating a proportion of their dividend back to the firm again, of their own volition. A 
second tension arises from the fact that some feel that previous workers who still own 
shares are still being paid despite not working at the co-operative, and could in theory 
intervene in its affairs. It should be noted that there was not much fear of such an 
intervention as it was felt the co-operative was being run well enough. 
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It appears that the former workers were fairly eager to relinquish shares and move on 
from the responsibility of shareholding in the co-operative. The price agreed for shares 
was high, favouring the business. Again, it seems that the importance of maintaining co-
operative values outweighed the economic gains of continued share ownership – 
nobody wanted to become rich from the work of others. The process was therefore 
supported by both shareholding and non-shareholding members. Shareholding members 
did not want to see a continued division of the workforce along these lines, as it goes 
against the ethos and principles of co-operation, and gives those outside the co-
operative the potential to intervene. There were some initial issues of trust at the start of 
the process – shareholders were reluctant to give their shares back to the co-operative 
without assurances that they would be paid off, so there was a need to buy back the 
shares before obtaining full co-operative status. 
 
A common theme in the interviews was an optimism for when the co-operative would 
be fully worker-owned and the profits being used to buy back shares could instead be 
used for higher pay. It was generally felt that the community of the co-operative would 
be improved by full co-operative ownership – people wanted to own and run the 
business they worked at, and the buyback would therefore enfranchise non-shareholder 
members. Even the least optimistic participants suggested that the full co-operative 
status would remove any ill-feeling as a result of the process. 
 
The co-operative has been able to finance its own expansion without taking out loans 
(excluding mortgages), with an exception soon after its original buyout where a member 
contributed some money, although the details of this are unclear. The issuing of 
shareholdings rather than pay perhaps accounts for this. Expansion has been funded 
from the profits of the co-operative, which are substantial. The mortgage on the new 
premises was paid quickly and ahead of time. One interviewee thought this might be 
because the members generally do not like banks for political reasons so wanted as little 
do to with them as possible, and did not want interest payments to banks dominating the 
affairs of the co-operative. This has created a strong motivation in the co-operative for 
reinvestment – as mentioned below, members typically took a very long-sighted view of 
the co-operatives financial affairs, allowing for expansion through investment of 
surplus. However, the comparative levels of investment compared to other firms and the 
exact investment strategy remain unclear, as the data collected did not include detailed 
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financial information. 
 
Members generally attributed the financial success and associated longevity of the co-
operative to its flexibility, and to a convenient size. It is flexible in terms of the fact that 
it can easily adapt its service to meet the needs of different customers. Some 
participants suggest that this was linked to non-hierarchical management as it allows 
members to use their initiative rather than following set rules; others suggested it was 
linked to the company being a co-operative as it meant that members had an incentive, 
such as pride in the company they feel they own, to go further for customers. Some 
participants were shareholders, others were not, but this did not appear to have an 
impact on a sense of ownership, even if ownership in legal terms was not present. Size 
was another factor attributed to the success of the co-operative: it is small enough to be 
flexible and relatively unstructured, which means it is small enough to avoid 
competition with some much larger firms in the same sector which cannot deliver the 
same level of personal service. It is, however, large enough to buy in bulk – owning a 
purpose-built warehouse is an important factor here. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This case study was one in which the participants showed a high degree of convergence 
in their responses. The value placed upon the co-operative mode of management was 
shown throughout the interviews, and the role of self-management and the combination 
of flexibility and security that this offered was reported very favourably. There was a 
fairly universal optimism about the move to a fully co-operative structure of ownership, 
and it appears that the functioning of the company is unlikely to change in this transition 
- but instead the transition will defuse tensions based on unequal distributions of income 
which some might see as unfair, and remove the threat of shareholders taking control, 
although this was not raised as a major concern by participants.  
 
The co-operative is one of the success stories of the movement, showing strong 
financial success and longevity. However, there is a question of whether or not it faces 
large amounts of competition and the extent to which it has been able to create a niche 
for itself by offering different services than potential competitors such as supermarkets, 
and being able to compete on quality of service and product range rather than on price. 
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The next case, the Printing Co-operative, shows similar resiliency but in a very different 
sector – where wholefoods is expanding, printing is declining in importance. 
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7 
The Printing Co-operative - Survival in a declining sector 
(Case Study 2) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The Printing Co-operative, alongside Wholefoods A, is a case study of a medium sized 
co-operative, but is one in which there is a skilled workforce which operates in 
specialised, divided roles. It is one of the oldest co-operatives in the study, and 
demonstrates the development of the firm from radical origins in the 1970s through to 
the present day. Although it has been a successful firm, surviving a number of decades, 
it is threatened by the fact that the printing sector generally is in decline as digital media 
comes to replace traditional printing material. However, some aspects of printing, such 
as art books, still remain a key part of the firm and present opportunities for profit. 
 
The chapter first outlines the dataset briefly, then discusses the history of the co-
operative, in particular focusing on the way it has been able to develop. No participants 
were at the firm at its inception which makes accounting for its history difficult whilst 
maintaining anonymity. However, what is clear is that the firm has been able to survive 
various crises, both internal and external, including recessions and politicised factions 
within the co-operative. The chapter then goes on to examine the organisation of work, 
the perceived costs and benefits to working at the co-operative, and the role of 
democratic management, before examining its financial aspects, in particular its 
response to the 2008 financial crisis and recession. The findings are summarised in the 
conclusion.  
 
7.1.1 About the Dataset 
 
The data on The Printing Co-operative was obtained during a day of interviews in late 
June 2014. There were five participants altogether from a total membership of 12, with 
interviews totalling around 3½ hours. All interviews were arranged on an ad-hoc basis 
on the day of the visit by a member of the co-operative (who was also a participant) 
who attempted to ensure that various departments were represented based on volunteers. 
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7.2 History of the Co-operative 
 
The Printing Co-operative was first formed in the late 1970s as a community press and 
radical co-operative aimed at job creation. It was financed from a range of sources 
including philanthropic investment and co-operative support funds such as ICOF. At 
first, with the emphasis on taking on unemployed people being the main priority, the co-
operative was able to develop through sweat equity and low pay, along with good 
relationships with landlords and suppliers. 
 
At the time of the interviews it had 12 members, having shrunk from 14 members 
before the recent recession, and has at times been larger with around 17 members. The 
printing sector in which the co-operative exists, in contrast to Wholefoods A and B, is a 
declining sector, with the market increasingly shifting towards digital media and with 
rival services being able to offer cheap, low-end printing. With the decline of the sector, 
there are also problems with firms about to go out of business undercutting other 
competitors in order to recover some losses, leading to a strong downward pressure on 
prices. 
 
The co-operative has retained its focus on printing and design, and has moved premises 
several times in order to allow the development of its services. It focusses primarily on 
high-end printing, such as art books, but also provides print and design services to many 
co-operatives and social groups as well as those within the private sector. Around 20% 
of the client base is other co-operatives, and the co-operative offers some preferential 
terms to similar causes. The co-operative has tried to be as socially responsible as 
possible, for example by making a commitment to using recycled materials and non-
toxic inks, and has also tried to build links with the co-operative sector by buying from 
them where possible. 
 
7.3 Organisation of Work: Flexibility and Control 
 
The co-operative underwent a shift from a task-rotation based model to a model based 
on teams (design, printing, production, finance etc.) as the co-operative developed and 
the work became more skilled. The work in this sector is highly skilled and requires 
specialisation of the labour force. Many of the participants came to the co-operative 
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because they had skills and interests in the design and print sector, rather than wanting 
to work at a co-operative, although the idea of the co-operative was generally appealing. 
The exception to this is that one participant with a history of co-operative membership 
actually took a pay cut to move to the co-operative, on the basis that they wanted to 
shift from one job in the sector to another. 
 
However, task rotation is still encouraged with one participant saying that there is a 
strong encouragement for people to try to learn different skills and be able to do more 
jobs as it is beneficial to everybody if there are more skills in the co-operative as it 
allows for some redundancy to fill in gaps when people are away. However, the highly 
skilled nature of some of the work limits this. As well as the opportunity to do more 
jobs, many of the members also have additional roles, such as taking responsibility for 
the environmental impact of the business, which can give members the opportunity to 
employ a particular interest or skill set at work alongside their main job.  
 
Members suggested that they had autonomy over their own working practices, provided 
output was good, and that they exercised a lot of control over the organisation of their 
work. Although members have contracted hours and times, these are very flexible. 
Members emphasised the flexibility of their working hours and were able to take time 
off or finish early for childcare responsibilities. Participants without such commitments 
thought that they worked well for members that did. Several participants had other jobs 
outside of the co-operative – one for pleasure and interest, another for extra income. The 
system at the co-operative is that no more than two people can be out of a department at 
any one time, and therefore communication and organisation are key. It was suggested 
that being a co-operative helps hugely with this as democracy, openness and 
communication are key to the model, so people are able to work out what others want to 
do and try to accommodate one another. It was argued that cutbacks and redundancies 
in other firms would make this flexibility difficult in other firms, and that one of the 
main differences between working in a co-operative rather than a conventional printing 
firm is that workers have not been laid off despite the decline in the sector. In the 
printing department, it was argued that a lack of staff meant that work was far less 
flexible than in other departments. Other members were more sceptical, arguing that 
workplaces have generally got more flexible over the last 25 years and therefore the 
flexibility might not be closely linked with co-operation. It was suggested that members 
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on occasion take advantage of the responsibility to keep their own hours, but that this 
was not a problem and in fact it is helpful to have a system which is not too strict. This 
sentiment was echoed by other members who suggested that there was no need to “look 
busy” and that there was no “infantile” culture of working to impress a boss, with 
instead the focus on personal responsibility.  
 
The co-operative was also said to have performed well in terms of treatment of 
members, such as offering better maternity and paternity benefits than legally required 
to do, and that the culture was to try to do better than the minimum standard. Members 
are also free to take a sabbatical after four years of membership, allowing some 
members to pursue interests outside of work which could help with progress towards 
other employment, such as long courses. Workers have matched-contribution pensions, 
which were briefly suspended. 
 
The participants placed a lot of significance on personal responsibility, and this is 
reflected in the style of management which is non-hierarchical. People therefore have to 
be motivated to work well and act professionally. Because there are no individual pay 
rises or promotions, there is a real emphasis on collective working which makes 
everyone take on the role of a manager, and there is no division or envy over pay. 
Everyone has access to information about what is going on, and this, combined with the 
small size of the co-operative, means that people have an incentive to work hard, since 
other people would notice if they were not. These two sets of incentives reinforce each 
other – to succeed, everyone must work hard together, and nobody wants to be the 
member who is holding everyone back. Therefore, a lack of individual incentives can 
still encourage good working practices. Most new members are encouraged to attend 
courses on co-operative work (hosted by Co-operatives UK) in order to get a good 
understanding of how the system works.  
 
7.4 Membership and Democracy 
 
Workflow is organised by two members, but it was argued that this is facilitating 
people's work rather than trying to control it. The system is therefore based on success – 
if the system works, people will respect the authority behind its implementation, and 
there is a need to demonstrate to members that following the system (e.g. for ordering 
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paper) is beneficial to all.  
 
There have been issues of discipline in the past but not at present. Participants suggested 
that the co-operative system is able to handle these issues because it is up to the people 
who work with “troublemakers” to deal with them by discussing the issues at hand, 
rather than trying to do it indirectly by discussing the problem with their boss or 
manager. It was argued that having a boss or manager wouldn't make the problem any 
easier to deal with, but would make the solution “less skilled” as there is value in 
working together to resolve problems and work through tough times together. 
 
The co-operative is run on a one-member-one-vote system, and, since it takes the legal 
form of a co-operative business, all members are directors of the company. All 
participants valued the democratic process highly, with one saying that it was “worth a 
few hours a month”, and another arguing that “people think it's a problem, but it's not”. 
One member suggested that it provided freedom for members to control the direction 
that the company went in – if a member had an idea it was up to them to present it to the 
rest of the members in a meeting and make the case for it. This also makes the co-
operative highly adaptable as any member is in a position to bring forward ideas based 
on their experiences. However, some members expressed frustration with the process 
when they are unable to convince others of the value of their ideas but suggested it was 
because suggestions were not good enough, showing an interesting deference to the 
democratic process. Another member suggested that it was a problem on occasion as the 
co-operative lacked a strong sense of direction with decisions “going around in circles” 
with nothing getting done. Overall it was argued the many changes in the way that the 
co-operative functions since its creation show that the system is adaptable and flexible, 
and as with most other case studies, the profitability and survival of the company were 
held up by participants as evidence that the democratic mode of management works, 
although another member suggested that splits and poor management in the co-
operative in the late 1980s left it briefly insolvent.  
 
As with other case studies, personalities were mentioned as a key division in debates, 
with some members louder and some quieter in meetings. Over time, however, it was 
suggested that members become more vocal as they get more comfortable with the 
process. It was also suggested that debates were thorough enough that more vocal 
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members did not really affect the decisions made, but it was suggested that this will 
make some members feel more in control than others and that some members do have 
more of a say as they are more willing to present ideas and speak up. One participant 
suggested that small cliques have formed in the co-operative at times which mean that 
some members were able to band together and exert more control, but these have 
always been transient alliances of members with similar interests, and there have been 
none that the participant noticed for many years.  
 
Another key division is between different teams especially production/non-production 
workers. It was argued this was accentuated by the design of the premises which put the 
printers on a different floor to the rest of the members. Members differed as to whether 
or not a cleavage existed between these two groups. Some argued that the division did 
not appear at all, even though when the co-operative moved to this premises it was 
expected. Another participant suggested there was a division but it was fairly 
insignificant, stating that different departments will have rows but that it was not a 
problem. Another participant suggested that these divisions did exist but were not about 
“someone getting their own way”. The issue was suggested to be a class or cultural 
division of hands-on work versus office work rather than to do with grievances between 
departments. However, because any divisions are not “contained within a repressive 
hierarchy”, they come out into the open and therefore people's attitudes become clear. 
This is something to be mitigated since poor management has led to splits in the past, 
mostly based on politics. Several members mentioned the role of politics in the co-
operative. The co-operative was initially set up as a political project, and the motivation 
for many members, especially early in the co-operatives formation, was a political one. 
One participant suggested that this political drive had reduced over time, and that new 
members are needed to bring new dynamism to the co-operative, with new ideas. 
Another suggested that political divisions between different groups (anarchists, 
feminists, socialists etc.) as well as an office vs. shop-floor dispute had led to the 
significant problems previously mentioned which left the co-operative insolvent. 
However, this occurred in the late 1980s and has not been a problem since, perhaps due 
to changes in working practices which made members more productive (although the 
participant emphasised that the problem was inefficiency rather than people not working 
hard). 
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Members emphasised the idea that co-operative behaviour is something which is learn 
through working in these organisations, and therefore the structure and form of the 
democratic process in the co-operative is important. One participant emphasised the 
importance of regular meetings, arguing that even weekly meetings are often not 
enough because not everyone will be able to attend every meeting. It was suggested that 
democratic decision making breaks down in other co-operatives because they meet less 
regularly and therefore people are left out of the process, meaning that decisions made 
at one meeting are overturned or debated again at later meetings when the previously 
absent members are present, which leads to very slow decision making, and decisions 
not being made at the right times. Decisions are always put to a vote, and people have to 
learn to compromise and accept consensus – it was suggested that members typically 
represent opposing opinions and then debate until a compromise is reached. A member 
theorised that that as other companies, and society in general, do not work this way, it 
was difficult for new members to work out how to function in an environment where 
they are responsible for their own decisions – people still “don't get it” and use phrases 
like “what you should do is...” rather than “what we/I could do is...”. As a result 
chairing and structuring meetings well is important, so everyone can have a chance to 
contribute and exercise this responsibility.  
 
Some members said that in the past there have been problems with people not turning 
up to meetings, with one member suggesting this showed a “lack of interest and 
respect”. It was also suggested that poor attendance at meetings in the past could have 
been due to the existence of cliques, and that this was no longer a problem, to do with 
the size of the co-operative (which used to be bigger), or to do with old shift patterns 
which were not very accommodating. Another argued that especially with smaller 
decisions, members can take a very casual attitude to the process, but that people took 
major decisions, such as investment decisions, very seriously. Most participants put 
forward the idea that taking the initiative, making suggestions and working them 
through at meeting was a responsibility of membership, not a right. 
 
7.5 Finance 
 
Financial information about the company is accessible to all members so that business 
decisions can be discussed. Members valued the access to information, suggesting that 
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hearing about problems through meetings is better than hearing about redundancies as 
they happen. Access to this information also helps the members to work together, 
because they can see how their work benefits others (rather than a boss). The financial 
knowledge present in the co-operative is important, in particular having a good 
accountant who can make the accounts accessible for everyone.  
 
Pay at the co-operative is equal and hourly, with some shift bonuses, and with no 
dividends distributed. This also applies to the cleaner, who is not a member. It was 
suggested that better pay is possible in the sector, but not enough to make it worth 
leaving as higher pay at a conventional firm would mean a less relaxed workplace. 
Some member suggested paying a higher wage presented problems – because there 
were so many members on a good wage, and that the co-operative is overstaffed, prices 
have to rise. However, the member also suggested that they would not want to make 
anyone else leave the co-operative for higher wages. Other members disagreed arguing 
that the prices are competitive, with the wage bill about the same as would be expected 
in a conventional firm, but distributed more equally.  
 
The co-operative has been able to expand from surplus and from loans. They have 
borrowed from a range of sources including the Industrial Common Ownership Fund 
(ICOF). According to participants, they have not suffered different treatment from loan 
providers because of being a co-operative, but had to pay high rates of interest on new 
equipment due to the high fixed rates inherent to specialist asset finance. The co-
operative has chosen not to go down the route of issuing withdrawable share capital in 
order to invest, and this was put down to a culture within the co-operative of finance 
through debt (it was recognised that co-operatives in general struggle to raise capital). 
The premises are leased rather than owned, as tying up money in assets not at the core 
of the company goes against the principles of the business. This means that a lot of the 
value produced leaves the co-operative as interest and rent – this was linked by the 
participant to a fundamental problem of lacking capital in a wider capitalist system. 
Historically, the co-operative has reinvested around two-thirds of surplus and used the 
remaining third to enhance working conditions or raise pay, although at times this has 
been closer to a 50/50 distributions. This was framed as a fairly conservative approach 
(although this claim is impossible to evaluate without comparative quantitative data 
from this and other firms) with plenty of surplus retained as people realise that in order 
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to sustain the co-operative it needs to be financed in the long term. It was suggested that 
in non-adversarial workplaces owned by the workers, the attitude is generally medium 
to long termist rather than a short-term focus, and that long job tenure helps with this, 
but can also make the members a little complacent and risk-averse. Participants shared 
the view, stated by one member, that there was “no point chucking surplus into wages”. 
Wage reductions are very rare, as this goes against the mission of the co-operative to 
provide good jobs for people, especially as wages are fairly low anyway, and in boom 
years the extra surplus is generally used to pay debts rather than bonuses. 
 
It was argued by one participant that expansion was the wrong way to look at the 
business, and a better word would be development, as the co-operative does not need to 
get bigger in order to become more productive. Investment decisions are made 
democratically but one member argued that such decisions are not made on-the-spot but 
are the result of a long-term process of development – the firm has been building up to 
expansions or developments for a long time, and the decision to invest will always have 
financial consequences. Therefore the idea of a trade-off between development or 
higher wages is a false dilemma, as decisions have already been made, so collectively 
the co-operative cannot decide not to take out a loan after it has already made the 
decision to buy new assets. However, there is a general tension between development 
and income, fuelled, among other things, by individual financial pressures on members. 
 
The co-operative experienced a downturn during the 2008 economic crisis. During this, 
two members from the printing department left the co-operative, and there was a pay cut 
around 2010. Participants reported this in different ways, some attributing the members 
leaving to redundancies, others stating that members left voluntarily, arguing that 
members put themselves forward for redundancy when needed. Overall it was argued 
that the co-operative was a “pretty safe place to work”, and that most departments have 
more members than is necessary as there is no “slave driving”. It was also suggested 
that no more redundancies could have taken place as this would jeopardise the future of 
the firm.  
 
These decisions were made democratically, and with everyone having access to the 
accounts of the firm, it was possible for people to agree to the pay cut. It was suggested 
that having equal pay also helped to soften the blow of the pay cut as members did not 
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feel that they were losing out compared to others. The pay cut was a short term decision 
with a return to previous rates expected. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
The Printing Co-operative has a long history which involves periods of success and 
periods of crisis, but the co-operative form has been able to survive throughout, and the 
business remains deeply committed to co-operative values, working with other firms in 
the sector and continuing its democratic style of management. The individual 
participants also placed great emphasis on the co-operative values present at the firm 
and argued strongly in the interviews for the co-operative model from both an 
ideological perspective and in light of the instrumental benefits realised at this case. 
This include increased job flexibility in the short and long run, and freedom from 
hierarchy and bosses.  
 
Financially, the co-operative demonstrates some key issues around accessing credit, but 
also shows that this is not necessarily a barrier for development – it has been able to 
borrow where needed, and uses leases and loans to finance itself through debt where it 
cannot do so through surplus. It is noteworthy that this attitude to borrowing is different 
from that at other co-operatives, notably Wholefoods A, where membership was hostile 
to the idea of money leaving the co-operative in interest payments to banks and 
creditors. However, this attitude of financing through debt was also seen to be co-
operative in character as it prevents the assets of the co-operative being locked into 
bricks-and-mortar. As with other studies, the long-sighted nature of the members is 
clear, where they have been able to resist calls to extract too much surplus from the 
business in wages and bonuses, and instead have been able to retain this money for 
investment. This can be due to the access to financial information, the professionalism 
of financial management at the co-operative and the processes of democracy present, as 
well as commitment to the ideals of the company.  
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8 
The Bakery Co-operative - A small start-up co-operative 
(Case Study 3) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The Bakery Co-operative is included in this study as another example of a small co-
operative but also as one which is a fairly recent start-up. All of the other cases 
examined here were founded, in one form or another, several decades before, and as a 
result elements of the experience of working in a nascent co-operative have been 
forgotten, and knowledge of the history has been lost as people have left. By visiting a 
much newer co-operative, it is possible to gain an insight into the challenges faced by a 
new business in this sector. It is important to note, however, that being a new co-
operative it is less able to give indications of what makes co-operatives successful, since 
its future prospects are unknown. This chapter examines the brief history of the co-
operative, with a focus on the motivations for its formation, before going on to look at 
how it operates in terms of organisation and working practices for employees in 
different departments (baking and administration), the level of autonomy and flexibility 
for workers, in particular with regards to the issue of low pay. The chapter will also 
examine how it works democratically with very small membership, and how it deals 
with issues of finance. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the key findings. 
 
8.1.1 About the Dataset 
 
The data for the Bakery Co-operative consists of interviews which took place on one 
day in August of 2014. There are approximately 1½ hours of interviews from three 
participants, out of a co-operative membership of five. Interviews were pre-arranged by 
the co-operative on the day of the visit. 
 
8.2 History of the Co-operative 
 
The co-operative was formed in 2012 and is therefore the most recently formed co-
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operative in the study by many years. At the time of the interviews, it was at its peak 
membership of five, having risen from three initial founding members (one of whom 
left the co-operative shortly after its formation). The co-operative also employs two 
casual workers who act as delivery drivers. 
 
The co-operative was originally founded as a way for one former bakery worker to 
expand into business development rather than baking, whilst another could continue 
their interest in artisan baking. The product made by the co-operative is described by its 
members as 'artisan bread' which is labour-intensive and time-consuming to make, but 
delivers a high quality product. The product occupies something of a niche as there are 
very few artisan bakeries in the area. The co-operative, like all others in the study, also 
champions ethical and sustainable practices – in this case, in terms of ingredient 
sourcing. Baking the bread is a highly skilled process, and to join the co-operative as a 
baker an individual would need an appropriate background, such as experience as a 
baker or chef. 
 
The motivation for founding the co-operative in this form was fairly political – the co-
operative form was chosen because it lacked hierarchy, and the founding members did 
not want to be someone else's boss any more than they wanted someone to be their boss. 
The worker co-operative structure was chosen over other forms (such as CIC or 
BenCom) due to it's establishment as a workable structure. The founding members had 
experience of other co-operatives, such as housing co-operatives and other worker co-
operatives. The existence of the network of co-operatives was also an incentive to 
choose this form, and the Bakery Co-operative received guidance from other worker co-
operatives as well as building up good relationships with Co-operatives UK. It trades 
preferentially with other co-operatives for ingredients, retail outlets and printing 
services. 
 
The co-operative has grown slowly but steadily. It brought in a new member to replace 
the founder who left, and two bakers to work on a 6-month probationary period, as 
seems fairly standard in co-operative businesses. The slow growth is particularly 
remarkable as the sector is fairly small and declining, perhaps due to the influence of 
large firms moving into high-end bread products. Two local bakeries have closed 
recently. The process of making artisan bread cannot be mechanised, so it is difficult to 
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reduce variable costs. It has tried to break into a lower-end bread market, with 
competitively priced products, but did not find that they sold well and instead chose to 
focus on artisan bread. Participant's motivation for working here was often based on the 
quality of the artisan bread, which precludes the possibility of making a more profitable 
product. 
 
Being a co-operative has not hindered the growth of the bakery, which has been able to 
find local markets, perhaps due to its niche. It has not been an issue with suppliers or 
wholesale customers, and is well-received by individual customers.  
 
8.3 Organisation of Work: Flexibility and Control 
 
Work at the co-operative is split into two main groups – the administration team and the 
bakers, although there is significant crossover between these two groups. The bakers 
have the opportunity to pursue various other aspects of the business, such as selling the 
product at markets, doing deliveries, and marketing, whilst one of the administration 
team sometimes does baking, and the other member of the administration team is 
looking forward to learning baking skills at the co-operative. Therefore, there is a 
significant opportunity for task rotation which is largely in control of the members who 
are able to choose the extra jobs they do in the co-operative, and when they are to be 
done (with the exception of the baking responsibilities, which need to be done at 
particular times due to the nature of the process). Members valued the opportunity to do 
these other jobs, suggesting that it broke up the working day. One member argued that 
the co-operative was not designed or intended to be a formal training centre, and 
therefore the skills for baking are largely learnt in an apprenticeship-style, on-the-job 
type of training. It takes several months for new bakers to be productive, but during 
their probationary period they are likely to be under the informal tutelage of the more 
experienced bakers. However, this was not equated to working under a boss as members 
are not told what to do but are able to ask for help and guidance if needed, but the actual 
process of baking is largely the same as it would be in any other company making the 
same product. In the bakery section, it is difficult to make work more flexible for 
members, and at the time of the interviews the co-operative was considering taking on 
another baker to reduce the workload of the other three. 
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In the administration side, there is space for more flexibility as the work process is less 
structured and there is greater redundancy in this department – it was suggested that 
one-and-a-half jobs were shared between two people, so the jobs and rotas can be 
organised between them. Both administrators work less than full time (although one has 
another job), and one argued that they were able to organise their free time effectively to 
perform various other roles, such as working in community projects and at charities. At 
weekly meetings people are always asked whether they are happy with the level of work 
they have. There is a general feeling that the co-operative has the will to provide a more 
flexible experience for members but at the moment the redundancy does not quite exist 
to do this – perhaps this is best illustrated by the decision to take on another baker to 
make the workplace more flexible, and one member even suggested they would accept a 
wage drop in order to expand (although this would not actually be necessary – wages 
would just grow more slowly). 
 
Over-working was seen as a problem by some participants, arguing that under-staffing 
means some people work harder than they should, and that some people become too 
involved in the co-operative and put more time into it than is necessary. However, it 
was also described as a relaxed environment in which people did not feel pressure from 
a boss to work hard. The level pay structure creates peer-pressure, and makes people 
want to work hard, but generally people enjoy the responsibilities of co-operative work. 
They all valued the autonomy of the co-operative, and the lack of hierarchical 
management which gave people increased freedom to choose what to do and how it 
should be done, and that the benefits of a good working environment outweighed the 
problems of low pay. 
 
8.4 Membership and Democracy 
 
All members of the co-operative are directors, with some subject to a 6-month 
probationary period before they reach this status. This is due to employment law and the 
need to be able to easily remove potential new members in the event that they are not 
appropriate for the business. Decisions are made democratically in two-hour weekly 
meetings and day-long quarterly strategy meetings. Although there are a lot of 
meetings, members are paid for their time and do not see this as a burden, instead 
placing value on the democratic process. Participants felt that everyone had an equal say 
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and an opportunity to discuss each decision, and one participant suggested that the 
process of mutual understanding of decisions meant that better decisions were made. 
The small size makes the co-operative fairly easy to run in this way. It was suggested 
that should the co-operative expand, it would be better to “spawn” autonomous small 
co-operatives than to try to create a large co-operative, with around 10-12 people being 
suggested as a good target size for co-operatives in order to sustain good relationships 
between all members. As with other co-operatives, the importance of good inductions of 
new members to ensure they understand co-operative behaviour was emphasised. The 
small size means everyone understands what is going on and that people do not 
“retreat” into their specialisations at meetings but instead share all information at 
meetings. The co-operative is set up in one industrial unit, so all members share the 
same work space. This was suggested to be beneficial for good relations between 
administrators and bakers, as they are not “segregated” (although the sustainability of 
such an arrangement following growth was questioned). 
 
It was argued that sometimes the involvement of all members makes progress a little 
slow but that this is still better than some members making decisions on behalf of 
others. Generally it is not the process of reaching a decision, but the actual 
implementation of it which is slow, and the administrative members have a 
responsibility to implement decisions made collectively but to ensure they do not take 
on an authoritarian role – to date there have been no problems of decisions being made 
non-democratically. 
 
The focus of discussions was suggested to be medium-term, with little long-term 
strategic planning as the co-operative does not enjoy an especially strong financial 
position. However, there are no real divisions in the direction that the co-operative is 
moving in. Core founding principles such as environmental sustainability or ethics have 
not been sacrificed, but are discussed on occasion. 
 
8.5 Finance 
 
Pay was one of the key issues of this co-operative. At the time of the interviews, wages 
for members were less than national minimum wage (with the effect that casually 
employed delivery drivers, subject to employment law, earned more on an hourly basis 
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than director-members). Since the co-operative's formation, wages rose from zero to 
around five pounds per hour. Members generally suggested this was enough for some, 
but accepted that this depended on other financial circumstances, such as dependants or 
the existence of other forms of security such as salaried partners. The low pay is a 
source of frustration, as some members with more financial demands feel an increased 
pressure to raise pay more quickly, but at the same time, members stated plainly that 
they did not want to work at a conventional business for more money, and did not want 
to leave over the low pay, and that the low pay was not a barrier to working at the co-
operative. One member argued that this was especially the case for those who chose to 
live less consumerist lifestyles. There was a shared belief that wages would rise over 
time, as they have done, and therefore that things would get better. The equal pay 
structure was argued to be helpful in managing the frustration of low pay. Pay rises are 
decided democratically at strategy meetings, in which everyone had an equal say. 
Because the process of baking artisan bread is very labour intensive, the wage bill 
accounts for around 40% of turnover. 
 
The co-operative was originally financed from three sources. Predominantly, this was 
loan stock (around £30,000), a grant from a co-operative legacy fund (£9,500) and from 
crowd-sourcing based on pre-orders of bread (around £8000). According to participants, 
the co-operative did not struggle to find start-up capital, but early in its formation 
members were largely working for nothing. It has also been able to secure a low-rent 
tenancy from the council for its premises, and owns all other assets including a delivery 
vehicle. It has only recently experienced enough surplus to begin to pay the loan stock 
and start to accumulate reserves for replacing its fixed capital. Members have an 
awareness of the need to reinvest rather than increase wages more quickly, and the 
proportion of surplus to be saved was the result of a long discussion between members. 
People also felt fairly secure about the survival of the co-operative, due to its steady 
growth over time, and, as with other co-operatives, access to information about the 
financial status of the company creates a sense of security and control by alerting 
members to possible problems.  
 
It was argued that being a co-operative makes the business more flexible as gives 
everyone a deeper commitment to the workplace, so they will contribute more when 
required to, for example during a spike in workload. However, in the medium-term, the 
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slow recruitment process means that the co-operative cannot respond quickly to growth. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The size of the co-operative in this case makes for a different experience of democracy 
and management than at larger co-operatives since it allows members to be directly 
involved with most aspects of the business, allowing for some task rotation at the 
administrative/managerial level if not on the shop floor. The type of work, performed to 
a particular routine, means that issues of discipline did not arise as a problem as in other 
co-operatives. This is probably helped by the one-room working in which there is 
constant supervision by other members and the informal hierarchy of skills creating a de 
facto foreman.  
 
The main issue at this co-operative appeared to be the low pay, since members gave a 
very positive account of the working experience, their commitment to the high-quality 
products manufactured and sold, the chance to develop their skills, and of the co-
operative model in general. Although naturally members wanted and expected higher 
pay, they were prepared to wait for it in order to secure the firm and understood the 
issues around it such that they were willing to take a longer-term approach with regards 
to this. It is important to note that the rate of pay has risen quickly and raising it 
continues to be a priority for the co-operative, but one which is not allowed to 
jeopardise the long-term future of the firm and the prospects for members. If the firm 
were to run into financial difficulties and pay did not continue to rise, problems might 
emerge. The rises in pay are evidence of the success of the firm so far. The co-operative 
appears to have grown fairly quickly from start-up, through occupying a niche in the 
market insulated from direct competition and ensuring a firm capital base from crowd-
sourcing and loan stock as well as exploiting the opportunities for co-operatives and 
small businesses from development funds and local government.  
 
Start-ups, in any form of business, are difficult, and the low wages paid by the co-
operative are evidence of this. However, there is a sense that the benefits of controlling 
the firm as a director are worth this sacrifice, and that the pay-off in the long run will 
exceed the costs in the short term. Members did not think that the low pay was a barrier 
to working at the co-operative, but generally were young people without dependants. 
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The labour-intensive nature of the work also meant that flexibility was limited in 
comparison to other co-operatives in this study, but that bringing in more staff, 
alongside raising pay, was another issue to be considered as the co-operative developed. 
As a result a lot of the benefits of co-operative work at the Bakery Co-operative were 
either ideological, in terms of the intrinsic value in democratic decision-making and the 
lack of authority giving a more pleasant working environment, or based on the products 
it made and the way that it operated, rather than relating directly to control over time, 
since as a start-up it was unable to offer the higher wages and increased flexibility of 
more developed co-operatives with more members and a higher turnover.
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9 
Wholefoods B - A Large Worker Co-operative (Case Study 4) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Wholefoods B is by some margin the largest co-operative in the study, and is an 
example of the relatively small number of large worker co-operatives in the UK. This 
raises a particular set of questions – how well democratic management can function 
with the participation of a large workforce, how well discipline can be maintained in a 
much larger workforce without supervision, and how well the co-operative can compete 
with other large businesses and attract the large sums of capital required for its 
expansion and development. 
 
As with the other case study chapters, there is first a brief description of the dataset and 
a history of the formation of the co-operative drawn from documents and interviews. 
The chapter then goes on to examine how the work at the co-operative is organised and 
how this creates flexibility and autonomy for members, how the work is managed, with 
particular focus in this case study on issues of discipline and organisation, the effects of 
democratic management, membership and pay structures, before looking at the financial 
survival of the co-operative. The chapter finishes with a summary of findings. 
 
9.1.1 About the Dataset 
 
Data was collected in January 2015 and consists of 6 interviews with members (out of a 
total membership of around 90) carried out through opportunity sampling during a visit 
to the co-operative, and organised by a member who was also a participant. Data is also 
drawn from documents provided by the co-operative. The interviews were all between 
30 and 40 minutes, totalling just over three hours. 
 
9.2 History of the Co-operative 
 
The co-operative is the largest in this study, with between 80 and 100 members and a 
payroll of up to 120, including temporary staff. It is involved in manufacturing, 
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wholesale, retail and distribution of wholefoods and environmentally-friendly 
household products across several sites. Its products are vegetarian, organic and 
Fairtrade. It also exports internationally. It has seen continued expansion since 
formation, and has been a successful enterprise, owning a large warehouse and turning 
over around £15m per year at present.  
 
'Wholefoods B Co-op' was formed in the early 1990s from a fusion of two smaller co-
operatives which were wholefood retailers and wholesalers. According to one 
participant, originally one of these firms was a private business rather than a co-
operative, but the reasons for the shift towards co-operative functioning were not clear 
from the interview. The two smaller co-operatives date back to the early 1970s. The 
merger of the two co-operatives was done for the sake of efficiency and integration 
across two different urban centres and took around five years to complete. The co-
operative was then able to grow alongside the wholefood market which began to take 
off in the mid 1980s following increased public concern about environmental issues, 
accelerated by food scares and public enthusiasm for healthy eating from the 1990s. In 
1995, for example, pre-packing machines had to be bought by the co-operative to keep 
up with rising demand.  
 
9.3 Organisation of Work: Flexibility and Control 
 
As mentioned, the workforce is divided into sectors, each of which enjoys some 
autonomy in organising the deployment of workers. The way in which this is done 
varies significantly between sectors, with some not meeting at all, and others meeting 
weekly or fortnightly. This depends on working practices, among other things – in 
transport, for example, it is difficult to organise meetings at which everyone concerned 
can be present. In transport there is something of a clash between non-hierarchical 
management and legal requirements, as the law requires someone to be responsible for 
transportation at the company. This gives more power to the sector co-ordinator. It was 
suggested that, in theory, people can exercise a lot of control over what they will do at 
the company, but this varies by sector. Where rotas are drawn up by an individual, 
members can raise concerns about them but this is more difficult, especially for less 
confident members, than if the rota had been constructed collectively. In particular this 
disadvantages new members who are often worked very hard. The reasons for this are 
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unclear – possibly it is to ensure probationers are hard workers, or perhaps because they 
do not complain if they are treated less favourably than other members. The importance 
of building good personal relationships to realise the de jure power of membership and 
negotiate with sector co-ordinators was emphasised by one participant, and this is 
something which some will find very difficult. There is a need to “bed yourself in” at 
the co-operative and “carve out” a position compared to working in a “normal job” 
where authority relationships are clear – equality needs to be “negotiated” before many 
of the benefits of working at the co-operative are realised. This was seen as challenging 
but ultimately rewarding by the participant. It was also argued that individuals had more 
control in smaller sectors. 
 
Flexibility and security were some of the main rewards for co-operative work put 
forward by the participants. One participant said that working at the co-operative was 
“frustrating” but that the flexibility it offered kept them there, whilst several argued that 
they could find better pay elsewhere but that the mix of security and flexibility was 
more important. Flexibility of working hours to accommodate childcare was “worth 
more than money”. Part of the ethics of the business is ensuring that working life is 
made as comfortable as possible, and reciprocity between members allows for flexibility 
as this appears to be very much a shared ethic. This flexibility is accounted for by being 
a co-operative because there is nobody to challenge the way in which individuals 
choose to construct their working day – there is no boss to justify decisions before, so 
there is no need to engage in costly disputes in order to accommodate life outside of the 
workplace. It was suggested that in other companies it would be much harder to 
organise work in this way. However, as previously mentioned, accessing these benefits 
can be difficult and depend on the way in which members interact others in order to 
make these arrangements work. On the other hand, flexible working hours were said to 
be easy to access via the “appropriate channels” by another participant, and another said 
they had never heard of requests for more flexible working hours being refused when 
organising cover. One member went to far as to say that they could get the next day off 
if they needed to, and echoed the sentiment that it would be difficult or impossible to 
get this level of flexibility in other firms. Responsibility was mentioned in this respect 
by several participants, arguing that when people abuse the system they are frowned 
upon, and that time flexibility came with responsibility – time off should be for good 
reason and that people need to realise that their actions will affect others. It was 
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suggested that people do not want to let teams down and this could prevent people from 
taking time off. As in other cases, solidarity was mentioned, and this was linked to the 
lifestyles and worldviews of many of the members. Exactly how flexible working hours 
can be varies with work – member who work alone or in very small teams have more 
freedom than those who work in larger teams, it appears.  
 
Motivation for working at this particular firm differed between participants. Several 
participants had previously been self-employed or had experience in other forms of 
collectives, and most expressed a strong interest in working for a firm without a boss. 
One stated that they were disillusioned by the management at conventional companies 
who did not know enough about the work they were supposed to be managing, creating 
a blue/white collar divide. Others stated that they enjoyed the mix of security and 
flexibility without authority (one having been self-employed before, with limited 
financial security). It was argued that if there was boss, the management structure would 
be resented, and that the feeling of being able to change the co-operative, and to “take 
out” what is “put in” is a powerful motivation for continued employment at this 
company, although the size of the company and member's differing relations with one 
another mean that this is more true for some than others. It was suggested that this form 
of management allowed people to tailor their working lives independently, but also 
allowed some to be “passengers”. Political and ethical motivations for joining were also 
strong, including strong interest in Fair Trade, vegan/vegetarian food, wholefoods, 
organic food or anarchist politics.  
 
Task rotation is less prevalent at this co-operative than at others studied, possibly due to 
scale, although many participants had moved teams at some point, often due to poor 
health. However one participant said that being a co-operative was helpful for task 
rotation, and another mentioned that the probationary period for new members involved 
2-week placements to ensure that members appreciated the nature of other jobs at the 
firm. It was also said to be easy for participants to move between hobs in the long term, 
and that internal-only advertisements for vacancies were not uncommon. Participants 
mentioned that they had the control to make jobs their own and take the co-operative in 
new directions, such as organising the export side of the business or taking a role in 
researching new products.  
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It was suggested that there are sometimes divisions based on sector, and that task 
rotation would be helpful in order to prevent this as people do not always see the 
downsides of other jobs, and cannot always empathise with other members' problems, 
posing a challenge to the co-operative's cohesion. One participant stated that there was a 
long running dispute between manufacturing and distribution, with each accusing the 
other of poor timekeeping or taking too much sick time. Another possible cleavage, 
mentioned above, exists between office and shop-floor based members, and a third 
involving drivers, as one participant observed other members perceptions that this was 
an easier job than others. It was suggested that the lack of a manager meant that people 
searched for an us/them distinction with other sectors, where in a hierarchical firm it 
would be management who were the subjects of discontent. One problem identified is 
that formal rules are not followed consistently by different sectors which leads to 
unequal treatment of members and could aid the perception that some sectors are more 
lax than others. One aspect which is potentially helpful is that each sector can put points 
on other sector's agendas, meaning that disputes can be raised and discussed easily, but 
a lack of consistent sector meetings could prevent this from happening.  
 
Training is provided by the co-operative, such as forklift licenses, but the budget for this 
was reported to be underused. At least one member gives certified food training to other 
members. 
 
Several participants mentioned issues with discipline, although these were almost 
always in the past tense. There is a disciplinary committee with around 12 members, 
and three are chosen by human resources to investigate and adjudicate when complaints 
are made. This sometimes requires getting legal assistance from outside the co-
operative. The extent to which this was a problem varied by participant – some said it 
was inherent to any business, whilst others thought the behaviour of colleagues in the 
past was very problematic. One member said of timekeeping that it annoyed some but 
that it was not generally a big problem. The main issue raised was sick pay, which was 
previously a very generous scheme. Some members abused this scheme, making it 
unaffordable, and the membership voted to alter it. Members are still able to keep their 
jobs after long-term absence due to illness. Participants generally agreed that the 
disciplinary situation had improved, with some saying it was no longer a serious issue. 
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It was suggested that there have been problems with authority in the co-operative as 
members do not like being told what (not) to do, although these have mostly been 
eradicated over the last decade. Health and safety was given as an example by one 
participant who said it was only taken seriously “when it suits [the co-op]” - for 
example, people not wearing high-visibility clothing, or people drinking alcohol during 
working hours. One participant argued that the idea that the members own the business 
makes some feel like they are not accountable – so they do not need to turn up for work 
on time, for example, and that recruitment should target those who have not worked at a 
co-operative before, as not wanting a boss, or being part of a radical counter-culture, 
was sometimes a sign of a troublesome employee. However, the lack of bosses was also 
recognised as the motivation for many people to work hard. It was suggested that it is 
hard to make changes in these areas, such as a difficulty in instituting a lateness policy, 
although another participant said that tightening rules had been both effective and 
generally well-received, despite being normatively undesirable. 
 
The culture of the co-operative at the time was given as a possible reason for this, with 
people seeing the co-operative as “social scene” rather than a workplace. One 
participant suggested that co-operatives will inevitably attract people from the “fringe” 
of society who are unwilling or unable to conform to a conventional working 
environment. However, it was suggested that as some members left or were fired 
following disciplinary proceedings, the culture has changed for the better. It was 
suggested that the problems were caused in part by a culture which made discipline 
difficult – members managed to give jobs to friends who were unsuitable for the role 
and were reluctant to complain about their conduct. As in many workplaces, people shy 
away from reporting poor behaviour, but this is exacerbated by the anti-authority ethic 
which is key to non-hierarchical co-operative management, and can mean that problems 
which hinder operations are not dealt with quickly enough as the idea of taking a 
problem to HR is a very serious proposition, and those responsible for making 
disciplinary decisions can become unpopular. It was suggested that some see the co-
operative as a “utopia” so do not want to speak out against practices they disagree with, 
and that there is “company first” attitude which prevents some members from coming 
forward with concerns (for example about bullying) as they feel they are wasting the 
firms resources in doing so. This has the potential to create an environment, as 
suggested by one participant, where the needs of the collective are put before the needs 
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of individuals.  
 
In contrast to this view, it was also suggested that it is too difficult to remove 
troublesome members, and that often major rule changes have to be introduced in 
response to a small number of members abusing the system. An example was given of a 
former member who was at the co-operative for 8 years, throughout which time they 
were given many warnings and had many discussions about conduct. This is seen as a 
person-centered approach at the expense, at times, of a business-centered approach. The 
length of disciplinary proceedings was mentioned by many participants, as it has the 
potential to sour relationships between members. One participant surprisingly suggested 
that a boss would be better as they could deal with situations unambiguously and 
quickly. Disciplinary panels were said to be “a bit fluffy” in their reluctance to deal with 
issues. Several participants raised the issue that there was not enough training in dealing 
with disciplinary cases.  
 
Several participants said that the appraisal system for new members was not thorough 
enough, and that too much was decided on the basis of personality rather than working 
practices as people struggle to be honest when speaking openly about others. The 
system, it was suggested, is too lenient and very few, if any, prospective members fail 
the appraisal. There is a culture of “passive acceptance” as nobody wants to be critical 
or objective in public, perhaps out of fear of their own appraisals (which happen very 
rarely).  
 
9.4 Membership and Democracy 
 
The co-operative is made up a series of sectors – distribution, manufacturing, transport 
and so on which allow for some division of labour. The overall management is carried 
out by a management committee, made up of around six people who are changed yearly 
on a two-person rotation. Members put themselves forward for this and are voted on to 
the committee. This replaced a previous system in which each sector had a delegate, and 
all delegates met weekly. Some participants were or had been on the management 
committee. The co-operative also has general meetings which are four times a year and 
are held off-site. Members are paid for attendance of these meetings and attendance is a 
requirement of membership, and attendance is usually 50-60 out of around 80, 
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according to one participant. Several participants put forward the view that making 
every decision through a general meeting was an unwieldy process, and it was this 
which led to the formation of the delegate system which was then superseded by the 
management committee. One participant put this very plainly, arguing that decision-
making in a large co-operative is difficult as 30 to 40 opinions have to be considered. 
One participant, who was on the committee, said they probably had more influence than 
other members by virtue of this position. 
 
The shift from delegate to management committee has had several effects. The change 
was made by a vote of the general meeting, and most participants were enthusiastic 
about the change, although its imperfections were also stressed. By revolving the 
membership of the committee, the formation of a hierarchical boss/employee 
relationship is averted. This is also helped by the fact that any member can put 
themselves forward. The main purpose of the committee is to streamline the decision-
making process, and participants generally said this had been achieved, and that the 
quality of management had improved due to a range of factors including the formation 
of the committee. However, the need to ensure that decisions can be ratified by the 
general meeting can still be problematic and time-consuming. There is a fast-track 
system for urgent proposals to be put to the committee if decisions need to be made 
quickly. 
 
It was suggested by some participants with experience on the committee that the system 
was superior to the delegate system because the members were put forward themselves 
then chosen by the co-operative rather than being sent from their sector as a delegate. 
This allowed them to look at the business as a whole rather than approaching from a 
more narrow personal or sector-specific perspective. This allows for “constructive 
consensus” to be formed rather than fighting between different interested parties. Where 
consensus is not possible, matters are voted on or discussed further by the general 
meetings of all members. The management committee minutes are available to all, and 
the committee has no control in the general meetings, according to one participant. On 
the other hand, some still argued for the merits of the delegate system, stating that 
information flow was better as each delegate reported back to their sector. Under the 
management committee system, people have to proactively seek out the minutes of the 
meetings, and some do not do this. 
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However, this system of management has been criticised, and various criticisms were 
put forward even by participants who said they had voted for the system, or who sat on 
the committee. It is possible for people to sit on the committee for a long time if elected 
repeatedly, and for all members to be from the same sector. One participant said that 
some members of the co-operative felt that the committee was self-interested, and that 
some decisions were quite unpopular, and another argued that voices from “all corners” 
of the co-operative were not represented as well in the management committee as in the 
sector delegate system. The system is time consuming but participants said it was not a 
burden as it was necessary for the success of the business in the long term. Members 
valued employment at this particular company very highly and wanted it to survive, so 
were happy to give time to management committee meetings. 
 
The size of the membership was a controversial issue. One participant argued that the 
co-operative forced membership on new workers, which was in violation of the 
international co-operative principle of voluntary membership, and that membership was 
too large. It was suggested that people were becoming members who did not want to be, 
or were not responsible enough to take on this role. It was suggested that a minority 
membership did not present an issue as the co-operative already makes use of temporary 
workers, and would improve the standard of management. The idea of membership 
being too large was shared, albeit cautiously, by some other participants who identified 
issues with the size of the co-operative but were more reluctant to cap membership, with 
some arguing that they would not like to see a “two-tier” system which might create an 
“elite”. Others mentioned the implicit assumption that the co-operative would continue 
to grow, and would liked to see this commitment discussed openly and considered, and 
that other co-operatives of similar size tend to introduce more hierarchical management 
structures which would not be welcome at this firm. It was also suggested by one 
member that there are problems with using casual and temporary workers. These 
comments were made in reference to using such workers as cover. It was suggested that 
they are not always aware of the workload and need to be supervised whilst working, 
and that because they will not know what they will be working on the next day, they 
cannot be proactive and self-managing. They also lack the ability to multi-task and 
switch tasks, presumably as they have less knowledge of the co-operative's operations 
as a whole. There has been a rise in the use of temporary staff over the last few years. 
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The main problems identified were participation, decision making and discipline. It was 
suggested that the large membership made democratic participation difficult and 
encouraged free-riding, with a similar logic applying to discipline. The lack of 
participation by many members means that it is possible for a very small minority to 
take wield a large amount of power, especially if that minority contains influential 
members with strong personalities. This can leave some members vulnerable if they 
become unpopular with a group for some reason, and this may be linked to the 
reluctance to implement disciplinary proceedings mentioned above. Some members can 
be “ganged up” on and tend to leave as a result. The lack of participation was blamed by 
some on the arrival of new members who are less interested in the co-operative nature 
of the business and see it as just a job, which dilutes the ideas at the core of the 
organisation. It was suggested that an otherwise undesirable hierarchy or improving the 
way the management committee works would be the answers here. 
 
Several of the long-standing members who participated said that the co-operative 
worked better in the past when it had around 30 members, as it was harder to hide from 
responsibilities in both work and management. It also meant that issues of poor working 
practice could be dealt with by other members informally rather than the co-operative's 
disciplinary process, as it was easier to identify and work with those responsible. The 
size also makes inclusive decision making unwieldy, and consensus-based decision 
making impossible. As a result, it is difficult for the democratic process to represent the 
membership as a whole.  
 
The size of the co-operative in relation to democracy was an issue raised in each 
interview, and all participants described the challenges of participation with such a large 
membership. Each member has the opportunity to put forward proposals to the 
management committee, which have the potential to radically change the nature of the 
working environment if approved. However, very few members put proposals forward – 
the committee offers help with writing proposals which, according to one participant, 
has never been asked for. Almost all proposals are written by under a quarter of the 
membership, and new members in particular do not tend to write proposals. Another 
participant echoed this arguing that in general meetings, it is usually the same people 
(around six) who volunteer to execute decisions made by the meeting. It was also said 
that only around ten members do most of the talking in general meetings, but that this 
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was not a problem as members attend to vote, rather than to deliberate on issues having 
already read the relevant information. Apathy could be due to workload – information is 
primarily transmitted by email but only office-based workers tend to check this 
regularly, and busy individuals do not have the time to research matters in depth, 
instead trusting to those they feel know best, especially on complex issues such as 
finance. There was a strong suggestion by several participants that members are not as 
well-informed as they should be, but with long days working through breaks and 
finishing late usually raised as the reason for this, as well as the fact that the co-
operative is spread across many sectors operating on different sites, making it more 
difficult to find things out. As with other case studies, the importance of personality was 
stressed by participants, and that some members “shout louder” than others. 
 
The types of contributions made by members are also important. It was suggested by 
some participants that contributions were generally “reactionary”, in response to 
proposals put forward. There was often more criticism of ideas than the formation of 
positive alternatives. There is a lot of democratic apathy – for many members, the idea 
of being without a boss appeals more than making a positive contribution to the 
decision-making process, according to one participant. This links to ideas about 
information flow – by the time people have read minutes and raised issues, their 
reaction comes too late in the decision-making process to make a difference. It was also 
suggested that holding meetings in the evenings after work meant that they were not 
always “Productive or progressive”, presumably because members are tired and 
frustrated if the meetings drags on into the late evening. 
 
The issues of knowledge and power was raised here with participants suggesting that 
those who put themselves forward, or made proposals, were generally the long-standing 
members. It was suggested that a “hierarchy of knowledge” seems to exist, which was 
an idea described in different terms by various participants. There are some people who 
“need” to be on the management committee as they have the most knowledge about the 
business, but this further entrenches and re-creates this hierarchy. One participant 
argued strongly that there was certainly an “unspoken” hierarchy, arguing that the 
cleavage was in part between office based workers and shop-floor workers, and that 
they were unsure how to “join” the influential clique. However, they argued that the 
management committee was not part of this hierarchy, but that there was a set of people 
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who, through their influence and membership of the “unspoken” hierarchy, could 
undermine the authority of the committee, making it harder for it to make decisions. 
Other participants seemed to disagree with this viewpoint – one arguing that although 
there was an “old guard”, anyone with the motivation and drive could exert influence 
over the co-operative if they were proactive about it, and another stating that the 
appearance of some members, particularly long term members with over ten years at the 
co-operative, having more power than others was down to their knowledge and 
experience, as opposed to them actually exercising more control and direction over the 
business. For example, new members might have new ideas, but long-standing members 
will have the knowledge and experience to understand more about how those ideas 
would work in practice, and whether or not they have been tried before. In particular, 
people who lack skills or confidence are often not taken seriously, and do not seem to 
ask for help, and a lack of confidence was suggested as a reason why new members 
might not be as involved in the management process. Annual task rotation was 
suggested as a way to break up these hierarchies. It was stressed by some participants 
that new members who were vocal were welcomed, as they brought in new ideas, and 
that people were encouraged as much as possible to participate in the quarterly 
meetings. 
 
It was also suggested that the discussion is often about the “wrong” issues – in 
particular with too much focus on political or ethical issues than business (although as 
mentioned below, many members take the environmental and social ethos of the co-
operative very seriously). It was suggested that most disputes in decision making were 
on these types of issues. It was suggested that people privilege their own ethics and 
beliefs over what would be best for the co-operative (for example, suggesting that the 
co-operative sell only vegan products, or should not trade with certain countries, which 
would remove many product lines), and do not think through the implications of their 
voting preferences. The co-operative, is was said by some members, is “not political” 
but this is a difficult distinction to make. One member suggested that the co-operative 
“glorifies failure” as being too profitable would be ethically wrong (one example given 
was some members not wanting to be involved with a businessman, apparently because 
he drove an expensive car), and the tension between running a successful business and 
satisfying members with strong ethical convictions was noted by several participants in 
different terms. A few participants suggested, light-heartedly, that consensus between 
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groups of “punks, hippies and anarchists” in a business environment would always be 
challenging. However, it was also suggested that people's ethics are a motivation for 
them to contribute to the business and take charge of issues, for example in proposing 
and organising cruelty-free pest control. A participant also said that collective decision-
making was a valuable good in itself, and that if it was frustrating for some, then this 
was a bearable price to pay for this type of management. 
 
9.5 Finance 
 
The co-operative operates a flat pay structure with small incremental pay increases 
linked to length of service and index-linked pay rises. There are also quarterly pay 
bonuses which have replaced dividends. The incremental pay increases were suggested 
not to be large enough to create an incentive for long service (one member said they 
made £3.50 more per hour than a new member after 16 years of work). However, one 
participant said that some people’s wages were too high, and that sometimes longer-
serving members were not seen to be “pulling their weight”, although they also argued 
that it is these members who usually take on more responsibilities. More cynically, it 
was also suggested that it is not a coincidence that the most influential members are the 
highest paid, hinting that there is little appetite for a cap or other reforms of the pay 
structure. The rate of staff turnover appears to be varied – based on participants' 
perceptions, around half of the members only stay around three years, but the other half 
tend to stay for a very long time, with many members having worked at the co-operative 
for over ten years. The co-operative pays the living wage, and it was suggested that after 
this decision the quality of applicants for new positions rose. 
 
There are also casual and temporary workers, with a focus on getting casual workers 
onto temporary contracts very quickly. These workers are also paid the living wage, and 
the arrangement is designed to allow people to come and go from the firm (for example, 
to accommodate travelling) without the responsibilities of membership. Temporary 
workers are encouraged into membership, and the numbers of permanent non-member 
workers are very low. 
 
The co-operative has been successful enough to fund most of its expansion from 
surplus, although it took out a large mortgage over a period of around 20 years in order 
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to purchase its warehouse. It has been able to avoid borrowing from “mainstream” 
borrowers such as banks, instead making use of loans from co-operative finance and 
development organisations, and other ethical banks such as Triodos, which includes 
mortgage lending.  
 
The co-operative has expanded around threefold in membership since the 1990s, 
although the expansion has been gradual due to the nature of shared decision-making. A 
rule to cap the ratio of wages to sales at 12% has been observed which prevents rapid 
growth. This expansion has mainly been due to a rising market following increased 
public interest in organic food and wholefoods, stimulated by a series of food scandals. 
The co-operative also benefits from being geographically distant from its rivals, and 
from a diverse range of activities such as exports to Europe, with growth aided by 
macroeconomic factors linked to foreign exchange. Several members argued that the co-
operative form of the business was a factor in its success. It was suggested that the 
structure helps keep the business ethical, and that customers “buy into” the ethics of the 
co-operative. This includes a sense of trustworthiness which gave the company a 
competitive edge in light of scandals with large suppliers and supermarkets. However, 
participants also argued that a manager could make work more efficient, and that being 
run as a conventional business would be more profitable, but that its impact would 
depend on how much money a management structure took out of the business. It was 
suggested that the co-operative only aims to be successful enough to survive and 
provide a comfortable working environment, and that large profits are not an end goal in 
themselves if they are achieved at the expense of co-operative functioning.  
 
Expansion appears to be an unconscious goal of the business, with participants 
suggesting that it is not often discussed, but that expansion is assumed to be a goal even 
though many members appear uncomfortable with it. There is an implicit link made 
between expansion and prosperity. This is not seen as a big problem, since customers do 
leave the co-operative at times, and because possible rivals may be expanding, but some 
participants would like to see it discussed more explicitly. One member mentioned 
strategy 'away days' for all members which could help with this. 
 
As with other cases, a tension between reinvesting surplus and taking more as wages 
was mentioned, but participants said that this was generally contained, as shown by the 
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successful expansion of the business. It was suggested that most members are able to 
take a long-sighted view of the business, valuing the working environment and the 
ideals of the co-operative, so were able to exercise pay restraint where necessary in 
order to allow for its long-term survival. It was suggested that long job tenure was a 
factor, and that it was generally short-term members who wanted to extract more from 
the co-operative. One example was given of a former finance director who was only a 
member for a short time and advised a dividend which was not really affordable. It was 
approved because of an implicit trust that the financial team would not recommend a 
risky dividend, because members did not know that the individual who proposed the 
payment was not planning to stay a member in the long term. In the recent recession, 
the members voted for a pay cut and cuts to pension schemes, and were able to avoid 
compulsory redundancies through a recruitment freeze. The co-operative has since been 
able to restart recruitment.  
 
Shareholding is a £1 nominal share, but there is also a staff loan which is a £500 share 
taken from the pay of members when they join the co-operative. Members have the 
option to increase this share if they wish to. The money invested in this way provides a 
fairly small source of funding from the co-operative but also pays members interest, 
working like a savings plan. The loan is withdrawable on cessation of membership. It 
was suggested that as well as improving cash flow slightly (a participant noted that the 
money was not really necessary), this gives all members a stake in the business, aiding 
morale by providing a sense of ownership. Members who have been with the co-
operative for more than three years can also take out loans, which some members do 
very regularly.  
 
As with most financial decisions, general meetings of all members determine how 
interest on staff loans should be distributed. In terms of day-to-day operations, a small 
team controls the finance with spend limits of £350 for teams, with spending of up to 
£25,000 authorised by the Management Committee. Any spending larger than this must 
be ratified by the general meeting.  
 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
As expected, the larger co-operative raises some issues which were not as apparent in 
163 
other cases. The size of the enterprise makes it much more difficult for all members to 
participate in the democratic process, and as a result a dominant group of members 
seems to emerge, based on knowledge and experience, creating an informal hierarchy in 
a nominally non-hierarchical organisation. This in turn can create disillusionment with 
the co-operative norms and values present at the firm. As a larger business it could also 
be that there is considered to be more distance between members, creating the 
appearance of a hierarchy since members could feel alienated from one another. Once 
this happens, and the bonds of shared responsibility start to weaken, it presents 
problems for motivation and discipline, leading to the introduction of more formal rules 
and procedures. This is exacerbated by the particularly radical, anarchist nature of this 
case. However, it should be noted that participants were generally in favour of the co-
operative being able to enforce its own rules for the benefit of all, and the firm has 
avoided introducing direct authority and supervision. This was the only case where 
degeneration, manifest in expansion through non-member workers, was presented as an 
option by some participants, on the basis that membership entailed obligations and 
responsibilities which were not fulfilled by all members. 
 
Despite these differences, there is still much convergence with the findings of the other 
cases. Flexibility, combined with job security, still seems to be a particular feature of 
co-operative work, and this seems to translate from the medium to the large co-
operatives relatively well. In terms of management and organisation, there are more 
structures at Wholefoods B such as the management committee and teams with co-
ordinators, but these do not appear to have had a major impact on the autonomy 
available to the worker, nor to their ability to shape collective decisions. The financial 
success of the firms also appears to show a similar attitude on the part of members when 
making long-term decisions about pay and investment. Like the other cases, although 
there may be under-investment in these firms compared with equivalent capitalist firms, 
they appear to be able to survive, grow and develop whilst offering a different 
experience of work from their conventional capitalist counterparts. 
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10 
Analysis of Case Studies 
 
This chapter will look at the four case studies together, identifying intersections 
between the findings as well as searching and analysing contrasting findings. In so 
doing it seeks to address the theoretical contributions from previous chapters in order to 
build a more nuanced, sophisticated and empirically-supported picture of the 
relationship between co-operative work, working life and developmental freedom.  
 
Firstly, some basic and common observations about co-operative management 
structures, the social function of the co-operatives, and the UK context are summarised 
before analysis of how these structures interact with the working lives of members. In 
order to do this, three levels of analysis are used – the individual within work, the 
individual's control over time and finally the systemic level looking at the survival of 
firms and the security of work. The first level examines the intrinsic and extrinsic 
advantages of self-management, focussing on the idea that individuals can find work in 
itself valuable, following the Aristotelian perspective on work (Haagh 2007:123, 
2011a:450). This level of analysis is useful in order to look at why it might matter that 
individuals can shape their own workplaces and control their working practices in terms 
of seeing work as an ethical duty and one which has a wider social value. The second 
level of analysis examines the ability of co-operative firms to give a flexible working 
environment in which individuals are able to control their own development within and 
without the workplace. It focuses on the social bonds of reciprocity and solidarity which 
are created in a co-operative firm and how these can translate into a high degree of static 
and dynamic control. The final level of analysis looks at the ability of the co-operative 
firm to survive in a competitive market environment, and seeks to explain the survival 
of firms by isolating two sets of factors – the characteristics of co-operative firms which 
allow them to be competitive, and another set of structural factors which influence their 
behaviour when faced with crisis. This suggests that co-operatives are able to resolve 
the same difficulties through different mechanisms and in different ways to 
conventional firms. The chapter concludes by briefly revisiting the existing literature on 
co-operatives, specifically looking at the previous empirical studies raised in earlier 
chapters and comparing the findings. 
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In terms of the relationship between working life and developmental freedom, this 
analysis aims to look at how co-operative work changes the nature of working life as 
experienced and perceived by the participants. The effects it has on working life can 
then be evaluated in terms of developmental freedom through the lenses of control over 
time, in particular considering the ability of the worker to spend their time doing things 
which they have cause to find valuable. This encompasses a wide range of activities 
including their actual work within the co-operative and their ability to manage their 
employment as a means of subsistence in order to carry out other activities.  
 
10.1 Common Findings Between Studies 
 
Despite the differences in the contexts of each case study – size, sector and age – the 
similarities in the findings between the co-operatives are the most striking. Many 
participants offered similar perspectives both within and between cases.  
 
10.1.1 Co-operative Structures of Control 
 
All the co-operatives had broadly similar management structures, and where there were 
variations most participants argued that they did not constitute meaningful deviations 
from a general co-operative model. All co-operatives discussed the importance of a 
general assembly or general meeting of all members, at which all were expected to be 
present and to take part in activities. This forms the basis of all decision-making at the 
co-operative and is the ultimate source of power since it becomes difficult for any other 
control to be exercised without the approval of the general meetings. It is therefore a 
source of accountability, of final decision making power and a source of legitimacy for 
any devolved authority. In most of the co-operatives, there were also smaller groups 
elected from the general meeting with specific responsibility, including strategy 
committees, management committees, marketing groups and personnel officers. These 
seemed to be more important features at Wholefoods B, in which day-to-day 
management is run by the management committee which is awarded significant 
autonomy from the general meetings, but remains accountable to them. At all co-
operatives participants argued that they felt that the general meeting was a responsive 
body which members had an equal opportunity to put ideas towards. Even participants 
166 
who were more critical, particularly at Wholefoods B, argued that although informal 
hierarchies exist, they are not parallel with the formal institutions of the co-operative 
such as the management committee. At no case was it argued that a more hierarchical 
structure was necessary for market competition – although complaints that the process 
of decision-making can be frustrating were present at all co-operatives, there was no 
evidence to suggest that making decisions in this way had a negative impact on the 
business and that the co-operative principles had to be compromised in order to 
compete. Co-operative values are also developed through collective decision-making 
which entrenches the feeling of ownership of the firm, providing a source of motivation 
and responsibility. 
 
Organisation of work itself tended to be broken down into departments, the membership 
of which appears to be quite fluid, especially in Wholefoods A, which make decisions 
generally collaboratively amongst members or small sub-groups of members of each 
department. Individually, members at all studies had a degree of autonomy in work, 
with nobody to check that rules or procedures were being followed, which was 
welcomed by members for the most part and allowed them to use initiative to get their 
jobs done. The experience of working life is shaped by the organisation of work, 
specifically, in this case, the structure of the co-operative. Theoretically, it would be 
expected that democratic control in the workplace would lead to a division of labour 
based on workers' preferences, as opposed to an organisation of the workforce based on 
maximising productivity and efficiency (Pagano 1991:320). This in turn might involve 
more effort and expenditure on creating a comfortable working environment, including 
more flexible working hours from the perspective of the worker. This democratic 
control would be expected to translate into individual control as each member of the 
firm would be able to enjoy the opportunities offered to them for flexible working or 
better pay, which they could then use to advance their own capabilities outside of the 
working environment. This could include, for example, pursuing other jobs or 
vocations, childcare and parenting, or training and education. In terms of the forms of 
control already examined in this thesis, the relationship is one which links static to 
dynamic control – the control over time in the firm can be used to make long-term 
strategic decisions, in the right circumstances. 
 
There appears to be a general implied rule that members are free to make decisions but 
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that they will need to be able to present and defend these decisions to other groups of 
members and democratic bodies, with a set of democratic institutions forming from the 
spontaneous collaboration of individuals up to the general meeting. However, whilst 
there is a layer of authority that comes from these institutions, we can still describe co-
operative management as non-hierarchical for two reasons. Firstly, the system of 
authority is impersonal – it is exercised by institutions not by individuals in the sense 
that nobody has authority over another because of who they are but instead authority 
derives from the collective membership. Secondly, the institutions are derived 
democratically from members themselves, therefore there are no specific bosses – 
everyone is under the same set of mutual controls. This means that members are only 
subject to authority that they consent to and that they have the dynamic power to shape 
and reshape the institutions of control. In short, no formal authority exists outside of 
that which members choose to give each other or use collectively. In terms of the 'rules' 
and decisions of the co-operative, the importance of deliberative democracy – that is, 
making decisions through forums in which everyone has the right to speak, and in 
which decisions are reached through discussion and consensus-building where possible 
– was stressed at the case studies, with access to information to make decisions valued 
highly. This means that individuals have the power to shape the decisions of the co-
operative and helps to prevent the dominance of individuals. Although at all cases it was 
suggested that some individuals tend to be more vocal and forceful in debate than 
others, it was also argued that the access to information and time allocated for 
discussion of ideas meant that such individuals did not always get their way and instead 
decisions tended towards the holistic good of the co-operative rather than the sectional 
interests of individuals or departments. At all cases it was argued that no particular 
department or group of people tended to dominate the decision-making process. 
 
Because individual members take the role of directors of the firm (and refer to 
themselves as such), the motivations of those members to work can shape the 
workplace, at the same time as the continued success of the firm and the values it 
represents creates a powerful motivation to work, creating a two-way relationship which 
strengthens the social bonds between the individual and firm. In terms of the co-
operatives studied, the type of work they do, such as organic food sales, is a powerful 
motivation for members. The specificities of this work (e.g. the types of food to be sold) 
are constantly reviewed through democratic channels. Meanwhile, the democratic 
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nature of the firm itself creates intrinsic value for the members who appreciate the 
values of the firm and see co-operative work as a motivation in itself. This is an idea 
which became apparent after the interviews with many participants placing a significant 
value on the ethics and norms of their co-operatives.  
 
10.1.2 Social Function of Co-operatives 
 
All of the co-operatives expressed a strong ethical identity – at Wholefoods A and 
Wholefoods B this was realised in Fairtrade, vegetarian and organic produce; at the 
Printing Co-operative through a wider association with the co-operative movement and 
through environmental concerns; and at the Bakery Co-operative with a concern for 
organic food and the overall quality of the product. In all cases, there was also a strong 
ethical motivation for the organisation into a co-operative on the basis that it was a 
business model which was perceived to allow profitable operations whilst also ensuring 
the best deal for members/workers – there was an explicit rejection of the idea that the 
firm should only meet its legal requirements regarding wages and working conditions. 
This remained integral to the operation of the firms and was not something which 
participants would be willing to sacrifice in order to achieve better profits. The whole 
nature of success in business appeared to take on a different meaning in which success 
was measured not in pure profit but also in terms of the way in which the firm is able to 
fulfil its social functions of meeting (self-imposed) ethical obligations towards both the 
wider community and to its own members. 
 
In terms of the typologies given in Chapter 4, these co-operatives are something of a 
mixture (see Table 1 for typologies and Table 2 for information on case studies). It is 
hard to categorise them as the motivations behind their formations are multifaceted and 
open to interpretation. In the case of Wholefoods A, the conversion to full co-operative 
status is ongoing, and based largely on ideological principles, but the original formation 
of the firm as a wholefoods wholesaler still fits the categorisation to some degree. 
However, as described previously, this was not a conscious process but one based on 
survival of the firm through sweat equity in place of wage increases. Wholefoods B, on 
the other hand, seems to fit more cleanly but is itself an amalgamation of previously 
existing co-operative firms. The Printing Co-operative was set up explicitly as a co-
operative with an initial endowment and with job creation. The Bakery Co-operative 
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was established as a co-operative for what can be broadly categorised as ideological 
reasons.  
 
To summarise this section, there was considerable convergence of the case studies with 
similar sentiments expressed about the nature of management and democratic control 
despite some differences in the actual structures used. Despite their diverse origins, 
there is not a huge variation in terms of the mechanisms of management in the firms, all 
operate through decentralised day-to-day management at an individual and team level, 
under the long-term and strategic oversight of a directly democratic general assembly of 
all members. There is also little divergence in descriptions of the experience of work, 
with participants at all co-operatives emphasising the importance of co-operative 
management and ownership, and discussing the ethics of their firms as a key 
motivational force. 
 
10.1.3 The UK Environment 
 
The place of the co-operatives in the wider economy can also be considered in terms of 
common findings. In all cases, the co-operatives occupied a niche, often defined by sets 
of social principles (the sale of wholefoods, providing printing services to alternative 
organisations, baking as an artisan activity) rather than attempting to exploit a niche in 
order to make profits. This accounts to some extent for their sense of purpose and for 
their survival (see below). However, at all cases there was little credence given to the 
idea that co-operatives inherently suffer in capitalist economies, and members generally 
did not see that their market-facing operations really differed from other firms except 
for the products or services they chose to sell.  
 
However, at all of the co-operatives there was an idea of providing decent work in terms 
of pay and conditions, and this was seen as an objective of the firm. This suggests two 
conclusions. Firstly, all members found the experience of work valuable and chose to 
stay at the co-operatives. Even though participants usually did not join co-operatives out 
of commitment to co-operative values, they did see that work was organised differently 
and that jobs in co-operatives were “good jobs” for the sector. Participants seemed to 
take on co-operative values as they worked at these firms, rather than vice-versa, 
suggesting a powerful socialising effect. Secondly, it demonstrates how co-operatives 
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form a set of firms which operate in a fundamentally different way from most other 
firms, with a different set of priorities and objectives, suggesting they do not so much 
struggle in liberal market economies such as the UK, but simply approach challenges 
differently. There are strains – such as low pay at start-up – but these are tolerated by 
members who value the institutions of control which exist within these firms. 
 
10.2 Control Over Work 
 
Participants rarely spoke negatively about the case study co-operatives and, for the most 
part, were very positive about their experience of working at co-operatives. At 
Wholefoods A and the Bakery Co-operative, the positivity of the responses was 
overwhelming with hardly any negative sentiments expressed. Members valued 
working at a co-operative very highly and many said that they would be reluctant to 
work in any other form of organisation. Work therefore become valued for its own 
contribution to life.  
 
The value of co-operative work was shown to be both intrinsic and extrinsic. 
Participants appeared to enjoy the role that they could have in shaping the ethics of the 
firm, most obviously at the wholefoods co-operatives, whilst also respecting the role of 
democracy within the firms which diluted direct control. This meant that jobs which 
were similar, in terms of some of the tasks to be performed, to jobs in conventional 
firms could take on additional meaning as they represented work towards a valued 
cause. This suggests that the context in which the tasks take place is important for 
adding meaning to work, rather than the tasks themselves. This was also true in the 
other co-operatives, such as at the printing co-operative where environmental 
responsibility was taken very seriously and appeared to be valued by the members. This 
gave the impression that the work performed was taken as being a valuable use of time 
in itself rather than a means to subsistence, and that members felt that their work 
contributed to the good of society, broadly defined. Particularly important is the fact 
that the control of the firm allows members to “buy into” the ethics of the firm and 
make them central to their working motivation. This was also the case at the Bakery Co-
operative, where the nature of the product, artisan bread, was in itself a source of 
motivation for work. The co-operative character of the firm gave all members a say in 
the direction of the firm, allowing them to control both what was produced and how it 
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was made. 
 
This sense of intrinsic value was not only limited to the ethics of the firms in terms of 
the products stocked or the way they operated, but also to do with the co-operative form 
of organisation itself. Members were motivated to work at the co-operative precisely 
because the work was co-operative and they wanted it to stay this way – the co-
operative itself was a cause worth working for, for both ideological reasons to do with 
the lack of hierarchy, but also for the material benefits of co-operative work. Members 
also seemed to place value in the normative appeal of the co-operative in terms of 
fairness, as shown by the enthusiasm at Wholefoods A for the shift towards full co-
operative status from the legal form of a limited company. This enthusiasm appeared 
universal even amongst those who benefited from the previous arrangement, as it would 
allow the firm to operate more in line with a perceived set of co-operative ideals.  
 
Interestingly, very few participants actually sought out co-operative workplaces, but 
found this source of intrinsic value after their work had begun. This was perhaps 
clearest in interviews where participants talked about the survival of the co-operative for 
future generations of workers as well. Several participants discussed their identity and 
the idea that the co-operative was a workplace in which people were not judged on their 
lifestyles. This was a very appealing idea for many members who did not want to work 
for firms in which they would be forced to behave, act or dress in a particular way but 
instead were allowed more freedom of self-expression. Because members saw the co-
operative as a good thing in itself, for a variety of extrinsic reasons detailed below 
including control over time, their work for it was given an additional dimension of 
value. 
 
Self-management and non-hierarchical approaches were also seen to have a business 
benefit by many of the co-operatives. It was argued by some participants that 
management at conventional firms is distant from the activities of the workers and 
therefore is not able to manage effectively due to a lack of on-the-ground knowledge of 
operations. It is therefore better to have the people actually performing the tasks 
organising their own work. This was particularly the case at Wholefoods B where 
several participants mentioned the freedom to organise their tasks and pursue new 
initiatives through democratic decision-making was important for some of the successes 
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of the firm. The business benefit might also manifest in the workers having a wider 
understanding of the operations of the firm. Whilst task rotation is not unique to non-
hierarchical organisations, it is encouraged in this environment and the lack of 
promotional hierarchy does not penalise a horizontal job change. Having members work 
in more than one department, even if occasionally, makes the workforce more flexible 
as workers can be redeployed to cover absences or spikes in activity. It might also 
improve the quality of management decisions. 
 
There are some viable critiques of such a positive analysis of the impact of self-
management on work, in terms of the idea that co-operatives do have a distinct 
hierarchy, as well as problems of discipline and issues around firm ethos. Firstly, it was 
argued strongly by some participants, especially at Wholefoods B, that hierarchies do 
still exist in co-operative firms, albeit informally. If some individuals hold undue 
influence within the co-operative, it is hard to see how the benefits of co-operative work 
could be distributed universally and equally between the workforce – some members 
would not have the freedom to perform as they would like at work because they would 
be influenced and constrained by the inherently unfair decisions of the co-operative in 
setting particular rules of operation. Substantial power inequalities would also prevent 
some members from changing their working conditions through democratic processes. 
However, at all co-operatives the message that all members have the freedom to put 
forward their own ideas for discussion was prominent and strongly stressed. It was 
argued that if informal hierarchies of knowledge do exist and shape the agenda for 
discussion, that this was a system that would prevent a repetition of past mistakes rather 
than prevent the formation of new ideas and directions. It was also suggested that the 
freedom to put forward ideas and take a management role is one which members have 
to actively pursue, and that to do this is a key responsibility of co-operative work. All 
members at Wholefoods B, for example, can stand for the management committee, and 
many members saw this as a duty. This line of analysis suggests that if exclusion from 
the decision-making process does exist, it is largely voluntary rather than forced. On the 
other hand, at all co-operatives the potential for strong personalities to dominate was 
both raised and dismissed, and is possible that some selection bias of participants for the 
research meant that marginalised voices were not heard. 
 
Secondly, issues of discipline could have an impact on the benefits of self-management. 
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Wholefoods B was the only co-operative in which discipline was discussed at length, as 
it has experienced problems in the past with disruptive behaviour. It could be argued 
that a lack of direct hierarchical management forms an environment in which poor 
working practices can thrive, and that co-operative means of dealing with these issues 
are slow and unwieldy. This means that it is not so much a desire for meaningful co-
operative work which supports the “no bosses” argument but instead a tendency 
towards lazy working practices and other problematic behaviour such as drinking 
alcohol at work. However, this critique does not stand to scrutiny. Firstly, severely 
problematic behaviour was only strongly identified at Wholefoods B. This was 
attributed to a particular time period and specific individuals, and participants did not 
identify more recent problems having made some changes to its rules and operations. 
These changes did not appear to diminish the intrinsic value of co-operative work, nor 
have a significant effect on its more material extrinsic benefits (and could be argued to 
enhance both if it improves the organisation, communications and operations of the co-
operative). A participant at the Printing Co-operative suggested that co-operative 
management in terms of discipline is more “skilled” than hierarchical management as it 
involves more complex systems of conflict resolution, and this might be a case in point 
– co-operatives can adapt over time to challenges faced in this way without 
degenerating into conventional hierarchical firms. At Wholefoods A, although 
discipline was not a major issue raised, the importance of the “right people” was 
discussed, perhaps reinforcing the idea that co-operative operation is difficult and 
requires a level of interpersonal skill and willingness to learn which must be pursued in 
order to realise the benefits of such work. This appears to explain to some extent the 
observation of polarised job tenure, with many members at both Wholefoods co-
operatives either staying only for a short time, unable to function within a co-operative 
environment, or staying for a very long time. However, this is a less than satisfying 
conclusion as it raises the issue of whether some people are unable to work within co-
operatives at all, or whether it is an issue of attitude and approach. At the Printing Co-
operative a participant suggested that people are not taught how to operate co-
operatively in society, and therefore struggle within co-operatives at first. This 
viewpoint was also echoed by participants at Wholefoods B who suggested that 
members who have worked for a long time in conventional firms tend to struggle to 
work within non-hierarchical environments. 
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Thirdly, although the ethos of the firm might be a positive factor in work motivation, 
and the ownership and control of this ethos is something inherent to the co-operative 
model, disagreements over what this should actually be appeared to be a source of 
friction in several of the co-operatives. In Wholefoods B several participants raised 
problems in the decision-making process due to different perspectives on the product 
lines to be sold, whilst at the Printing Co-operative there was a severe conflict in the 
past between different ideological factions. If the ethos of the firm is key in generating a 
sense of occupational identity, it needs to be one which is agreed upon by its members. 
It would appear that this problem is resolved by the democratic process which is able to 
internalise such disputes and create a system in which members can exercise some 
limited collective control over the firm's ethical stance. Although a source of contention, 
the ethics of the firm are multi-faceted and have aspects such as democratic 
management, customer relations, environmental concerns and political perspectives. It 
is possible that even if some members are not completely satisfied with one ethical 
dimension of the firm (such as the product lines stocked) they may still be able to find 
value in another dimension (such as the democratic process) and therefore still be able 
to realise this value in the work. It appears to only be in extreme cases that this 
disagreement represents a threat to the co-operative as a whole. Furthermore, it was 
only at Wholefoods B where participants mentioned ethics as a potentially disruptive 
source of division in the decision making process, and it is possible that at smaller co-
operatives the deliberative process is a source of eventual agreement and improved 
cohesion in these matters. 
 
10.3 Control Over Time 
  
The participants at all cases stressed the importance of solidarity and reciprocity in co-
operative work. This included placing great value on the responsibilities that come with 
participation, but also on the benefits that this could bring. The main benefit discussed 
was the idea of time flexibility. At all co-operatives, with the exception of the Printing 
Co-operative, participants talked about how they were able to organise their own time, 
making time for commitments such as childcare or other work, without compromising 
their employment. This included changes to working hours and shift patterns and being 
able to get short-term cover for absences in emergencies. Some participants went so far 
as to say that they would not be able to work at a conventional firm as it would not be 
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able to offer this level of flexibility. The co-operatives were able to offer this level of 
flexibility for several reasons.  
 
Firstly, from an ethical perspective, arguments were made that the working environment 
should be comfortable and cater for the needs of members as much as possible. The fact 
that these firms are run co-operatively suggests that working towards the good of their 
members would be an integral part of their operation. Several participants raised the 
idea that their co-operative should always aim to do more than the legal minimum for 
members on issues such as flexible working or sick pay. Several participants discussed 
the idea that they did not want work to dominate other aspects of their lives, and would 
apply this idea to the lives of others as well. 
 
Secondly, there is an issue of reciprocity. Because flexibility can only be granted by 
other members, they have an incentive to accommodate it as much as possible since 
they will be asking for it from the same people. This represents co-operation at its most 
elementary level. The fact that it is other members who are doing this also allows for a 
system of flexibility which does not harm the business. A worker at a conventional firm 
who is responsible to a manager does not usually have to ask for permission from their 
peers for time off but instead needs to make a case to a manager. This might be 
something they are unwilling to do due to the power relationship in the firm. However, 
when they are instead looking for a favour from their peers, there is a sense of both 
interpersonal responsibility (as the member is asking the peers to cover for them) and 
reciprocity (as they would be willing to do the same favour for others). Therefore, 
although flexibility is possible, the responsibility that members have towards one 
another could act as a powerful controlling force to prevent members from abusing this 
situation – they do not want to repeatedly put their colleagues in this position. Their 
own pride in their co-operative might also be a factor here, which could be less 
prevalent in a firm where the worker has less control and no sense of ownership. All of 
the case study co-operatives had a strong sense of society and community rather than an 
atmosphere of “us and them”. 
 
In terms of static control, co-operatives have a tangible appeal. The ability of members 
to control the day-to-day aspects of their working lives, and to exercise enough control 
over their time to organise other aspects of working life, creates an emancipatory 
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workplace. Members are able to mix aspects of working life, such as care, with their 
formal employment very easily without placing the security of their incomes under 
threat. This easily translates into a sense of dynamic control, since the control that 
members can exercise day-to-day allows them to organise their working lives 
effectively and autonomously. The co-operatives also had provision for people to take 
extended time off, including sabbaticals, and there were many anecdotes at several case 
studies of members who had left for a period to attend university or pursue other 
qualifications who were able to return to the co-operative as members afterwards. Again 
to some extent this rests on the control the workers have to define the rules of their own 
workplace in a positive manner, the ethos of the co-operative that a job should not 
dominate the life of an individual, and the bonds of reciprocity and solidarity which 
allow members to respect the decisions of others when they exercise their control over 
time. 
 
10.4 Security, Stability and Survival 
 
The stability of the working environment therefore also needs to be examined here. 
Static control means very little if it is not secure in the long-term, allowing for planning 
and strategic decision-making. Therefore, the experience of working life is shaped not 
just in terms of the freedoms enjoyed by the individual at any point in time, but also by 
how well the structures of the firm can provide continued, stable employment through 
encouraging profitable working. This is where several key issues from the case studies 
arise – issues of how co-operatives manage working practices, of discipline and 
incentives to work, and of motivation to work. Much of the of the literature on worker 
co-operatives suggests that they are at risk of being out-competed by capitalist firms due 
to comparative underinvestment (Miller 1981:323), poor management practices (Elster 
1989:94), and poor workplace discipline (Elster 1989:105). On the other hand, there are 
also suggestions that they are able to survive crisis remarkably well from the 
perspective of job security (Pencavel 2005) due to their inherent difficulties in making 
redundancies. How different co-operatives, particularly ones of different sizes, are able 
to manage the workplace to ensure their long-term profitability and survival is 
examined in this section. 
 
All the co-operatives looked at in this study were trading businesses at the time of 
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research. Wholefoods A and Wholefoods B have experienced steady growth whilst the 
Bakery Co-operative was looking forward to growth in time, having been formed only a 
few years before. It has already experienced enough growth to expand its workforce. 
The Printing Co-operative, on the other hand, exists in a declining sector in which it can 
be undercut by failing firms, and has struggled for growth in the past. Nevertheless, it is 
still a profitable business with continuous expansion and development. However, the 
co-operative literature often suggests that co-operatives are problematic businesses 
which will struggle to compete and develop in competition with conventional firms for 
the reasons given above. This point is all the more salient when the financial crisis is 
taken into consideration, which all firms (except the Bakery Co-operative which did not 
exist until after the worst of the crisis) were able to survive. As a result there is a need to 
look at what the co-operatives are able to do in order to mitigate these potential 
structural problems. 
 
The success of the co-operatives studied can be accounted for along two lines of 
argument. The first argues that the co-operative model actually offers a firm foundation 
for survival and growth. The second argues that there is a motivation for long-term 
survival over short-term profit which is integral to the co-operative ethos and that 
particular actions are untenable to co-operatives. 
 
The argument for the merits of the co-operative model rests firstly on the value of 
deliberative democracy as a management technique. Although the ideal is rarely borne 
out perfectly in practice, even informal hierarchies of knowledge are still subject to 
democratic control. Dominant individuals are less powerful in deliberative settings, 
according to participants. Low turnouts or lack of preparedness for meetings and free-
riding off of management decisions – problems which seem to rise with firm size – 
may compromise the idea but do not lead to the creation of non-democratic systems of 
management. There is evidence from all case studies that making decisions 
collaboratively increases the quality of the decision and helps strategies to be 
implemented, and that co-operative members are able to consider the long-term 
consequences of decisions. The value placed on the management role afforded to 
members suggests that working under this form of management is seen as a privilege 
and something to be taken seriously. As a result, although members might lack technical 
management expertise in some cases, they are willing to devote considerable time to 
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attending meetings and researching possible options for the future. At Wholefoods A, 
for example, participants mentioned a system whereby members are delegated to solve 
particular problems by writing proposals for consideration, whilst at the Printing Co-
operative an ethos whereby ideas can be brought to meetings and become the 
responsibility of the proposing member to implement was mentioned. The fact that it 
takes time to make decisions can therefore be seen not as a failure of the co-operative 
decision making process but in fact a benefit since it demonstrates the time and effort 
made by members to access and process information to arrive at the right decision. This 
results in a feeling of ownership of those decisions which allows them to be 
implemented effectively and with some degree of consensus, although at Wholefoods A 
it was suggested that collective decisions can sometimes be “forgotten” if they are not 
enforced and institutionalised as standard practice. The degree of consensus at 
Wholefoods A is demonstrated by the suggestion that a shift from consensus to 
qualified majority voting had no real effect – the change being effected largely on 
efficiency grounds as part of an attempt to streamline the decision-making process. All 
co-operatives, with the obvious exception of the Bakery Co-operative, were 
characterised by fairly long job tenure which, it is suggested, aligns interests allowing 
for long-term decision making. The fact that job tenure is so long again suggests that 
co-operatives tend to work differently from other firms, and demonstrates the levels of 
commitment and motivation produced by control of the firm. 
 
The co-operative model can also be said to be more productive due to better workforce 
deployment. Generally labour in co-operatives is divided according to a mix of the most 
efficient allocation of work and the workers-preference principle described in Pagano 
(1991:320). Task rotation is employed, in particular at Wholefoods A, which has several 
effects. Firstly, it allows for a fairer allocation of work since different members can all 
take a turn at less or more pleasant jobs. This is an intrinsic quality of co-operative work 
as mentioned in the preceding sections. Secondly, and more significantly for the success 
of the co-operative, it increases the flexibility of the company by spreading skills 
around the workforce. This makes the operation less dependent on one individual as 
many can carry out most tasks, with a few exceptions where a job requires particular 
technical skill, as shown in the more technically divided workforce at the Printing Co-
operative. More flexibility, especially in labour-intensive work such as that carried out 
at Wholefoods A and Wholefoods B, means that the company can respond easily to 
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changes in its trading conditions, such as spikes in demand, as there are no “rules” 
which govern how things should happen, according to one participant at Wholefoods A. 
The idea of flexibility being present not just for the individual worker, but also for the 
firm, was present at all the cases except the Printing Co-operative for the reasons given 
above. Task rotation also feeds back into the advantages of a deliberative democratic 
system of management as detailed above, since it allows for a larger base of information 
on which to base decisions, and aids information flow. One remarkable aspect of the co-
operatives, especially the Printing Co-operative, was the flow of information about 
finance and operations from specialised staff to the other members in order that 
informed decisions could be made. This means that the quality of decisions made could 
be higher than those made by specialised managers, since they might lack the 
information base required to take all perspectives into account. One participant at 
Wholefoods B said that this was one reason they left conventional firms in favour of co-
operative work – because they felt that management decisions were made by people 
who did not understand the operations of the firm. This is not the case at the co-
operative. 
 
There are also productivity gains to be made from co-operative work, which is perhaps 
surprising as many critiques of the co-operative model, including Elster (1989:105), 
suggest that work ethics at co-operatives could actually be rather poor since members 
would have no supervision of their work, that incentives are weak and diffuse in the 
absence of authority, and that members might have an attitude of ownership that makes 
them reject perceived authority in an unproductive fashion. However, the evidence from 
the cases suggests that this is not true. It is suggested that motivation derived from the 
sense of ownership actually increases productivity – in essence, people work hard 
because they value the co-operative and want to see it succeed. This productivity within 
work needs to be differentiated from working harder for less pay and longer hours – this 
seemed to be more of a problem at the Bakery Co-operative, and in both the Printing 
Co-operative and Wholefoods A during start-up. Good discipline and solidarity was 
particularly important at Wholefoods A, where there was a strong trend across all 
participants to discuss issues of solidarity. It was suggested that having a stake in the 
running of the firm encourages individuals to innovate and work hard for the business 
as they have the power to shape their work into something they find value in if they 
work hard at it. Members are still held responsible for their work but by their peers 
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rather than an authority figure, and this allows for a sense of responsibility based on 
solidarity to form, rather than a fear of discipline. This is enhanced by a long-term 
stable workforce in which strong social bonds can be formed – members do not want to 
let their colleagues down through poor work because of shared respect for the freedom 
that they enjoy at work. This effect is enhanced by the equal pay structure which signals 
the lack of authority and appears to materially symbolise the equality of members. 
However, it was also suggested at Wholefoods B that this can be a problem as close 
friendships and the social nature of the workplace make it difficult to tell people when 
there are problems with a member's behaviour. At Wholefoods A it was also suggested 
that teamwork plays a particularly important role, and that co-operative principles will 
tend to attract people who are good at working in teams. To paraphrase one member at 
this case study, being a co-operative keeps good people in and lets them run the 
business well. 
 
Alongside the potential gains in productivity there are also several responses to the 
critique that discipline at co-operatives will be poor. This is, to some extent, a valid 
critique as most co-operatives reported problems with members abusing the benefits of 
the workplace. However, this applied to working practices rather than to decision 
making – there is very little evidence from the case studies of members with a very 
short-term focus seeking to strip the firm of revenue for personal gain, with one possible 
exception at Wholefoods B. Poor discipline has been an issue, again especially at 
Wholefoods B where there is a history of a minority of members using the freedom 
from authority to, for example, drink alcohol at work. At Wholefoods A and 
Wholefoods B the example was given of abuse of a generous sick pay policy which 
resulted in excessive absenteeism. There are two important lessons from these issues. 
The first is that the co-operatives were both able to solve these problems co-operatively 
and democratically, by changing sick pay and by using internal disciplinary tools to 
change behaviour or fire troublesome members. This shows that although problems 
might arise, they can be dealt with. Secondly, these problems do not seem to have had a 
significant negative impact on the success of the firm, and were repeatedly referred to as 
issues with a small minority of members. 
 
We can also look at co-operatives in a wider context in terms of how they compete with 
other firms in the market. There was a theme raised at the cases that being a co-
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operative meant that the business interacted with customers in a different way. At 
Wholefoods A it was suggested that there are strong incentives for staff to do as much 
as possible to keep customers happy, since losing customers harms the firm which they 
value and places the benefits of co-operation in jeopardy. It was suggested at both 
Wholefoods A and Wholefoods B that being a co-operative means that customers trust 
the firm more, perhaps because they know that they are always interacting with 
“management” of the firm rather than an employee. It might also be that the customers 
expects the ethics of the firm to be taken more seriously at a co-operative and not be 
cast aside for profit. Trust is obviously key in food retail, especially in light of recent 
food scandals which were mentioned by several participants. At the Bakery Co-
operative, participants suggested that individual customers find their co-operative 
principles appealing, but that wholesale customers were not as interested. At all co-
operatives, however, it was stated that suppliers did not discriminate against co-
operatives, contrary to some suggestions in Elster (1989:97). 
 
The merits of co-operative organisation aside, there are also integral structural 
constraints on the behaviour of co-operatives which help to make them secure 
workplaces. The case studies, in times of crisis, tended towards cutting wages rather 
than staff. Essentially, the option to fail or contract in size is not one which is open to 
co-operatives for two main reasons – firstly due to the role of democracy and 
ownership, and secondly due to their sense of social purpose. Their behaviour during 
the economic crisis is evidence of this structural constraint on behaviour.  
 
The clearest example of the structural constraint against failure comes from the Printing 
Co-operative, where there was a risk of being undercut by failing firms trading at a loss 
in order to recoup as much revenue as possible before the firm goes out of business. In a 
declining sector this seemed to be a real risk, although not one to be expected in 
growing sectors. However, the distribution of assets and control in a conventional firm 
means that this is a rational course of action – the owners of the firm control the 
decisions it makes, and are able to recoup parts of their investment by acting in this 
way. In the co-operative this is not an option since if the co-operative fails, its assets 
usually cannot be shared amongst the members, and its members would obviously all 
lose their jobs. Because the control of the co-operative is shared amongst these 
members, who do not in turn have right to the assets, this undercutting cannot be a 
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rational course of action (in much the same way that it would not be a rational course of 
action in a conventional firm if the decision was with the workforce rather than the 
management). Co-operatives, being run democratically by their members, have a much 
greater incentive to avoid failure due to the lack of remuneration in this eventuality and 
because of job loss. This might also apply to other business decisions – a risky 
expansion, for example, which might threaten the stability of the business is unlikely to 
be supported by the members. This is perhaps most evident in the fact that these co-
operatives all occupy a “niche” in the market. It was suggested at Wholefoods A, for 
example, that one reason for success is that the co-operative is at a “sweet spot” in terms 
of size and diversification, whilst at the Bakery Co-operative it was argued that a shift 
towards more mainstream baking away from artisan bread would be against the entire 
rationale of the co-operative, which exists for this purpose. This suggests that it may be 
the case that co-operatives do not seek profits in the same way that conventional firms 
might (i.e. by diversifying into more profitable sectors) but that the specific services that 
they supply and goods they sell are important, perhaps for ethical reasons in many 
cases. This again suggests risk-aversion and an “innate conservatism” (Hindmoor 
1999:223), and could be argued to put them at risk of failure due to a lack of dynamism 
and innovation. However, it also helps them to occupy a niche in the market which 
other firms may not wish to fill, principally because it may be unprofitable. Wholefoods 
A, for example, does home deliveries over a very wide area, which customers find very 
appealing but is not as efficient for firms as it could be. It was also argued that because 
Wholefoods A could not compete with supermarkets on price, it had to instead compete 
by offering a better service, and this specialism in home delivery and wholesale helped 
it to keep a large customer base.  There appeared to be limited use of technology at the 
Wholefoods Co-operatives (A and B) such as computerised stock control, which might 
be explained by underinvestment (Miller 1981), but could also have had other 
consequences such as a different approach to sale and delivery or comparative over-
staffing. 
 
The social purpose of the co-operative is also key here. The co-operative exists not only 
as a source of income for workers, but also fulfils a social role for many of the 
participants, who argued from an inter-generational perspective that they would like to 
see the firm survive to provide good employment to others. This creates a moral 
imperative for the survival of the firm and for the avoidance of redundancies, which are 
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made difficult by the social bonds formed through long job tenure and shared 
management. There is a strong sense of solidarity whereby members do not want to turn 
on each other and compete, but instead work together even if the individual benefits to 
members are harmed. This is most evident during the financial crisis. At all the case 
studies there was a pay cut but minimal redundancies (the only clear case being at the 
Printing Co-op). In the meantime, some members left the co-operatives (including 
voluntary redundancies where members put themselves forward), in effect allowing for 
'natural wastage' to occur in the absence of hiring, which reduced the size of the work 
force at the same time that a pay cut was reducing the size of the wage bill. At 
Wholefoods B this included cuts to pensions, healthcare benefits and overtime. This 
drop in expenditure allowed the co-operatives to move through the crisis without 
forcing any redundancies and with the change in economic fortunes post-recession, has 
allowed for new hiring. Access to information was again critical here – pay cuts were 
accepted, albeit slightly reluctantly, because members had access to financial 
information and were able then to make an informed decision about the correct way 
forwards for the co-operative. Equal pay, meaning that the burden was shared among all 
members, was also helpful. In summary, the social function of co-operatives creates a 
natural conservatism in which the co-operative, both in terms of its membership and its 
form, must be preserved even if this means wage cuts or changes to working conditions. 
It is notable and worth repeating that these changes were reversed post-crisis. 
 
To conclude this section, the case studies suggest that co-operatives represent a stable 
and secure workplace which allows for a high degree of control over working life. In 
particular, access to information about the financial state of the firm was available easily 
to members who were able then to plan their lives based on this information. The co-
operative structure appears to be one which places a premium on long-term stability. 
Members of both wholefoods co-operatives in particular received a higher rate of pay 
than might be expected in a conventional firm of the same nature. A stable source of 
income is, of course, key for security in working life since it offers the basis for 
dynamic control – it is hard to make long-term strategic decisions without a financial 
foundation. If co-operatives had showed a tendency to fail, then any benefits in terms of 
working environment and flexibility would be irrelevant since individual's property 
rights in stability would be very weak – they might have many rights within the co-
operative but if the whole system fails, they would be left with very little. We can 
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account for the stability of co-operatives in several ways: firstly, the aspects of co-
operative work which actually serve to make co-operatives successful firms, including 
high productivity, good decision-making due to good information flows, a customer-
focused work ethic and increased trust on the part of customers, alongside a structural 
tendency towards survival. 
 
10.5 The Co-operative Literature: Support and Dissent 
 
The findings of this study do not generally deviate from established case study literature 
(see Chapter 4). This is noteworthy since much of the literature is not focused on co-
operatives in the UK in the present day, but instead mostly considers co-operatives in 
other countries, or within the UK in the 1970s and 1980s when there was considerable 
interest in the model's application to industrial capitalism. Much of the literature also 
focuses on rescue co-operatives, which are now very uncommon. The UK narrative has 
been changed by the move through the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing recession, and 
by the increasing normalisation of casualised working practices in low skill, labour-
intensive work, and it is against this narrative which we can compare our cases as 
operating against-the-grain, with a radically different attitude towards work and the 
purpose of the firm. 
 
In terms of experience of work, it seems that working in a co-operative offers a strong 
basis for flexible, autonomous work, as reflected in work in all case studies and in the 
cases outlined by, in particular, Cornforth et al. (1988), in which members seemed to 
value the opportunity for task rotation, learning new skills and exercising control in the 
workplace. This seems to be a common theme in most examples from the literature as 
well, including in the plywood co-operatives (Greenberg 1986, Pencavel, 2005). 
Furthermore, it seemed that people valued the opportunity for co-operation despite the 
costs of so doing, such as the burden on time or the responsibility, and that those 
members who did not want to get involved in decision-making did not compromise the 
operation of the co-operative. It is noteworthy that in liberal capitalist economies 
institutions of control over work for individuals at the task and organisational level are 
rare, making co-operatives more significant. 
 
The issues of class raised by Myers and Thornley (1981) do appear to be concerns 
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raised in some case studies. They suggest that there is the potential that only certain 
members of the co-operative will be in a position to enjoy the normative benefits of co-
operation (such as the satisfaction of democratic participation) since their financial 
position will shield them from the potential costs of co-operation. At the Printing Co-
operative, there were some issues where the more ideologically minded design workers 
seemed more interested in the intrinsic ideas of co-operation, whilst for the printers the 
instrumental and indirect functions of co-operation seemed more valued, such as job 
security and flexibility. However, the issue of income was not raised, presenting this as 
more a clash of cultures than one of material class. At the Bakery Co-operative, on the 
other hand, wages were very low due to the start-up costs of the enterprise, but members 
typically did not have alternative means of support but were willing to accept these low 
wages in return for the work, training and potential of the co-operative The sacrifice 
being made here is all the larger when one considers the risk of failure of the co-
operative, and that the low wages for several years could have been accepted in vain. 
Possibly the sense of control of the firm and information about its financial position 
helps the members to make an informed choice here. 
 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature suggest problems of capitalisation for co-
operatives, in particular due to credit market discrimination and poor management 
skills. Miller (1981) suggested that co-operatives would have a tendency to underinvest 
compared to equivalent capitalist firms since assets owned individually would not be an 
attractive investment (see section 3.4.2 above), and that the incentive for investing in 
assets owned collectively is low as individuals cannot withdraw those assets. In all but 
one case (Wholefoods A), assets were held collectively. However, members at such co-
operatives seemed happy to 'invest' (in terms of reinvesting surplus and building 
reserves) rather than withdrawing profits as earnings. These firms then, despite growing 
slowly and not making huge profits, tended to be able to expand from their own 
surpluses, thus avoiding issues of credit market discrimination. In some cases this was 
an explicit choice due to ideological hostility to banks. The pattern of investment bears 
some prima facie similarity to the “defensive” strategy suggested by Miller (1981:322) 
where the co-operative does not always invest whenever it sees potential opportunities 
for growth and expansion but instead invests in a risk-averse way to secure its future, at 
a comparatively lower level than the capitalist firm. However, the data in this study 
cannot confirm this hypothesis and the findings are limited to observations about the 
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level of investment from interviews with members. The firms have survived and seen 
increased in profits, especially in niches with less competition as Miller (1981:323) 
notes, but they may well still underinvest compared to equivalent capitalist firms. The 
notable finding here is that this does not appear to have had a significant impact on their 
operation as co-operatives and that the developmental freedom offered by co-operatives 
is still high. The reasons for this seem to be twofold. Firstly, investment may be “seen 
as a means to job security rather than a financial investment” (Fletcher 1976:190-91), 
and as such it is inherently long-term and the benefit to investment is the continued 
survival of the co-operative as a means of employment. The profit and yield of the 
investment therefore matter less and a low yield investment crucial for the continual 
function of the co-operative (such as updating machinery or computers) would still be 
accounted for under this system as it ensures people keep their jobs – and may even 
overinvest to ensure the security of the co-operative (Jossa 2014:73). Secondly, as 
Miller (1981:321) notes, investment levels will also be linked to the actual purpose of 
the co-operative, and that the assumption that income-maximisation for members 
always takes priority is an oversimplification (1981:313). This can explain how co-
operatives can invest and help ensure their continued survival but could also 
underinvest compared to capitalist equivalents. The members seemed to be aware that 
they were not in a position to personally realise the benefits of their investment (in the 
form of reduced wages) but wanted to see the co-operative as an entity survive in itself, 
and took value from this. As has already been mentioned by Thornley (1981), co-
operatives, whilst profit-making organisations, do not exist solely to maximise profit 
and the community benefits of continued survival means that the loss of earnings in the 
short term creates a type of legacy which members are willing to invest for the social 
future of the co-operative and its new members, even though the benefits do not accrue 
directly to themselves. This perspective on the future was expressed by participants at 
Wholefoods A, the Printing Co-operative and Wholefoods B, and seems to fit within the 
co-operative principle of serving the community (ICA, n.d.) in the sense that the co-
operative's functioning as a source of decent jobs is in itself a potential shared good for 
the community and therefore is worth spending money on. It is also possible that the 
sense of shared ownership means that this money used for investment is not viewed as 
being “owned” by the members – wage rates are organised in advance at the case study, 
by democratic process, and therefore the surplus to be reinvested may not be seen as a 
sacrifice by members. 
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This situation is slightly different with Wholefoods A, where individual shareholdings 
built through deferred wages were being repaid in order to build a collective asset 
ownership system as a co-operative. Although this meant that the individual 
shareholders benefited in the short term due to their shares being bought, they also 
voluntarily donated a share of this back to the co-operative again, and all participants 
seemed optimistic about the shift to co-operative form despite some anger at the 
unequal distribution of profits during the process. 
 
It is also suggested in a large section of the literature (Elster 1989, Miller 1981:320, 
Thornley 1981) that co-operatives will struggle to deal with external businesses such as 
suppliers and creditors. At no cases were issues of relations with suppliers raised, and in 
some cases external relations (typically with customers) were improved by the image of 
being a co-operative. One reason for this is that Wholefoods A, the Printing Co-
operative and the Bakery Co-operative tended to source a lot of their inputs from other 
co-operatives. A participant at the Bakery Co-operative suggested that suppliers either 
did not know they were a co-operative, or did not care as long as they paid, which they 
did. 
 
In terms of access to credit, again none of the case studies here suggested that there 
were difficulties, with participants where this was raised denied they had issues 
accessing credit. There are at least two possible explanations for this. The first is that 
the literature is context-specific and written at a time in which high-profile industrial co-
operatives were failing, and when small collectives were still very much in their 
infancy. This would make banks or firms in the 1970s and 1980s wary of co-operatives 
and unfamiliar with the way that they operate. None of the co-operatives studied here 
are rescue co-operatives with pre-existing problems, which could include debt, so this 
legacy should not present a problem for them. Secondly, the actual type of credit 
accessed could be significant. At Wholefoods A (which might be exempt from the 
negative connotations of co-operatives due to its different legal status) the primary loan 
was a substantial mortgage, secured against the property being bought. The Bakery Co-
operative was able to raise finance through a variety of methods, most notably through 
pre-sales of bread (crowd-sourcing) and through grants tailored towards co-operative 
development. Some of the capital behind the Printing Co-operative also came from co-
operative development agencies. Whilst interest payments were an issue at the Printing 
188 
Co-operative these were due to the high interest rates associated with “specialised asset 
financing” and were not due to it being a co-operative. For the most part, however, the 
co-operatives have got around any potential problems with banks by funding from their 
own surpluses and only borrowing on occasion, and by leasing vehicles or property 
rather than buying. 
 
The ability of co-operatives to compete with other firms can be explained in several 
ways. Firstly, it could be argued that the costs of production and technologies of 
production are not that different from most other firms. At none of the co-operatives 
was any major difference observed in the way that the actual production processes differ 
from any other firm, although this is a tentative observation not based in comparative 
study. The main difference in the way that the tasks were performed seems to be task 
rotation, especially in Wholefoods A and to a lesser extent Wholefoods B, and this was 
argued to actually be beneficial in terms of spreading knowledge and ideas around the 
co-operative and giving individuals the opportunity to implement new ideas and work 
autonomously. In terms of wage bills, although pay per hour might be higher than in 
competitive firms, there are also no highly paid managers, so wage bills might be 
comparable in size but simply distributed differently. Wholefoods A, whilst small, still 
enjoys economies of scale such as being big enough to have custom-built premises. The 
only major observation about technologies of production was that at both Wholefoods 
co-operatives, the shift to computerisation for stock control was quite slow and came 
quite late, possibly due to a lack of capital. However, these firms have still been able to 
survive without being driven out of business. There is perhaps a tendency to assume that 
firms which cannot compete will not survive, when in fact the market is more complex 
and customers' demands more differentiated such that firms which cannot compete on 
price alone can still survive in other ways. 
 
Secondly, we could make the case that these co-operatives are able to escape 
competition by operating in niche markets rather than competing directly with other 
firms. In the case of the Wholefoods and Bakery co-operatives this seems to be the case 
– there are very few providers of artisan bread and few retailers who stock a large array 
of wholefoods. Although the markets for these goods might be fairly small, although 
generally growing in the case of wholefoods, the co-operatives have been able to 
occupy these niches which are largely neglected by larger retails, perhaps because 
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profits are fairly low and there is little demand in comparison to other product lines. In a 
similar vein, the argument could be raised that co-operatives actually offer a higher 
quality good than their competitors in terms of the service that they offer. This was 
particularly emphasised at the Printing Co-operative and Wholefoods A, at which 
participants discussed at some lengths the benefits of co-operatives when working with 
customers. The whole ethos at Wholefoods A meant that the firm offered a very 
personalised service and was able to build strong relationships with long-term 
customers, whilst at the Printing Co-operative there was a strong focus on working with 
clients which came with the co-operative ethos. 
 
There was also little evidence that the co-operatives have had to compromise on certain 
principles in order to work effectively. Task rotation seemed to be the only typical 
aspect of co-operative work which was not widely used, mostly due to the issues of 
leaning specialised skills which cannot be taught on the job. This was clearest at the 
Printing Co-operative but also a little at the Bakery Co-operative, although there was a 
strong emphasis on skills teaching in the latter case both with designated bakers and 
potentially other staff. Where task rotation did exist it was cited as a business advantage 
due to the flexibility it offers. With this aside, all other elements expected of co-
operatives a outlined in earlier chapters existed – concern and action for the wider 
community, working with other co-operatives, democratic management, limited returns 
to capital and autonomy from external shareholders or organisations. Democratic 
management, often believed to be a stumbling block for co-operatives trying to operate 
competitively, did not seem to be a problem and was argued to actually be more 
productive than a direct hierarchy due to the perceived advantages in productivity and 
morale. Only at Wholefoods B were major issues with discipline cited which required 
democratic action to introduce rules to prevent abuse of the freedom from authority.  
 
Explaining this apparent success within liberal capitalism in light of the expectations of 
the literature is difficult. As mentioned previously, much of the literature on co-
operative failure is based on the rescue co-operative experiences of the 1970s and 
1980s, and since then several co-operatives such as Suma alongside Wholefoods A, 
Wholefoods B and the Printing Co-operative have developed into successful businesses. 
The success of these firms, alongside other employee-owned enterprises such as Scott 
Bader and John Lewis, may have changed the perceptions of co-operatives. Perhaps one 
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reason is that there was a cycle of failure where co-operatives were thought to be 
inherently flawed, therefore were not given credit, cheap capital or other access to 
market opportunities such as strong relationships with suppliers. As a result they failed, 
reinforcing the perception of their business model as risky and making it even harder to 
succeed. Once this cycle is broken and some successful co-operatives gain prominence, 
there is the opportunity for them to succeed. It could also be argued that management 
has been de-mystified by a rise in entrepreneurship and small start-ups and the 
development of easy-to-use software which can organise formerly complicated 
operations like payroll. This could make banks less wary of a lack of formal 
management style in the firms they lend to. Finally, there is the role of meso-level 
institutions. Both the Bakery Co-operative and the Printing Co-operative received 
capital from non-market sources such as ICOF. Whilst Wholefoods A and B, by virtue 
of being successful businesses, do not seem to struggle in credit markets to the extent 
that might be expected, other co-operatives, especially at start-up, may be constrained 
by this and therefore unable to offer much scope for control over time and work in a 
competitive environment due to the pressures of self-exploitation. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from the empirical research are threefold, mirroring the 
points of this chapter. Firstly, the co-operatives do appear to offer a sense of value in 
work and the control the worker has to direct their own firm seems to hold great value. 
Secondly, they offer a mix of flexibility and security which appears to be due to specific 
aspects of co-operative work based on the bonds of reciprocity and solidarity being built 
on a non-hierarchical structure. Thirdly, in spite of literature to the contrary, co-
operatives do not appear to be destined towards failure as businesses, nor do they appear 
to struggle with issues of degeneration; in fact, the opposite appears to be true. In the 
context of the UK, it would appear that co-operatives are very much against-the-grain, 
attracting a range of individuals who are motivated by the sense of control achieved 
within the co-operative, even though such motivation may not become apparent until 
the individual has been at the firm for some time. The exercise of this control makes co-
operatives act differently from other firms, privileging security and quality of jobs over 
profitability whilst still operating as market-facing businesses, striking a balance 
between the two aspects. However, the trade-off suggested (e.g. Clarke 1984) between 
191 
efficiency and democracy appears to be an over-simplified way of looking at the issues 
– it is possible for democratic firms to form institutions of democratic control which can 
work effectively, even in larger co-operatives. The search for market competitiveness 
does not entail a degeneration to the prevailing mode of operation but instead requires 
new solutions to these challenges based on values of the co-operative. 
 
Developmental freedom represents a measure of the ability of the individual to shape 
working life (Haagh 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). This includes the value offered to 
individuals of performing work which they find meaningful and valuable, and working 
with a sense of stability. Co-operatives perform well here on four main counts. Firstly, 
because the decisions of the firm, including its long-term strategies and principles of 
operation, are constantly up for debate and are the source of discussion in the case 
studies visited, it is possible for members to shape their working environment and add a 
dimension of value to their work – stacking shelves in a warehouse is a more satisfying 
job if you have an ethical or political attachment to the products you are working with. 
Secondly, the co-operative itself, by virtue of adherence to co-operative principles, is 
likely to be an organisation in which ethical values are taken seriously. The best 
example of this is probably the Printing Co-operative, which is committed to using 
recycled papers and non-toxic inks despite eco-friendly printing not being its main 
reason for existing (unlike Wholefoods A and Wholefoods B which exist purely to sell 
these types of product which in themselves are value-laden). The ethos of serving the 
community, broadly defined, again adds a dimension of social value to the work 
performed at co-operatives. Thirdly, the fact that co-operatives offer this opportunity 
means that working towards their success and survival, in particular so they exist for 
future members to join, is a purpose behind what might otherwise be mundane work. 
Finally, there is also an inherent satisfaction in working for oneself, taking 
responsibility for the direction of the firm and realising the economic and social benefits 
of working well which means that the work in co-operatives is likely to be less 
alienating and more fulfilling than work outside of co-operatives, improving the quality 
of working life. Because it is easier for members of a co-operative to gain these sources 
of satisfaction and value in work, co-operative work can be said to enhance 
developmental freedom in this regard. 
 
There is a clear case for increased freedom for the individual based on their control over 
192 
time, both static and dynamic, at the co-operative. For the reasons detailed above, it is 
possible for co-operatives to offer a level of control over time in the short term, for 
example allowing flexible working hours, and in the longer term through workers being 
able to set working patterns. Control over time can also refer to the option at these co-
operatives for task rotation and learning new skills. Although formal training was 
unusual, at all co-operatives there was a strong focus on individuals learning new skills 
on the job, which benefits both the individual and the firm. This allows for strategic 
career pathways to form within co-operatives as individuals can choose new specialisms 
and have the means to follow them through within the firm.  
 
The co-operative offers an environment of security and economic stability in these 
studies. Co-operatives appear, in spite of literature suggesting the contrary, able to grow 
successfully without creating large support networks. The only co-operative showing 
signs of degeneration was Wholefoods B, due not to concerns about profits but based on 
the idea that its size was making it unwieldy and that membership was being too freely 
extended to those who were not taking on the responsibilities that it entails. Even at this 
co-operative, as at the others studied, the ethos and principles of co-operation were too 
strong to consider taking on non-member staff. As a result, the co-operative can be 
viewed as a stable self-sustaining system. 
 
The co-operatives showed an ability to survive economically whilst retaining jobs, even 
through times of crisis. They were able to achieve this through a cautious strategy of 
investment and general risk aversion and through good management and working 
practices. The flow of information within the firm is crucial to this as it allows 
expectations about pay rises/cuts to be shaped collectively and on accurate information, 
allowing members to make informed decisions about finance. Members did share an 
incentive to invest for the future, both for their own self-interest in keeping their own 
jobs, but also for reasons of solidarity and respect for the co-operative as an institution. 
As a result, all of the co-operatives were able to offer, with the exception of the Bakery 
co-operative, a good rate of pay for the sector and a predictable and stable source of 
income. The alignment of management and workers interests through democratic non-
hierarchical structures appears productive. This means that they can offer a secure basis 
for worker control without compromising the quality of working life through 
jeopardising the survival of the firm. 
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11 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis has based an understanding of work on Haagh's (2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) 
analysis of work in terms of developmental freedom and control over static and 
dynamic time-frames, which suggests that an individual's freedom to control their 
working life is dependent on the control and security afforded by sets of institutions. It 
has extended this analysis through application at the firm level in the case of the worker 
co-operative, arguing that institutions of control within the firm provide a basis for 
control over working life. In Chapter 2, these concepts were introduced in relation to the 
idea that the employment relations based on property rights in capitalist systems do not 
provide for much control over working life. This is linked to concepts of alienation and 
a poor quality of working life where both a high degree of division of labour based on 
deskilling and use of technology, and insecurity of employment and income are 
prevalent. 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the worker co-operative as a firm in which property rights are 
different from those in conventional firms, and as a result workers own and manage the 
firm collectively. It suggests a variety of political and economic reasons why this may 
be a benefit, including development of human capacities, less alienating work, better 
working conditions and efficiency savings. It also explained why, in capitalist 
economies, these theoretical advantages may be unattainable, suggesting that the 
systemic environment will be hostile to co-operatives leading to a lack of access to 
finance and expertise, alongside the inability of co-operatives to compete with 
conventional capitalist firms. It also found arguments for structural issues with co-
operative forms of organisation, suggesting they underinvest, are unable to manage 
themselves, and are prone to degeneration into conventional enterprises. This chapter 
raised some questions and hypotheses for research, finding the existing theoretical 
literature to be inconclusive in its analyses of the performance of co-operatives. In 
essence, it suggested that in theory, co-operatives have the potential to increase control 
for individuals through their ownership of the firm providing for a better experience of 
work based on control of the firm, and control over time but questioned the ability of 
co-operatives to provide this in a capitalist system where the pressures of competition 
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could lead to self-exploitation. It also suggested that the co-operative form, through not 
being the prevailing mode of property rights in firms, is probably not in a position to 
offer economic security since, although workers will not usually lose their jobs at the 
co-operative, those jobs are also subject to the survival of the co-operative in a 
competitive market. 
 
Chapter 4 attempted to provide some answers to these questions and raise other issues 
around co-operation through examining a range of case studies of worker co-operatives 
in a range of economics and periods. It found that there was evidence that co-operative 
work had innate benefits in terms of control at the task and organisational levels, but 
also suggested that this came at the cost of low wages and long hours, especially at early 
stages. It also found that the survival of co-operatives is linked to the presence of 
supporting institutions.  
 
The second section of the thesis was focused on the empirical research carried out at the 
four case-study co-operatives – Wholefoods A, the Printing Co-operative, the Bakery 
Co-operative, and Wholefoods B. In Chapter 5, the methodology of the study was 
explained and justified in terms of how qualitative data about working life in co-
operatives would be collected. The chapter explained that information was sought from 
several participants at each case-study with the objective of composing a composite 
picture from the interviews in which working life was evaluated in relation to the 
institutions of the particular co-operative. 
 
Four case studies were presented, offering fairly convergent findings, which were 
analysed in terms of the categories of analysis used to frame the hypotheses and 
research questions – the experience of work, control over time and the stability and 
security of the co-operative. Each case study was able to bring a particular perspective 
on co-operative work. Wholefoods A demonstrated the effects of ownership structure 
and the relationship between ownership and co-operation as well as being a very 
successful co-operative which was able to function profitably under capitalism. The 
Printing Co-operative was an example of a firm struggling with competition but still 
able to survive in a shrinking sector of the economy. It also demonstrated the effects on 
co-operation of workforce divided along the lines of different skills. The Bakery Co-
operative was the only young co-operative in the study and appears to be quite typical 
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of the type, demonstrating the ability of the form to finance itself in different ways, but 
also demonstrating the risks of low pay and long hours during the start-up phase. 
Finally, Wholefoods B showed the effects of size on management and working practices 
at co-operatives, in particular discipline.  
 
The analysis engaged on three levels, looking at control over work, control over time, 
and the security and stability of the firm. It found that co-operatives can offer significant 
control over work at both organisational and task levels, which helps to shape the ethics 
of the firm, allowing increased social value to be found in work. It also allows for task 
rotation, increases learning of different skills and gives a fuller understanding of the 
work process. In terms of control over time, it was found that the co-operative, through 
being a social institution in which relationships between individuals are 'embedded' 
(Gupta 2014:99, Polanyi 1985) in norms of reciprocity and solidarity, allows 
considerable flexibility which in turn allows for dynamic control for individuals. It was 
also found that the co-operative can be secure and stable, offering well-paid work, but 
generally appears to do so after a lean period in which pay is low, raising the prospect of 
self-exploitation.  
 
It was suggested that in the context of the UK, co-operatives can offer a source of 
security which is generally absent at other firms, in particular due to the absence of 
control for workers in corporatist industrial relations. Whilst this control can only be 
exercised whilst the individual remains at the firm, rather than existing at the systemic 
level, it still has the potential to improve the developmental freedom of the individual, 
in particular with regards to the long job tenure of members. Co-operatives in the UK 
are very much an exception, and appear to operate, in particular with response to crises, 
differently to other firms, allowing them to offer a stable platform for meaningful work. 
 
11.1 Answering the Research Questions 
 
The central research puzzle, as outlined in the introduction, was whether co-operatives 
are forced by the systemic environment of liberal capitalism to abandon co-operative 
principles in pursuit of profit or mere survival, and alongside this to ascertain whether 
the operation of co-operatives in such an environment is conducive to maximising 
developmental freedom. This research has in turn generated other findings of interest, 
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such as other constraints on co-operative behaviour and unforeseen approaches to 
control. 
 
In terms of developmental freedom, the findings of the previous chapter weigh strongly 
in favour of the co-operative as a means of organising work. The idea behind the use of 
developmental freedom as a principle for measuring quality of working life is that it 
allows for a multifaceted approach to working life in terms of control over time, and 
also places the emphasis on control for the individual rather than prescribing ideas of 
what is or is not good. The co-operative can advance both static and dynamic control of 
working life through the opportunities it creates within formal, paid work. Co-
operatives are able to pay relatively good wages for the sector, due to both wage 
compression and all the surplus remaining in the business rather than being extracted by 
external shareholders. They also offer job security since workers are rarely made 
redundant, let go, or fired. This means that members have a firm base on which to build 
their working life, regardless of the inherent benefits of working for a co-operative. The 
major risk – that the co-operative is inherently inefficient and crisis prone – appears not 
to be the case. The exception in this study is the Bakery Co-operative where members 
are working at very low rates of pay as a means to cover the start-up costs. This process 
seemed to take place at various points in other cases as well, such as at Wholefoods A 
where early in the development of the business employees received a shareholding in 
exchange for their work instead of wages. This is an interesting aspect as it does appear 
to close off co-operative work for those who cannot survive on very low wages for a 
period of time unable to access the long-term pay-off of membership of a co-operative, 
especially given that the co-operative is not guaranteed to succeed even with the 
sacrifices of its members. On the other hand, this form of financing also prevents the co-
operative from being over-leveraged in early stages or being dominated by equity 
investors. It appears to be an inherent issue with co-operatives that part of their success 
might be that they do not accrue large debts, yet in order to do this the workforce needs 
to make these sacrifices. It should be noted that participants were asked if they would 
take higher paid jobs elsewhere and answered that they would rather stay at the co-
operative at low pay.  
 
The benefits of working in co-operatives in terms of individual autonomy and the 
control over time this offers appear to be strong, with flexibility arising from the lack of 
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authority allowing members to negotiate shifts with one another in the short and long 
term to accommodate for other commitments, most notably childcare. In understanding 
co-operative behaviour, this demonstrates the importance of the social nature of these 
organisations – although they are profit-making, profits do not always come first and 
the well-being of members is a crucial part of the company's purpose. Structurally, 
because the benefits of increased productivity accrue to workers, collectively, they are 
in a position to make potential compromises and work around each other in a way that 
hierarchical managers cannot – it is members' own profits that they are choosing to 
weigh against the benefits of more flexible or comfortable working conditions.  
 
Co-operatives appear to offer an opportunity for members to perform work which they 
find less alienating and more valuable in itself. The work has a social purpose in terms 
of both the co-operative ethics of the firm and wanting to sustain the ideals of the co-
operative, and also in terms of the ethical products and services sold. This is key in the 
extension of the developmental freedom framework to the collective firm. The control 
which individuals are able to exercise in terms of the way that their firm operates and 
the activities it chooses to do or not do in itself represents an exercise of the freedom of 
the individual over their work. In firms without this role for workers' voice, the 
individual has only the choice of whether or not to work at the firm, and to leave if they 
find themselves in conflict with the firm's ethic or elements of its activities – a choice 
which is hard to exercise due to the uncertainty of leaving a firm and the need for steady 
income. The co-operative, on the other hand, offers the option of worker-led reform and 
control over what the firm does and the types of work individuals do, and therefore 
provides another avenue of control for the individual. Part of the role of the 
developmental freedom framework is to place the focus firmly on the control exercised 
by individuals over the type of work they do. Outside of the analysis of co-operative 
firms, the framework highlights the ability of workers to leave, switch or retain jobs as 
strategic decisions depending on their overall life and career objectives, as well as to use 
their bargaining power within firms to ensure a certain quality of working life. In the 
case of the co-operative, however, control is exercised within, as well as between, firms, 
and the negotiations take place within a democratic arena in which all individuals 
represent both themselves and their collective goals as a firm. In summary, the fact that 
work can be highly valued by individuals in a co-operative represents an increase in 
developmental freedom which is attributable to the control that the workers can exercise 
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over the firm's decision-making. 
 
The democratic control of the co-operative does not seem to stifle individuals but 
actually allows them to develop their ideas into new initiatives for the firms. The role of 
discussion and deliberation is important here in shaping the expectations, limitations 
and desires of individuals such that people can be satisfied with the outcome of 
discussions and can take ownership of decisions made. Democratic management is 
more than just voting – to be effective it involves nurturing interpersonal relations, 
informed discussions and consensus-building where possible so that the collective 
decisions of the co-operative can operate in tandem with the autonomy of members. A 
good example of this would be Wholefoods A where democratic decisions were made 
in order to change rules about sick pay due to cases of abuse of the system. These 
decisions can be seen to made in the interests of the co-operative but also in the interests 
of individual members since the behaviour of some might threaten the survival and 
profitability of the firm. The same could be true in terms of pay cuts – they could be 
seen as an infringement on the freedoms of individuals by giving them less disposable 
income but are also in the interests of members in order to sustain the co-operative and 
avoid the potentially disastrous social effects of forced redundancies. The members of 
the co-operative have sets of convergent interests: in terms of finance, they all want the 
firm to be profitable in order to increase their pay but also to guarantee its survival in 
the long term and invest for development; in terms of autonomy they want the firm to 
be well-run so that it can be profitable, but also want the flexibility that comes with a 
lack of hierarchy and democratic management; and they are resistant to the potentially 
destructive consequences that would come from introducing authority structures which 
would damage the ability of the members to manage themselves. The co-operative 
therefore becomes a stable system where, although there are tensions, there are also 
significant complementarities – every sacrifice has a benefit not to external shareholders 
but to the members themselves if the co-operative is to survive, and in order to realise 
these benefits, members seem willing to consider the co-operative in the long term and 
are willing to put in the time and effort to make sure that this system of control work.  
 
The external systemic environment seems not to affect co-operatives in all the ways that 
might be expected. Whilst at the start-up phase, the lack of available investment capital 
through, for example, equity investment, does appear to present long hours and low pay, 
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it is also arguable that these issues face all small businesses in these start-up phases, 
especially for directors, but without distributing the benefits of ownership to all 
workers. At maturity, cooperatives do not seem to collapse under the pressures of 
competition, with the possible exception of undercutting by failing businesses found at 
the Printing Co-operative, and are able to sell their goods at comparable prices in order 
to keep customers. This is especially noteworthy in terms of the Wholefoods co-
operatives which are potentially in competition with large supermarkets. Despite the 
ability of co-operatives to survive in the systemic environment of liberal capitalism, 
they do so under considerable strain at times of crisis and during start-up, and the extent 
of the control of individuals is limited by the constraints of the system in which their co-
operative exists. 
 
11.2 Evaluation of the Empirical Study 
 
The methods used in researching the case studies provided a useful, rich dataset based 
on interview data with several participants at each co-operative. All interviews provided 
a slightly different perspective on co-operative work but most offered very similar 
attitudes and opinions, with a few exceptions. There were some clear differences 
between the interviews at different case studies as different issues took priority. For 
example, in the Bakery Co-operative interviews, participants did not tend to discuss the 
ideological purpose behind co-operation to the same degree as the other cases, and 
instead concentrated more on the challenges of a small, nascent business. At 
Wholefoods B, on the other hand, the issues of managing such a large organisation were 
discussed far more. To some extent this was due to changes in the questions asked but 
also in terms of what the participants were able to and wanted to elaborate on in the 
interviews. The interview technique gave participants the opportunity to raise issues due 
to the approach of using open questions and a loose interview structure, and participants 
were able to raise some points which were not considered before the interview phase, 
most notably the ethical and social purposes of the co-operatives themselves. 
 
The interviews which were outliers – typically where participants were, if not hostile to 
co-operative ideas, certainly less enamoured with them – were of interest. There were 
only a few such interviews, most notably at Wholefoods B. It is difficult from these 
interviews to know how representative the views put forward are, but the objective was 
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to interpret the experiences of individual members of these co-operatives, and to be able 
to use these to describe the potential challenges and opportunities of co-operative 
working. These findings were not affected by the outlying interviews which tended to 
put forward similar arguments in favour and against co-operation to all the other 
interviews, such as flexibility and control. The main critiques offered were firstly that 
the ethos of co-operatives got in the way of their effective operation due to arguments 
about ethical choices and a skewed world-view dominated by moral concerns; and 
secondly that there was a tendency to privilege the co-operative's collective needs over 
the well-being of individuals. The outlying interviews offered a different perspective on 
co-operation by highlighting some important concerns, but it is impossible to know the 
extent to which these concerns are shared by others or what other participants may have 
thought about them. The analysis above suggests that the ethical considerations of co-
operatives are important as a source of value in work, and therefore discussions of them 
are perhaps a cost of having a system held together by social norms and shared 
identities. On the matter of privileging the collective over the individual, more data is 
required since this was an isolated finding and for reasons for discretion details could 
not be divulged. 
 
A larger sample of individuals at each co-operative would have been a useful way to 
expand the dataset and allow more viewpoints to come forward. However, at all co-
operatives dominant themes emerged even from very few interviews, and these were 
fairly easy to discern. It could be tentatively suggested that other interviews would have 
raised and reinforced the same points rather than adding new lines of inquiry. There was 
an inherent sample bias from the fact that interviews were voluntary and organised by 
the co-operative themselves, suggesting that only the most enthusiastic members would 
be willing to give up their time to discuss the co-operatives, and that these would be 
those most committed to the idea of co-operation and want to publicise it. Avoiding this 
bias would be very difficult – compulsory participation enforced by the co-operative is 
ethically dubious and could have created hostile interviewees who did not want to be 
part of the research but instead felt obliged or forced to do so. The means to return to 
the co-operatives to conduct repeat interviews would also have allowed more depth of 
data to emerge, giving participants time to reflect on their answers and on 
interpretations from the researcher, but this was not feasible given the burdens it would 
place on participants. 
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The sample of four co-operatives is a useful and instructive one. Whilst, as a general 
principle, more cases would yield richer data, the cases chosen each illustrate a 
particular challenge and opportunity for co-operatives and work together well to give a 
cross-section of different co-operative firms in terms of age, size and sector. 
Wholefoods A highlights the potential for successful co-operatives and underlined the 
importance of the ethical dimensions of co-operative work, as well as offering 
interesting insights into ownership and shareholding (although this emerged during 
interviews and was not known beforehand). The Printing Co-operative gives an 
indication of co-operative work in a skilled sector with divided labour and shows the 
continuities and differences between this and the far less divided labour force at the 
Wholefoods co-operatives in particular. It also shows the issues faced by co-operatives 
in declining sectors. The Bakery Co-operative demonstrates the difficulties and 
potential of new co-operatives in niche sectors, allowing the research to look at the 
formation of co-operatives and how they evolve over time. Finally, Wholefoods B 
shows what working life is like a much bigger co-operative and highlights issues of 
size. The intersections and divergences between these, in terms of the motivation to 
form a co-operative, the size and type of work, and the ages of the co-operatives, are 
adequate to construct a picture of co-operative work more generally, with some limits in 
terms of the application of the findings to co-operatives of different origins, most 
notably rescue co-operatives. 
 
In terms of the robustness of the findings, there is scope for a critique that the study has 
looked only at successful, currently existing co-operatives, therefore the finding that co-
operatives are successful is inevitable. However, this study goes beyond simply stating 
that co-operatives exist profitably and seeks to explain this survival in terms of the way 
that co-operatives function internally, drawing largely on the way that they solve 
problems in different ways to conventional firms and have different goals. Where co-
operatives have failed, it is likely that these structures did not form properly, and 
anecdotal evidence from the interviews suggests that co-operatives tend to fail when 
they do not create a social workplace where everybody contributes, but instead become 
very dependent on a small core of members, who, when they leave, take their 
knowledge, expertise and dedication with them. What the study demonstrates is the 
possibility of co-operatives to offer a system of organisation which can be stable and 
successful, but that where these systems do not form or work properly, failure becomes 
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likely. The rescue co-operatives in the literature illustrate this – where there are pre-
existing tensions and hierarchies, co-operative management does not work well, and 
where co-operative cannot form organically along a developmental trajectory defined by 
consensus of members, they are likely to fail.  On the other hand, because the study did 
not look at quantitative financial data, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions on their 
profitability and patterns of investment, and the comparative levels of these across 
different types of firm structure. 
 
11.3 Avenues of Further Research 
 
This study raises a number of questions which could only be answered by empirical 
research outside of the scope of this thesis. Attempts to replicate the findings of this 
thesis through different methods might be valuable, for example a quantitative approach 
informed by these qualitative findings but with a much larger sample to test the 
robustness and generalisability of the findings and engage in comparative analysis of 
investment levels in different type of firms. There are also questions raised in these 
findings which cannot be answered through the methods and cases chosen. The first 
would be to look at co-operatives in credit markets more thoroughly through a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to try to see if there is a systemic bias against 
lending to co-operatives and why this might be the case. This would need to look at 
both sides of the issue, investigating both lenders and co-operatives in order to look at 
the willingness to engage in loans from both sides. Do co-operatives tend to finance 
themselves through surplus out of necessity due to lack of access to credit or do they do 
so as a choice, and has the construction of an environment in which co-operatives do 
not receive external capitalisation changed their preferences in credit markets? It would 
also be useful to examine how access to credit for co-operatives has changed since the 
1980s. 
 
The research has focused on 'the individual', but has been unable to differentiate 
between, and focus on, those individuals typically enjoying fewer opportunities in the 
workplace and labour market, such as women. A gendered study examining co-
operation from a feminist perspective would be extremely valuable, in examining the 
extent to which the decision making process allows for equal input between genders, 
and how the social functioning of co-operatives is experienced by different genders. The 
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mode of sampling used in this research makes drawing conclusions about this very 
difficult since very few participants were women, and publishing specific findings about 
individuals could compromise anonymity. Furthermore, in order to encourage 
participation and build trust in a short time period, questions about personal life were 
deliberately avoided in the interviews. 
 
Finally, there is a question about the possibility of extending the co-operative model 
into the wider economy. Despite optimism from organisations like Co-operatives UK 
and the Employee Ownership Association, such enterprises still represent a minority of 
firms. There are questions as to whether large firms can operate as co-operatives and 
still retain the benefits of co-operative work described in this work, and how they would 
go about a process of democratisation. In particular, it might be questionable whether 
co-operatives would retain their solidaristic character if they were the norm rather than 
the exception – for example in planning for future generations. This would also need to 
examine the extent to which small start-ups can be encouraged to take a co-operative 
form as opposed to the conventional one. This would, linking to the first avenue 
suggested for further research, require a deeper examination of the financial aspects of 
start-up businesses. There is also a question of how this would affect smaller co-
operatives who rely on their status as a niche in the market, or how hierarchies might 
form between co-operatives, creating a contradictory system. Dahl (1985), for example, 
suggests a co-operative economy as being prone to inequalities between firms. The idea 
of a co-operative economy as a new form of socialism or an intermediary form between 
capitalism and socialism has been suggested but is under-theorised as an idea.  
 
11.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has brought together three sets of literature - economic literature on the 
viability of co-operatives, sociological and political literature on the desirability of co-
operation, and a set of literatures on work including the labour process literature and 
Haagh's (2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) developmental freedom approach. In so doing it 
has demonstrated the case for worker co-operatives as one possible source of security 
and control for individuals in liberal economies. The thesis has reinforced existing 
approaches (Haagh 2011a) that suggest that the work/leisure trade-off is an inadequate 
way to analyse motivation and working life, and extended the developmental freedom 
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approach to co-operatives regarding the role of democratic control and norms of 
fellowship and solidarity within these firms, and the effects these have on firm stability, 
control over time and the means to accommodate different activities in working life, and 
the effect on the value individuals can realise from work. In so doing it has also added 
to the existing canon of co-operative cases, both by examining the experiences of co-
operatives in the post-crisis UK context and also by bringing in perspectives on control. 
The developmental freedom approach places the control over work at the centre of 
analysis, allowing for an understanding of co-operatives based not just on whether 
workers experience higher job satisfaction or better wages, but instead on how the 
democratic decisions made by members interact with the need to establish security 
within the firm and the stability of the firm in a competitive market. This provides an 
analysis of co-operatives which looks at both their operation as viable businesses and 
the drive towards control together, since it necessitates relating the internal and external 
environments in which individuals and the firm exist to one another in the analysis. 
There are some wider conclusions to be drawn from the analysis – namely the 
limitations of the co-operative as a source of control, and the possibility of a co-
operative economy.  
 
The co-operative's potential for providing a source of security and control comes from 
the idea that it can “return the locus of control to the individual” (Rothschild & Whitt 
1986:145) through democratic ownership and control of the firm. This study suggests 
that this is indeed a possibility, but there are some caveats to draw – co-operatives are 
not, by themselves, a solution to problems of insecure working life.  
 
There are limitations to the ability of the individual to control the firm, and to an extent 
this may rise with the size of the co-operative, although the relationship between size 
and control may be quite complex. Firstly, based on the findings from Wholefoods B, 
the direct deliberative democracy of the co-operative requires some degree of delegation 
and steering from a management committee if decision-making process is not to 
become unwieldy. However, it did not appear from the case that this in itself led to a 
significant decrease in the sense of control although it may reduce the number of voices 
taken into consideration when making decisions. Issues around size and control were 
slightly less direct, and related to the effect of size on behaviour, for example by free-
riding on the initiative, work and participation of others, with the possibility of diluting 
205 
the idea and ethic of the co-operative by the introduction of a hierarchy of participators. 
Tentatively, the problem may not be size in itself but the difficulty in encouraging new 
members to take an active role in a large organisation, and in encouraging individuals to 
exercise their control over the firm. The effect on control over the experience of work, 
including control over time, seems to be fairly limited though, perhaps because those 
not participating are generally happy with the decisions made and therefore do not feel 
the need to exercise their rights. Their interests may converge with the smaller group 
who participate regularly. The problem here is in the long-term sustainability of such a 
system if active members leave or the co-operative ethic is lost, especially since 
participants at several case studies gave anecdotes about co-operatives which had 
collapsed after active members left, taking their knowledge, enthusiasm and co-
operative values with them. 
 
To some extent co-operative consensus-based decision making relies on both the 
communication of preferences and the shaping of preferences in the deliberative arena. 
There are likely to be inequalities in the ability of individuals to act in decision-making 
which could not be studied in this research. Furthermore, it seems that the formation of 
a co-operative requires a set of individuals to make sacrifices of time and money which 
in the long run may benefit themselves but also some individuals who come to the co-
operative later and are not involved in the formation, presenting a potential free-rider 
problem. 
 
In the current configuration of the economy, co-operatives cannot help to solve all 
problems of labour market insecurity. Individuals are not guaranteed work at co-
operatives, and incentives exist to limit membership of co-operatives. Advantages of 
control can only exist as long as one is a member of the co-operative, giving rise to 
issues of the spatial mobility of individuals as well as changing work requirements over 
people's lives (such as leaving for a number of years to undertake childcare 
responsibilities). Therefore, the existence of worker co-operatives does not mitigate the 
case for a more horizontal capitalism with institutions of control at the systemic level 
(Haagh 2012), but I argue that such firms can still represent an important source of 
control by adding new sources of security at the firm level to augment those that may 
exist at the systemic level. This may require there to be more credit and investment 
available for co-operatives if they are to develop to maturity quickly without 
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compromising security. The growth of meso-level institutions such as CDAs should be 
encouraged, and organisations that advocate co-operative forms should work with 
financial institutions to demystify the model in order to minimise the aversion to lend. 
 
Secondly, there is the consideration of the viability of a co-operative economy and a 
replacement of liberal capitalism with a co-operative market. An analysis of the 
viability of such an economy based on the current understanding of co-operatives is far 
outside the scope of this study, but current literature raises some issues, principally 
where innovation might stem from in such an economy (Hindmoor 1999) and how such 
a system could avoid degenerative pressures. The co-operatives in this study all exist as 
firms which operate in resistance to, but also in co-operation with, capitalist markets. 
There are questions of how well they could exist if they were no longer spaces of 
resistance, in terms of how shared identity and meaning is created. This might be 
particularly a problem for investment if the idea of leaving the benefits of investment 
for future generations to reap became compromised if such workplaces were the norm. 
This might inhibit the operation of such firms by changing the social relations on which 
they are able to operate. On the other hand, there are arguments to suggest this would 
not be the case, since the interests of workers would still control the firm, and these 
interests would likely favour security and control of the firm, and there is no reason to 
believe that all of the diverse objectives of co-operatives, such as social responsibility 
and providing decent work, would be lost. In the UK context where such firms are a 
minority, more co-operatives in a largely capitalist economy are likely to be a good 
thing in terms of control and security. 
  
207 
Appendix 1 – Interview Forms for Participants 
 
Please note that all both the Participant Information Sheet and the Consent Form were 
originally single page documents and have been copied verbatim here for information. 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Contact: Robin Jervis, School of PEP, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 
5DD 
rj519@york.ac.uk 
 
About the Research 
I am a Ph.D. student at the University of York writing a thesis about worker co-
operatives. My supervisor is Dr. Louise Haagh who can be contacted via email 
louise.haagh@york.ac.uk or by mail at Louise Haagh, Department of Politics, 
University of York, York, YO10 5DD. 
The research has the explicit approval of the University of York ELMPS Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Aims of Research 
The research aims to find out about the experience of being a member of a worker co-
operative in terms of the control that individuals have over the work they do, their 
ability to plan for the future and their opportunities for training and professional 
development at work. 
 
Mode of Research 
The research will take place through short (up to 30 minute) one-to-one interviews with 
some members of the co-operative. 
 
Data Collection 
Interviews will be recorded (audio only) and written notes taken. These recordings and 
notes will be kept private and confidential. Direct quotes will not be used in the 
published research without consent. Audio recordings will be deleted after transcription 
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and the transcripts kept on the University's secure IT system. All data collected will be 
kept in accordance with the Data Protection Act. You must sign a consent form for your 
interview to be used in the research. The numbers on the consent forms do not 
correspond directly to the numbers you will hear recorded to index the interviews. 
 
Use of Data 
The data from interviews, after analysis, will be used in my Ph.D. thesis and may also 
be published both in print and electronically, for example in books or academic 
journals, and may be presented at conferences.  
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
You or the co-operative you are a member of will not be named in any publication of 
the research. Your co-operative will be referred to in the publication by sector and 
number (e.g. “Engineering Co-op 2”). Feel free to use names in the interviews as these 
will not be disclosed even if direct quotes are used and will not be written on transcripts. 
Full transcripts of interviews will not be disclosed. Recordings and notes will be kept 
securely. Audio recordings will be destroyed after transcription and notes and 
transcripts will be destroyed when the thesis is complete (expected to be around Easter 
2015). I cannot guarantee that members and co-operatives will not be identifiable due 
to the nature of the information disclosed in interviews and published in the research. 
 
You do not have to take part in the research. 
 
You can withdraw from the research at any time before publication (i.e. at any 
point before 31/03/2015) by contacting me at rj519@york.ac.uk 
 
If you do choose to take part I cannot pay you. 
 
Please ask if you have any questions about the research. My contact details are at the 
top of 
this sheet.
209 
Consent for Use of Interview Data 
 
You DO NOT have to answer any question you do not wish to 
 
You CAN END the interview at any point 
 
You CAN WITHDRAW your consent for the interview to be used BEFORE OR 
AFTER the interview UNTIL 31/03/2015 
 
Do you consent for the interview to be recorded (audio and notes)? 
 
□ Yes 
□ No  
 
Do you consent for direct quotations to be used in publications (including PhD thesis)? 
 
□ Yes 
□ No  
 
If you would like a copy of the completed PhD thesis tick here □ and provide an email 
address where an electronic copy of the thesis can be sent: 
 
…........................................................................... 
 
Please sign here BEFORE the interview begins to indicate that you consent to participate in 
this research, and to certify that you have read and understood the 'Information for 
Participants' sheet: 
 
Signed: ................................................... 
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Date: ......................... 
 
Print: ........................................... 
 
Please sign here AFTER the interview is completed to indicate that you still consent to the 
use of the interview in my research: 
 
Signed: ................................................... 
 
Date: ......................... 
 
Print: ........................................... 
 
PLEASE ASK if you have any questions about the research or use of the interview 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
CBC – Cheese Board Collective 
CCF – Co-operative and Community Finance (formerly ICOF) 
CDA – Co-operative Development Agency 
CDFI – Community Development Finance Initiative 
CME – Coordinated Market Economy 
CSO – Co-operative Support Organisation 
ELMPS – Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee 
ICA – International Co-operative Alliance 
ICOF – Industrial Common Ownership Fund (now CCF) 
ICOM – Industrial Common Ownership Movement (now part of Co-operatives UK) 
IPS – Industrial and Provident Society 
KME – Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering Company 
LLP – Limited Liability Partnership 
LME – Liberal Market Economy 
LMF – Labour Managed Firm 
MCC - Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa 
SCOP – Sociétés Coopératives et Participative [French Co-operative Organisation] 
SRL – Synthetic Resins 
WMF – Worker Managed Firm 
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